Τετάρτη 30 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Special Ops Wants Commandos to Have Invisible Faces

Special ops commandos are already the savviest, most covert of all soldiers: They fly in stealth helicopters, wear high-tech camo suits and use nothing but the best face paint Pentagon cash can buy. But they’ve still got weak points. Most importantly, their own body heat and even the swiftest of movements can give them away.
That’ll change if U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) gets its way. The agency in April announced that “invisibility” equipment for commandos was one of their top priorities. Already, commandos have uniforms that can block most of the heat they emit. But as SOCOM notes in their latest round of small-business solicitations, they’ve gotta be able to “breathe, see and hear,” making it tough to keep their faces concealed from sensors. Now, SOCOM is asking for proposals that’d “reduce the warfighter’s facial signature” in marine environments, to minimize their risk of heat-based detection by infrared sensors or motion-based spotting via electro-optical surveillance.
Sounds crazy, but they just might have a shot.  In 2008, the Army Military Research Office boasted that they were a mere two or three years away from developing metamaterials that could deflect light to conceal a given object. Since then, experts at various institutions have made impressive progress. Researchers from the University of Texas at Dallas have shown off an invisibility cloak that harnesses the “mirage effect,” defense company BAE Systems has developed a system that renders vehicles invisible to the entire infrared spectrum and physicists from St. Andrews University broke new ground with a meta-material that comes even closer to all-out undetectability.
SOCOM wants prototypes to zero in on what scientists already know about creating undetectability: The University of Texas’ device works best in water, for example, while metamaterials are optimal at night. So SOCOM’s after just those attributes: Something that works in aquatic scenarios, including open ocean, surf or on the beach, and is effective in various nighttime lighting conditions. The prototype should also work year-round, in freezing or scorching temps.
And if commandos are gonna make it ashore, a successful prototype will need to be nearly as discreet as they are. The solicitation notes that “an operator’s ability to swim” is a top consideration in the finished product’s design.

Τρίτη 29 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Son Tay Raid Veteran Mentors MISO Soldiers


About two dozen Soldiers listen quietly, the silence only broken occasionally by the sound of laughter as retired Command Sgt. Maj. Joseph Lupyak relays his stories of service in Korea and Vietnam.

Many of the stories that Lupyak relayed to the Soldiers came from his past, including the events surrounding the Son Tay raid in 1970 in which Special Forces were sent in to rescue 65 American prisoners of war.

Though the story topics changed throughout the meeting, the theme stayed the same: psychological operations are an important and integral part of special operations.

Lupyak, who works in the Training Development Division at U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, joined the Army in 1951 at the age of 19 and was sent to the Republic of South Korea to fight in the Korean War. It was there as a member of the 3rd Infantry Division, he received his for taste of psychological operations on the battlefield when, on his first day, the North Koreans using loudspeakers said, “Welcome back Charlie Company, 15th Infantry Regiment.”

“They already knew we were there even though we had come up another hill that night in the darkness,” Lupyak said. “The enemy was only about 300 meters away and they knew who we were and the name of our company commander.”

The American forces were also using psychological operations on the North Koreans. Leaflets had been produced saying that if the enemy gave themselves up they would be treated well.

“You'd be surprised at the number of prisoners we got through those leaflets,” he said.

He told one story of a Soldier who screamed because three Chinese Soldiers had walked up to his foxhole while he was asleep. The Chinese Soldiers were lucky they did not get shot, but they did successfully turn themselves in.

When he returned from Korea, Lupyak left the Army but came back after less than one day of working in the coal mines in his home state of Pennsylvania. He completed refresher training and joined the 77th Special Forces Group (renamed 7th SFG in 1960).

As a master sergeant, Lupyak was selected to go on the Son Tay raid. He described it as “one of the biggest psychological operations that was ever pulled off.”

The raiding party trained at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., with a camp built that was identical to the Son Tay layout. Lupyak said they rehearsed the raid more than 500 times.

He recalled that there was a subtle form of “psyop” used after their departure from Florida, as a group of Soldiers were left at the base to continue rehearsal as a decoy force similar to that used by the Allies on D-Day.

Before the raid, as there was a bombing moratorium on North Vietnam, U.S. Navy ships bombarded the east coast of North Vietnam with blanks and flares to give the impression of bombs, providing a diversion from the path of infiltration by the American helicopters.

“They thought they were being invaded by the United States," said Lupyak, "so their radar was turned toward the coast. We flew in and never had a shot fired at us.”

The full benefits of this operation were not appreciated until 1973 when Lupyak and other Raiders met with prisoners of war who had been released after the war. They met in San Francisco, Calif. and the prisoners were extremely grateful for the effort to save them.

They said that as a result of the raid the North Vietnamese immediately "took all the prisoners from the outlying camps and took them to the Hanoi Hilton," said Lupyak. They said they also received better medical treatment and better food.

Lupyak also said that the raid resulted in the Chinese pulling out their support of North Vietnam and was therefore "the biggest psychological effect on the war." The prisoners said they could have stayed another 10 years in the camps because they knew that the Americans would not forget them.

Lupyak was later assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (A) as the group command sergeant major but he said that, "every place we went, we took ‘psyop’ people with us…" but it is up to you young Soldiers to carry on and psych out the enemy.

He retired from the Army at Fort Bragg in 1980.

Lt. Col. James Hickman, 6th Battalion Commander, thanked Lupyak for talking to the young Soldiers of MISO and "reaffirming my belief in the lineage of what we do."
 

Δευτέρα 28 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Can the Turkish state win the war against the PKK?


Turkey has been fighting against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism for the last 30 years. Expectedly, this long-lasting fight has produced its own clichéd arguments, too. Without analyzing the major transformations of the sides involved, and political factors, Turkish intellectuals in the mainstream media, especially liberals with leftist backgrounds, have been circulating these clichés.

The first argument is the following: “The last 30 years have proved that neither the PKK nor the state can win this war.”

Wining the war here refers to militarily defeating the PKK, not removing the problems that cause the unrest among Kurds. In fact, it is true that the state could not win this war, basically because it did not want to win it. And there are a number of reasons why. First, the state did not want to implement democratic reforms or give basic rights to the Kurds, thus, it withheld the rights of the Kurds by using the PKK as a good excuse. In a way, the very existence of the PKK helped the state to push back Kurdish demands. The state, by maintaining the PKK risk at a level that did not pose a national security threat, postponed the democratization process.

Second, the state, by using the PKK as an excuse, kept the Kurds in northern Iraq under pressure to maintain its interests and military presence there. Whenever the Turkish state thought the PKK was developing more than expected, Turkey conducted massive operations to curb its expansion. One can find many examples of this.

The following question will further highlight the state's stance: When the PKK declared a cease-fire between 1999 and 2004 and withdraw its units to outside of the country, why didn't the state implement democratic reforms for Kurds, especially when it was shuffling its system to become a member of the EU? The answer is simple. The state never considered the PKK as a major threat to its national interests; it always used the terrorist organization as an excuse for its domestic policies and international interests.

Third, the political rivalry in Ankara between the military and the civilians was another reason why the military did not want to win this war. It was one of the reasons for the military to use the PKK as an excuse to maintain its influence over the government.

Fourth, 20 years ago, the military technology that is available today was not available to win the war without serious losses. Now, however, with the smart bombs and drone technology, the state has an enormous advantage helping it to find and kill PKK militants in deep valleys.

The PKK leadership misread this long-lasting strategy of the Turkish state and thought that the state would never defeat the PKK. In particular, the hard-liners in the PKK thought the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and the Turkish state were at their weakest point, and with the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) network the PKK was at its strongest. Therefore, the PKK thought it could win the war against the state if it launched a war that triggered a public revolution.

Yet it failed, because the state's policies toward northern Iraq and domestic politics as well as its perspective towards Kurds have changed. The state no longer considers granting democratic rights as a danger to its national unity. Instead, the state thinks that the existence of the PKK, with its deeply penetrated network among Kurds, is a threat to the Turkish state. Therefore, it has decided to remove the PKK from the face of the earth and it is likely now that the state will win this war.
 

Κυριακή 27 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Colombia’s FARC rebels have named Timoleon Jimenez as their new leader

Colombia‘s FARC rebels have named Timoleon Jimenez as their new leader after the group’s previous head was killed in a Colombian militaryoperation earlier this month.

In a statement  from the FARC, or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the group said it had designated 52-year-old Jimenez as its new chief on November 5, a day after his predecessorAlfonso Cano was killed while trying to break out of a military cordon in southwestern Colombia.

“We want to inform you that Comrade Timoleon Jimenez, with a unanimous vote by his companions in the secretariat, was designated on November 5 as the new commander of the FARC,” said the statement published on the Bolivarian Press Agency website, a site that often carries messages from the rebels.

The US government has offered a $5m reward for Jimenez, known as Timochenko, and Colombia’s government is offering another $2.6m for his capture.

Jimenez is the nom de guerre of Rodrigo Londono, who was born in the village of Calarca in western Colombia. He is one of the least visible rebel commanders.

One of his most recent appearances was in a May 2008 video confirming the death of FARC leader Manuel Marulanda.
Jimenez has been a member of the FARC’s seven-man ruling secretariat since the 1980s, making him the longest-serving member, according to Carlos Lozano, an analyst for the Communist Party weekly Voz.

Blows to leadership

The rebels’ leadership has suffered a series of blows beginning in March 2008, when the FARC’s foreign minister, Raul Reyes, was killed in a bombing raid on a rebel camp across the border in Ecuador.

That raid yielded authorities a treasure trove of information from computers and digital storage.

That same month, the FARC’s co-founder, Marulanda, died in a mountain hideout of a heart attack. Cano, the rebels’ chief ideologist, was named to succeed him.

And in July 2008, commandos posing as international aid workers rescued former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, three US military contractors and 11 others in an elaborate and bloodless ruse.

Still, the FARC has been regrouping in recent months, and is believed to have about 9,000 fighters within a disciplined military hierarchy.
 

Παρασκευή 25 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Ο Γοργοπόταμος

Ταινία του '68! Αναφέρεται στα μαύρα χρόνια της κατοχής, στην αντίσταση και στο εγχείρημα της καταστροφής της γέφυρας του Γοργοποτάμου

Στην ταινία εμφανίζεται και ο Θάνος Μαρτίνος, ένας Έλληνας κομάντος που συμμετείχε στο βρετανικό καταδρομικό απόσπασμα, το οποίο έπεσε με αλεξίπτωτο στην Ελλάδα και συνεργάσθηκε με τους αντάρτες για την καταστροφή της γέφυρας.






Η επιχείρηση στον Γοργοπόταμο



Τη νύχτα της 25ης Νοεμβρίου 1942 μια φοβερή έκρηξη σε μια ήσυχη κοιλάδα της κεντρικής Ελλάδας έκοψε στη μέση την οδογέφυρα του Γοργοποτάμου, απ’ όπου περνούσε η σιδηροδρομική γραμμή που συνέδεε την Αθήνα με τον Βορρά. Τα εκρηκτικά τοποθέτησαν και πυροδότησαν Βρετανοί σαμποτέρ αφού προηγουμένως η από κοινού δράση ανταρτών του ΕΛΑΣ και του ΕΔΕΣ εξουδετέρωσε την ιταλική φρουρά.

Η σιδηροδρομική γραμμή βγήκε εκτός λειτουργίας για αρκετές εβδομάδες, προκαλώντας έλλειψη καυσίμων και διακοπές ρεύματος στην Αθήνα. Η κορυφαία αυτή πράξη της ελληνικής αντίστασης έκανε φανερή την ευάλωτη θέση του Αξονα στην Ελλάδα, η οποία εξαρτάτο από μια λεπτή λωρίδα σιδηροδρόμου και αυτοκινητοδρόμου, που κατέβαινε σαν φίδι κατά μήκος της ανατολικής ακτής της χώρας.
Η επιχείρηση είχε σχεδιαστεί και καθοδηγηθεί από Βρετανούς στρατιωτικούς, μέλη του SOE (Special Operations Executive) – του Εκτελεστικού Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων. Η αποστολή τους, που είχε την κωδική ονομασία Χάρλινγκ, ήταν να ανατινάξουν τη γέφυρα για να σταματήσει ο ανεφοδιασμός των δυνάμεων του Αξονα στη Βόρεια Αφρική. Κατόπιν, θα έφευγαν από την Ελλάδα. Ωστόσο, η Βρετανική Στρατιωτική Αποστολή έμελλε να παραμείνει έως το τέλος του πολέμου και να παίξει έναν αμφισβητούμενο ρόλο στην πολιτική του αντιστασιακού κινήματος. Οσο για τους αντάρτες του ΕΛΑΣ και του ΕΔΕΣ, την επιτυχία στον Γοργοπόταμο θα ακολουθούσε η μεταξύ τους σύγκρουση.
Το σαμποτάζ σχεδίασαν και οργάνωσαν Βρετανοί στρατιωτικοί, Του Θαναση Kαλλιανιωτη
Η ανατίναξη της γέφυρας του Γοργοποτάμου τη νύχτα της 25ης Νοεμβρίου 1942 δεν ήταν το μοναδικό στην Ελλάδα γεγονός όπου συνεργάστηκαν διάφορες μεταξύ τους παρατάξεις, ο ΕΔΕΣ και το ΕΑΜ εν προκειμένω, αφού τρεις μήνες αργότερα, στο οροπέδιο Φαρδύκαμπος της Σιάτιστας αντάρτες του αριστερού ΕΛΑΣ και συνάδελφοί τους εθνικιστές της ΥΒΕ/ΕΚΑ αιχμαλώτισαν ένα ολόκληρο τάγμα Ιταλών. Χωρίς το πρώτο είναι απίθανο να υπήρχε το δεύτερο κι αμφότερες οι επιτυχίες διέθεταν κοινό παρονομαστή, έναν αμέσως επακολουθήσαντα ενδοελληνικό σπαραγμό.
Είναι φανερό πως η διαφοροποίηση ανάγεται στον «ανάδοχο»: στον Φαρδύκαμπο δεν υπήρχε κανείς, ενώ ο Γοργοπόταμος σχεδιάστηκε, οργανώθηκε και κατά ένα μέρος εκτελέστηκε από Βρετανούς. Χωρίς την παρουσία τους όχι μόνον δεν θα λάβαινε χώρα η καταστροφή της γέφυρας, αλλά η μετέπειτα σημαντική ένοπλη αντίσταση εναντίον των τριών κατακτητών δύσκολα θα ξεπερνούσε στην ύπαιθρο το στάδιο των ασύνδετων ανταρτοομάδων, εκ των οποίων ελάχιστες θα ασχολούνταν με μαζικές επιθέσεις εναντίον των κατακτητών. Ισχυρή ένδειξη των ειρημένων αποτελεί η ενιαύσια βαθιά παρανομία, διάβαζε διάλυση, από Γερμανούς και Βουλγάρους των ενόπλων ελληνικών σχηματισμών κατά τη φθινοπωρινή εξέγερση του 1941 στη Μακεδονία.
Διττής, όχι όμως και ισομερούς, φύσεως ήταν η πτώση των Βρετανών στην Kεντρική Ελλάδα τέλη Σεπτεμβρίου του 1942, όπως φαίνεται από τους επικεφαλής τους. Ο αρχηγός της Αποστολής, αντισυνταγματάρχης Μηχανικού Εντμουντ Μάγιερς, εξέφραζε το στρατιωτικό μέρος, σύμφωνα με το οποίο επειγόταν η διακοπή των γερμανικών ενισχύσεων από την Ευρώπη στη Βόρεια Αφρική μέσω των ελληνικών σιδηροδρόμων. Εκτός από τις ειδικές του γνώσεις για την καταστροφή της γέφυρας, η ένστολη παρουσία του ήταν απαραίτητη για την έλξη σε ένα σώμα των κεχωρισμένων Ελλήνων ανταρτών.
Στον υποδιοικητή της Βρετανικής Αποστολής, έφεδρο ταγματάρχη Πυροβολικού Κρίστοφερ Γούντχαουζ, έναν πανέξυπνο, ελληνομαθή και ωκύποδα (προσόν άριστο για την περίσταση) νεαρό αφέθηκε το πολιτικό σκέλος της υποθέσεως. Καθώς ο Κρις, όπως ήταν το παρωνύμιό του, επρόκειτο να παραμείνει στην Ελλάδα, ενώ ο αρχηγός του να επιστρέψει στο Κάιρο, φαίνεται πως το σαμποτάζ βάραινε ολιγότερο από την επιτόπια αναγνώριση του πεδίου και την εν καιρώ διαχείριση των ιδιαιτεροτήτων του.
Η παρουσία των Βρετανών ήταν αναγκαία, αφού περίσσευαν οι θολές αναγνώσεις για την κατάσταση στην Ελλάδα, τουλάχιστον λόγω της μυστικότητας και της απόστασης μεταξύ του χωριού και της πόλης. Ετσι, οι πληροφορίες που ξεκινούσαν από την ύπαιθρο έφθαναν με βραδύτητα στην Αθήνα όπου υπήρχε συμμαχικός πομπός ασυρμάτου για να μεταδοθούν στη Μέση Ανατολή. Ηταν αδύνατον λοιπόν να εξακριβωθεί εξ αποστάσεως τι ίσχυε και τι όχι στον κόσμο των ελληνικών βουνών, παραδείγματος χάριν ο πραγματικός αριθμός των ανταρτών, το ποιόν, οι σκοποί ή οι αρχηγοί τους. Ετσι, γραφικοί κλέφτες διαφημίζονταν ως πραγματικοί αγωνιστές, ενώ κάτω από ηχηρά ψευδώνυμα κρύβονταν ποικίλων ειδών άνδρες. Ελάχιστοι π. χ. γνώριζαν ότι ο «ταγματάρχης Πυροβολικού Αρης Βελουχιώτης» ήταν στην πραγματικότητα απόστρατος δεκανέας κι ασήμαντος έως τότε στο Πανελλήνιο δηλωσίας κομμουνιστής, ενώ οι περισσότεροι αγνοούσαν ότι ηνίοχος του ΕΑΜ, στις δέλτους του οποίου δρούσε ο ρηθείς, ήταν το ΚΚΕ.
Κριτήριο για την επιλογή του τόπου προσεδάφισης αποτέλεσε η γεωγραφία. Ετσι, παρ’ όλο που στον Ολυμπο δρούσαν ένοπλοι Ελληνες από την άνοιξη ήδη του 1942, προτιμήθηκε η Στερεά Ελλάδα, επειδή εκεί έστεκαν οι στόχοι, τρεις τεράστιες γέφυρες – τα Τέμπη δεν προσφέρονταν κι επιπροσθέτως βρίσκονταν πολύ μακριά από την Αθήνα. Για την καταστροφή των γεφυρών χρειάζονταν δεκάδες αντάρτες, αλλά οι μόνοι βέβαιοι για τη συμμετοχή τους ήταν όσοι δρούσαν υπό τις διαταγές του απότακτου συνταγματάρχη Ναπολέοντος Ζέρβα, γνωστού στους συμμάχους, αφού ήδη είχε λάβει σημαντική οικονομική στήριξη για τη δημιουργία ανοιχτού αντάρτικου. Στην τεράστια σωματική (και ψυχική) αντοχή του υποδιοικητή Κρις οφείλεται εν πολλοίς η εύρεση και σύνδεση του μακρινού ΕΔΕΣ με τους Βρετανούς δολιοφθορείς στην Γκιώνα.
Την πτώση των αλεξιπτωτιστών έμαθαν αμέσως οι Ιταλοί, γι’ αυτό και κίνησαν δυνάμεις εξεύρεσής τους. Καθώς οι συνδέσεις καθυστερούσαν, διαμορφώθηκε η αντίληψη ότι την αγνοούσε ο ΕΛΑΣ της περιοχής, παρ’ όλο που το γεγονός, εξέχον στην τοπική Iστορία, διαδόθηκε προφανώς αστραπιαία. Με παρόμοια ταχύτητα εικάζεται πως είχε εξαπλωθεί και η φήμη ότι οι Βρετανοί αγόραζαν με λίρες σφάγια και τρόφιμα για την επιβίωσή τους χωρίς να τα κατάσχουν.

Ο ΕΔΕΣ και ο ΕΛΑΣ έδρασαν από κοινού
Η εμφάνιση του ΕΛΑΣ στη σκηνή συνέπεσε με την άφιξη των ανταρτών του Ναπολέοντος Ζέρβα στο πεδίο, με τους τελευταίους αποφασισμένους να λάβουν μέρος αμέσως στην ανατίναξη. Ο ΕΔΕΣ θα έδρεπε τη δόξα του εγχειρήματος και αφειδή συμμαχική στήριξη σε περίπτωση αχειρίας του ΕΛΑΣ, κάτι όχι εντελώς απίθανο, αφού λόγω της αυστηρής πολιτικής δομής του τελευταίου ήταν φυσικό να αναμένεται έγκριση συμμετοχής από ανώτερα κλιμάκια. Καθώς όμως επρόκειτο για εγχείρημα στην περιοχή του ΕΛΑΣ, η απουσία του πιθανότατα θα κατέληγε στον λήθαργο, αν όχι τη διάλυση των μονάδων του, αφού κανένας από τους απλούς αντάρτες δεν θα την εκλάμβανε ως ορθή.
Τελικώς επιλέχτηκε ως στόχος η γέφυρα του Γοργοποτάμου και ύστερα από αναγνωρίσεις το τριμερές σχέδιο καταστροφής της είχε ως εξής:
α) τοποθέτηση και εμπύρευση εκρηκτικών στη βάση των μεταλλικών στηριγμάτων
β) απασχόληση ή εκμηδένιση της εκατέρωθεν ιταλικής φρουράς
γ) απαγόρευση άφιξης ενισχύσεων και διακοπή επικοινωνιών
Για το πρώτο μέρος η τεχνογνωσία αρκούσε, αφού εκτός του Μάγιερς υπήρχαν και άλλοι Βρετανοί αξιωματικοί έμπειροι των εκρηκτικών. Η εκτέλεση των υπολοίπων δύο μερών προϋπέθετε ορθή κατανομή όπλων, κυρίως αυτομάτων στεν, και πυρομαχικών, ιδίως χειροβομβίδων μιλς, αφού ο εχθρός είχε οχυρωθεί, σωστό διαμοιρασμό ανταρτών και αυστηρή τήρηση χρονοδιαγράμματος μέσα στη χειμωνιάτικη δυσχωρία, λογικές σχέσεις στις οποίες διακρίνονταν οι Βρετανοί, ιδιαίτερα ο Κρις.
Η αρχηγία της επιχείρησης αφέθηκε στον (απότακτο) συνταγματάρχη Ζέρβα ως ανώτερο στον βαθμό από όλους τους παρευρισκομένους, γι’ αυτό αργότερα αυτόν επικήρυξαν οι Ιταλοί. Την καταβολή του νοτίου βάθρου της γέφυρας όπου οι Ιταλοί ήταν πολυπληθέστεροι ανέλαβε ο βαθμοφόρος του ΕΔΕΣ Μιχαήλ Μυριδάκης, λόγω της έλλειψης αξιωματικών στον ΕΛΑΣ παρά εξαιτίας του εντυπωσιακού παραστήματός του. Ο Αρης Βελουχιώτης δεν προσφέρθηκε ως υποψήφιος, πρώτον διότι ήταν πλασματικός «ταγματάρχης», κι έπειτα επειδή φοβόταν να μην αποκαλυφθούν τόσο ο πραγματικός στρατιωτικός βαθμός του όσο και το ονοματεπώνυμό του. Συμμετείχε όμως στο επιτελείο της επιχείρησης και ήταν χρήσιμος για να προσδίδει τόλμη στους άνδρες του, κάτι που ήδη το είχαν αποδείξει.
Αρτια λοιπόν οργανωμένη η επιχείρηση ήταν αφύσικο να μην επιτύχει. Οταν αντάρτες και Βρετανοί αποσύρθηκαν ευτυχείς από το πεδίο, ο Ζέρβας επέστρεψε στην περιοχή του Βάλτου από όπου είχε εξορμήσει. Για τη συμμετοχή οι Βρετανοί προσφέρθηκαν να δώσουν παράσημα και χρήματα τόσο στον Ζέρβα όσο και στον Βελουχιώτη, αλλά ο τελευταίος ενώ αρνήθηκε το πρώτο, αποδέχτηκε το δεύτερο, ήτοι 250 χρυσές λίρες μετρητοίς τον Νοέμβριο κι άλλες τόσες έναν μήνα μετά. Η οικονομική εξάρτηση του ΕΛΑΣ από τους Βρετανούς είχε αρχίσει.
Ολίγες ημέρες αργότερα βαδίζοντας στα ίχνη του Κρις ο ΕΛΑΣ, ενισχυμένος με δύο νέους εξ Αθηνών καθοδηγητές, ανταπέδωσε την επίσκεψη των ανταρτών του ΕΔΕΣ με μια κύρια όμως διαφορά: ο Ζέρβας είχε προσέλθει αδελφικώς για την επιτυχία ενός κοινού σκοπού, ενώ η εισόρμηση του Αρη σκόπευε στην εξάρθρωση του ΕΔΕΣ. Επειτα από τη μεσίτευση του Κρις προς στιγμήν μόνον κατευνάστηκε η έμφυλη σύγκρουση. Η γέφυρα που είχε ενώσει τους αντάρτες είχε τελικώς καταστραφεί.
* Ο κ. Θανάσης Καλλιανιώτης είναι ιστορικός, δρ Ιστορίας ΑΠΘ. Αναδημοσίευση από την Καθημερινή της Κυριακής της 10/10/2010

Τρίτη 22 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Our War: The Invisible Enemy


As a former U.S. Marine currently serving in the U.S. Army, I found this doc to be an eye opener.

Chronicling the exploits of the Grenadier Guards, 1st Royal Irish, and the infamous Coldstream Guards as captured by the Soldiers themselves, the footage shot by these men was only recently declassified by the MoD. It has since been compiled to tell their story via a BBC documentary series titled "Our War".

Watch. Reel. Learn. Dedicated to us, the International Security Assistance Force, and those who did not make it home.




Δευτέρα 21 Νοεμβρίου 2011

See the special forces rifle 30 rounds rapid-fire one hundred meters just 11 seconds eyesight

 
 
Οn the 60th anniversary of the parade, one God is the eagle, the sea like a dragon, into the earth like the Tigers will play the mysterious side goose through Tiananmen Square, the first kicked, this is – special forces team.
 
 
 
Special forces “special” Where? “Brave Heart and loyalty to the pride, but myself domineering, vigorous vitality, fearless courage, daring Ganpin the murderous.” Recently, the National Day parade square foot teams special forces team of correspondents uncover political commissar Zhao Zemin Colonel established nearly 20 years the team by the forces of mystery.

Reporters: special forces for all of us is still relatively unknown and mysterious, can brief you on?

Zhao Zemin: 1990 Gulf War, the Central Military Commission to determine the new era of strategic policy. In this context, the Chinese began to build special forces. Our special forces established during this period, he completed “Erna – surprise” international scout contest, national counter-terrorism exercise, the 2008 Beijing Olympic security support more than 90 other major tasks.
Simply, is the special forces special operations forces. Nature is the first special operations reconnaissance, after the war. In terms of special forces, this is not just the forces of combat reconnaissance reconnaissance, it also contains the basis for the decision-making organs of the head of reconnaissance.
 
Ago, we only occasionally in the news media and TV drama about some “clues” such as “out of the Amazon,” “shock troops.” These are special forces of the shadow of TV drama, but not entirely reflect the special forces. This year’s National Day parade, we will witness China’s special forces through the avalanche Tiananmen Square and enjoy the Chinese special forces, “Brave Heart loyal pride, but myself domineering, vigorous vitality, fearless courage, dare dare fight the murderous. “

Reporters: special forces established nearly 20 years, why the first National Day military parade in appearance?

Zhao Zemin: The special forces team to participate in the official capital of the National Day parade, marking the special forces officially debuted a new arms show in the world. In the people’s army, in relation to engineering, communications, artillery, armor and other arms, the special forces is the “little brother.” Although the formation of nearly 20 years, but in all branches of the military is one of the youngest branches of the military.

from 1949 to 1984 the previous parade, then have not the arms. 1999 National Day military parade in the capital, the force has been formed although nearly nine years, but is still in development and construction period, is a “tender” of arms. Now, after nearly 20 years of construction, the arms has matured, become the fist and the dagger in the PLA troops. Special Forces first appearance, the result of both developed special forces, but also the People’s Liberation Army to go crack troops, the inevitable result of continued reform and construction.

Reporter: What special forces in the way of the difficulties in training?

Zhao Zemin: a new generation of Special Forces training program clearly defined, special forces training for the selected training courses goose. Special forces training with special training program for officers and men of quality requirements are comprehensive. In step with the good, toeing the line in terms of training, arms, kicking goose is certainly not the advantage of special forces, training difficulties are obvious. Of course, our police on the ground good independent operations, able to jump in the air, can dive in the water, swim across the force where there is its overall quality, “not interlaced Hills”, naturally, can overcome the training problems.

Reporter: How do you overcome them?

Zhao Zemin: Commando action ACTION generally bend, bow legs, splayed feet forward, like a cat moving fast, the pace is very light. Even if the halt, the general is bent bow legs, ready to attack at any time to do. This position, both to narrow the target, to minimize the possibility of enemy attack to consider the impact at the same time there are good preparations.

training ground in the parade, looked up, chest, abdomen, legs straight, the basic requirements of the queue. In order to solve the hamstring problem, the soldiers tied up the leg training, sleep training before Junzi also continue to stand tied. In order to solve the bending problem, do not sleep at night pillow pillow.

special forces training is usually a Big World, ears, hunched over stacked step, light forward. However, the training station Junzi requirements parade moving, do not take the way of the upper body deformation, the lower body is not shaking. To this end, the soldiers in the standing, when the pull station Junzi line, so do not move slowly. In order to exercise the eyes, special forces teams in front of the queue side 45 degrees, a side of a small 3-meter red flag, to guide the eyes of all soldiers.

 
 
 
Soldiers training very hard, very seriously, and some soldiers still secretly practice after training. Recently, we strengthen the endurance training, each team member to go five kilometers every day goose, 10 kilometers in step, up to two 18 km. Tiananmen things from China Form 96 meters to be toeing the line when the parade passed. Training, a comprehensive training on the requirements of our soldiers kick 200 meters above the goose, so as to maintain the momentum of an avalanche, to stirring.

Reporter: What are our police party special skills of team members?

Zhao Zemin: it can be more ah. Li Hailong is an excellent sniper, 100 meters to play five cents coins, 200m to fight Apple, 300 m in diameter 15 cm plate to fight, 800m to fight simulated human targets … … shot. Is more powerful rifle 100 meters 30 rounds rapid fire, just 11 seconds, and eyesight. For the special forces in terms of combat only victory can not fail, only the first shot without a second gun.

Liangpeng Ju is an excellent driver powered aircraft, reconnaissance and experimental skills are very high, the air is not easy to attract people’s attention.

Mating Jie driving high, two meters high in a steel beam on the driver’s field car passed.

Mongolian soldiers sain map is Signal Corps, set up 5 km team wired only 23 minutes, climbing hand, fixed line just 38 seconds.

FAN Wenbo is a student at the school of computer science professional, is to study a master hacker attacks.

Reporter: Can you say a few special forces parade in the village team on interesting stories.

Zhao Zemin: through their doors, too, had a special forces Chuanchuang and basic skills. “Shua!” Look into it, “Shua!” Look went out again. The village is not allowed in the parade, but after the soldiers Chuanchuang. A Chuishi Ban to send a soldier to the meeting room of fruit, in order to fast, “shabu” what came from the windows, so guests surprised, I hastened to explain, to stop them do not.

last night put the film in 3-meter-high curtain of the rope used to hang off the other side the soldiers looking for the ladder team, and our special forces who fly rod, curtain rope tie hand put Well, the presence of others team members applauded. This little story quite a bit.

Reporters: Our special forces soldiers usually how is training?

Zhao Zemin: Special Forces is the whole training unit, common subjects after training, dedicated to the special training ground for professional training. The training is difficult, demanding, in strict accordance with rules and regulations at all levels to do, follow the rules and do, according to the laws of science do, training organized, scientific methods appropriate to ensure the safety of officers and men on the basis of increase in military technology. Of course, a full range of requirements for officers and men, our goal is to strive to become wise and brave commanders and combatants. According to tasks and requirements, soldiers often carry out table-top exercises simulation exercises, make-up reconnaissance training.

Reporter: What is your weapons?

Zhao Zemin: The current special forces equipment, can be said to set the whole army advanced weapons in one. Personal weapons and equipment, is based on the combat mission configuration. These weapons can complete a variety of special tasks, both shot through the throat silenced the enemy machine guns, sniper rifles, but also cut off the snakes and climbing tool necessary tools. Of course, the units are equipped with a variety of fast moving sport utility vehicle, the implementation of the various light and heavy weapons combat assault.

Reporter: In the absence of the war years would not “powerless” regret?

Zhao Zemin: We want to fight, but we want peace. The real value is in force to defend peace. We trained competent and skillful, good at combat ready, which is determined by the functional requirements of the armed forces, but also other diverse tasks to complete the basic conditions. This is the “battle can not play day, soldiers can not one day without practicing.” With high quality, both fighting, but also deterrence; deterrence is fighting, it can also inhibit the war. I think this is the “hero use of force” approach.
 

Κυριακή 20 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Latvian special forces to join Lithuanians in Afghanistan

Later this year, the Lithuanian Special Operations Task Group Aitvaras will be joined by a Latvian Special Operations Forces contingent in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in the south of Afghanistan upon completion of premission training, the National Defence Ministry said BC.

This will be the first time when the Lithuanian Special Operations Task Group Aitvaras incorporates contingent of another country.

The core of the joint unit is formed by the Lithuanian SOF personnel and will be given under command of a Lithuanian Special Operations Force officer.

"Lithuanian troops have been part of the NATO-led ISAF mission in the south of Afghanistan for four years now. Members of the Task Group Aitvaras have been recognised for their professionalism by the allies and as well as by the ISAF leadership. From now on the Latvian Special Forces contingent will join us. We have been cooperating with our neighbour Latvia in the field of defence since 1991 by participating in joint exercises, military projects. The outcomes of our interoperability and long year friendship will be now put on test in combat circumstances, "says the Lithuanian Armed Forces Commander Lt Gen Pocius.

"Special Operations Forces is one of the most complex military capabilities. I am pleased that we develop this capability together with our neighbours Lithuanians which confirms our professionalism, ability and willingness to cooperate by even more integrating Armed Forces from the Baltic States," emphasizes Latvian National Armed Forces Commander, Maj Gen Graube.

The decision to deploy a joint Lithuanian-Latvian Special Operations Forces unit as part of the Lithuanian Aitvaras to Afghanistan was made this August under a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding between Lithuanian Chief of Defence Lt Gen Arvydas Pocius and Latvian National Armed Forces Commander Maj Gen Raimonds Graube.

"The Memorandum of Understanding is an example of concrete and essential cooperation between the Baltic States as well as a significant contribution to strengthening and developing of common defence capabilities of the Baltic States and NATO," points out the Lithuanian Chief of Defence Gen Pocius. According to him, the ongoing bilateral cooperation is the most evident proof of confidence between the military of the both countries.

The Memorandum of Understanding which was signed in August earlier this year between the Lithuanian and Latvian Defence Ministries sets out the arrangements, general responsibilities, principles and procedures of the participation of the Latvian SOF contingent in ISAF as part of the Lithuanian SOF Task group Aitvaras.

This example of cooperation between the Lithuanian and Latvian SOF also serves to endorse agreements adopted by the Baltic defence ministers' meetings on seeking closer cooperation in defence sector and acting together thus ensuring visibility of joint activity and benefit of joint projects in solving security challenges and issues at global and regional level.
 
Personnel of the Lithuanian Special Operations Task Group Aitvaras have been a part of NATO ISAF operation in the south of Afghanistan since 2007. While on the mission the Task Group Aitvaras render military assistance to the Afghanistan military force, organise and conduct seminars and military training to the Afghanistan national police, and carry out other tasks.

Σάββατο 19 Νοεμβρίου 2011

Kenya's Special Forces



Little is known about them and their work. Within the Kenyan Defense Forces (Kenya Army, Kenya Air Force and Kenya Navy) establishment, their real work is not even spoken in whispers. Today we can reveal that it is the official government policy not to publicly acknowledge their work.
Their official name is Kenya Army Paratroopers. You will only see them during the national pass out parades. Within the army they are just known as the ‘green berets’ or the ‘paras’ thanks to their unique paratrooper wings insignia.
Ulinzi House (Kenya’s Department of Defense –DOD- headquarters) is shy to admit that the Kenya Army Paratroop Battalion is her premier and elite Special Forces unit. All of the records denoting their work and missions are classified.
The closest the public came to know their significance was during the abortive 1982 Coup plot against Kenya’s second president Daniel Moi’s administration by the Non-commissioned Officers of the Kenya Air Force (KAF). The Paras commandos and the Presidential Escort regiment of GSU’s Recce Company were the ones who escorted Moi back to Nairobi from the Rift Valley. The second time was during independent Kenya’s second transition. President Kibaki’s first Aide de Camp was an officer from the Paras.
Seeking for information on them is an uphill task. Former and current commandos who have served in the Paras battalion are extremely friendly and courteous but they reveal nothing about their work.
The much that DOD reveals is the vision, mission and role of this battalion. Nothing else. And these for a keen military watcher are quite telling.
Their mission is “to execute airborne operations in order to counter both external and internal threats.” This is closely followed by their vision which is to “have an airborne unit deeply rooted in professionalism and certain of its ability to fight, win land battles and execute airborne operations.”
However their real work comes out in their role which is summed up in one sentence “to conduct airborne operations and special operations in both conventional and unconventional warfare.” The key words here are their capability to conduct ‘conventional and unconventional warfare’.
Though for many years the Kenyan military have been ridiculed as too soft and combat shy rotting in the barracks at the expense of tax payers money, the veracity of these claims cannot be verified. Much of the information the Kenyan intelligence community has on the country’s possible threats and opportunities is obtained by the paras.
Interestingly while the entire battalion is a special operations and warfare brigade there exists within its ranks a mega secretive division referred to as “D Company 20 Paratrooper Commandos”. These are the cream of the army and its dare devil entity. In most of the world’s directories on Special Forces across the world, their listing appears in only a few. Actually the General Service Unit (GSU) of the Kenya Police is much more known that the ‘D’ Company. And this explains how secretive the Paras are. Apparently they thrive best in their covert nature.
The ‘D’ Company of the 20th Paratrooper Commandos are a complete replica of celebrated British crack unit the Special Air Service (SAS). Actually their training manuals are almost similar. The Kenyan paras are fashioned in the same lines as their British counterparts. Both simulated and actual training for the paras is conducted in Kenya and in UK, Israel and USA. The Kenyan paras train alongside their comrades in arms of the British Army’s SAS, Sayaret Matkal of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and US Rangers. A critical component of their training is ‘thinking like terrorists and would be assassins’. It is an involving process and life changing experience before one becomes a Para. Among their key strengths and competencies is fluency in multilingualism, counter and anti terrorism activities, urban, desert, mountain and bush combat. They can also operate heavy artillery and light infantry weaponry.
These are not all; the Paras are masters of disguise, deceit, sabotage and are well versed in special weapons, martial arts, pugilism and hand to hand battle. The Paras are also excellent intelligence operatives and form the cream of the largely unknown Military Intelligence Corps (MIC) and provide the bulk of staff manning the cadres at the surreptitious Kenya National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) and sometimes share critical HUMINT (human intelligence) and ELINT (Electronic intelligence) dossiers with the country’s supreme intelligence agency the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS). The most interesting bit about the Paras is that they are avid readers and keep track on the latest societal trends. Before embarking on any mission, the ‘green berets’ are briefed on all possible scenarios to expect and equipped for the same.
To adorn the ‘green beret’ paratrooper commando insignia is no easy task. Only the exceedingly intelligent make it. To be admitted to the paras is a tedious process with a higher security clearance and thorough vetting process undertaken to eliminate all possible doubts and compromise possibilities. Extreme physical and mental tests are carried out on would be candidates before they are admitted to the Paras. These are followed up by highly involving IQ tests.
Once one has been admitted to the Paras, the hardest and harshest training system ever subjected to a human being begins. It’s almost like torture and the drill sergeants know no other way other than the contents prescribed in training manuals. Personnel admitted in the Paras specialize in mountain warfare operations at high altitudes terrains and exposed to the tough skills of climbing and cold weather survival.
Other than mountain warfare they are also drilled in vehicle insertion techniques, motor vehicle maintenance and mechanics.
But the real nitty gritty of the paras is airborne warfare. Their training involves the ever risky airborne insertion from both fixed wing aircraft and choppers. To this end the paras not only rely on the army’s airborne unit the 50th Air Cavalry Battalion but also the Kenya Air Force.
Indeed high and low altitude parachute infiltration is the main credo of the ‘green berets’. The three main forms of parachute deep cover infiltration are must training for all personnel in the battalion. These are static line parachuting, high altitude low opening (HALO) and high altitude high opening (HAHO). Both HALO and HAHO drops and insertions are enormously dangerous and always run the risk of enemy detection and contact with ‘objective’.
All Paras are bound by the Official Secrets Act, small wonder they reveal nothing about themselves and confirm nothing even when confronted by facts. But while DOD may refute many of the facts of the paras Wikipedia the world’s online encyclopedia notes about them: “D Company of the 20 Parachute Company is the only sub unit in Kenya that performs high risk tasks such as Recce, ambushes, raids, and high risk infiltration on any task. Within the Company is a troop of 4+20 persons who perform the most dangerous duties of all.”
This is the much that the online chronicle reveals of this battalion which is headquartered in the Kenyan military town of Gilgil with outposts in several other military bases across the republic.
They are inconspicuous from others in the army. Their berets are green in colour. Unsentimental and hard-boiled commandos, well versed in all forms of warfare.
INSIDE THE GSU
Little is known about them.
The much that the general public knows about them is that they are the painful answer to civil disturbance and the quelling of riots by university students, unruly political mobs and communal skirmishes.
Tonnes of flak have been pummeled at them by human rights activists’ accusing them of gross human rights abuses. That notwithstanding they have also been blamed of high-handedness and excessive use of force when dealing with the general public. But perhaps their darkest hour came in 1975, when populist politician, JM Kariuki was assassinated. Media reports and witness accounts reveal that the then GSU Commandant Ben Gethi was the last person to be seen with JM alive.
This has been the public perception of the General Service Unit (GSU). Whom the press always refers to as “dreaded”. They are truly ‘terror’. The mere mention of the word GSU among many Kenyans normally sends shivers of fear and trepidation.
Just why are they feared? Is it because of their no-nonsense approach to civil disorder? Or their dispassionate adherence to their commands? This could be, but the reality is that the Kenyan and by extension the Eastern African public has never really known, let alone appreciates what the GSU is all about. A major reason why this is so is because, the Kenya government rarely comments on her activities and operations.
And today the secrets are out.
GSU is a specialized unit of the Kenya Police Service that is eternally on standby. Within the Kenya’s security establishment GSU’s real significance is a tightly kept secret. While few in Kenya know of the other side of the GSU, the certainty is that this unique outfit of the Kenya Police is actually acclaimed worldwide and listed in numerous almanacs of “Special Forces” among them the “Global Special Operations Forces Directory.” But even then very little is written or officially acknowledged about this division and her numerous exploits are virtually unknown to Kenyans.
Interestingly the GSU has been a subject that has attracted the interest of quite an array of scholars for some time now. Way back in 1992, the GSU was a theme that had intrigued security scholars in the continent. In his paper Civil-Military Relations in Post Independent Africa published in the South African Defense Review of 1992, Dr Simon Baynham fervently argued that “Kenya’s paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU),” was “built up by President Moi to break the monopoly of the regular armed services.”
This assertion came soon after Africa’s foremost scholar on military affairs Dr Samuel Decalo had contended that the GSU was “capable of defeating the entire army by itself.”
These two viewpoints by imminent scholars are indeed the pointer to what the GSU is all about. While the GSU has performed numerous proxy activities, and classified and unclassified operations both in Kenya and within the East, Central and Horn of Africa regions, it only acknowledges three of them. These are, the 1961 Zanzibar Uprising, where GSU were “for the first time deployed outside Kenya… to Zanzibar to quell civil disturbances that had claimed about 90 lives.” It took the GSU “only two days to restore normalcy.” The second operation that GSU admits is the 1963 – 1969 Secessionist Shifta War, which degenerated into a guerrilla war within Kenya’s Northern Frontier Districts. To this day the legend of the GSU is known across the NFD up to Mogadishu. The final one is the gallant role played by this regiment during the abortive 1982 Coup attempt orchestrated by renegade Kenya Air Force personnel and several activists. Though little light has been shed on the GSU and the 1982 Coup attempt, Professor Herb Howe in his paper “African Private Security” published in Conflict Trends gives a glimpse:
“Insecure rulers have parallel forces for several purposes. Firstly, they protect the ruler against domestic unrest, especially coup attempts: for example, Kenya’s GSU stopped the attempted takeover by the air force in 1982. Their well-armed presence supposedly lessens actual coup attempts.”
Investigations of GSU’s operations now reveal that unbeknown to the general public is the fact that GSU is not just a formation like any other within the Kenya Police Service. The GSU is a specific unit of commandos in the same leagues as the famed British Special Air Services (SAS), US’ Delta Force, France’s EPIGN and celebrated ultra secret Israeli commandos, the Sayeret Matkal, who rescued more than 100 Air France passengers in “Operation Thunderbolt” at Entebbe, Uganda. Put it simply, the ultimate war machines.
Though lately, the GSU has started recruiting women into its ranks, it has always been a male dominated squad, owing to the rigours undergone during training and work related demands. Of all her 13 commanders since inception none has been a woman and two of their chief commandos have risen to become Police Commissioners. The late Ben Gethi and the current chief Mathew Iteere.


It is instructive to note that immediately Major General Hussein Ali took over as Commissioner of Police, he deployed officers drawn from the GSU as Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPDs) and even into the crack criminal bursting squad of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) the “Flying Squad” across the republic, to stem the rising tide of crime that was slowly creeping into the country. The success rate is plain for all to see today small wonder Kenya was recently upgraded by the UN and granted “B” status in the same leagues as Vienna, Geneva and Rome. Whenever crime levels soar, the police always falls back on the GSU to contain emerging criminal trends.
According to the Kenya Police Service the general objectives of the GSU are “to deal with matters pertaining to internal security across the republic; to be a reserve force to deal with special operations and civil disorder and to be an operational force that is not intended for use of a permanent static nature.”
GSU’s beginnings date back in time. The creation of the GSU was mooted during Kenya’s independence struggle. Faced with heavy casualties within the British Army ranks, the colonial government sought to minimize her losses significantly and at the same time come up with a fighting unit that would achieve results. This is how the GSU was conceived, borne and specially nurtured and trained in 1948. At that time it was referred to as the Regular Police Reserve or the Emergency Company. Its scope of operations at that time involved curtailing the rapid expansion of Elijah Masinde’s Dini Ya Musambwa in Pokot counties in the expansive Rift Valley Province. However its main challenge was to deal with the highly advanced bush and non-conventional guerrilla war tactics of the Mau Mau freedom fighters.
Come 1953 and the “Emergency Company” became the GSU, a name retained to this day. This is a highly armed; hard-nosed trained and well equipped fighting force. Another surreptitious aspect of the GSU is that it is an all rounder fighting force, capable of waging war on all fronts, namely air, land and water. However GSU’s specialty is as it was originally intended; non conventional war in extreme conditions. GSU is a fighting unit well drilled in infiltration, subterfuge, intelligence, operating behind enemy lines, martial arts, air borne surveillance, amphibious engagement and anti terrorism.
In 1957, as the Mau Mau war was approaching its zenith, the GSU became a fully fledged formation, within the police establishment. Its first commandant who is credited with making it what it is today was Superintendent of Police (SP) S.G Thompson. By 1963, Africanisation of the top portfolios began and by 1967 all company and platoon commanders were black Kenyans.
Training of GSU recruits is a strenuous and back breaking regime of some 10 months at the GSU Training School (Embakassi), and the hardy GSU Field Training School, Magadi in the Rift Valley. Very few make it through the arduous training process. Only the toughest, bravest and the best survive. Actually, the GSU is not only structured in the same lines as the British famed Special Air Services (SAS) and the Special Boat Services (SBS), it is an exact replica of the two. The other notable exception is that the GSU and especially, the elite Ruiru based “Recce Company” is a combination of both with hybrid training from Tel Aviv, London and Washington. The Recce Company from where Presidential Guards are drawn, are not only trained in Kenya, but they also undergo extensive overseas training, at UK’s SAS and SBS facilities and further get drills with Israeli’s covert Sayeret Matkal. With units spread across the republic, GSU forces are self-contained, operate in the field and are provided with their personal equipment, transportation vehicles, and top-of the range communication systems. GSU commandos are experts in all manner of weapons, demolition, sabotage, evacuation, sniping, reconnaissance, surveillance, VIP Protection, bomb disposal, Counter terrorism, night combat, desert warfare, urban warfare, infiltration, mountain warfare, amphibious engagements and survival techniques in enemy territory.
Small wonder you see them at key security installations, like State Houses, Embassies and High Commissions and guarding ‘high value assets’ like visiting dignitaries (President Barak Obama when he visited Kenya as a senator, Hillary Clinton and presidents) and the De La Rue premises.
But perhaps the best kept secret of the GSU is that it only recruits the best. Brilliant intelligence operatives, marksmen, Information Technology wizards and highly motivated individuals are the stuff that straddles the various companies within the GSU fraternity. In some instances, the GSU sometimes loans her operatives to the intelligence services, for delicate and furtive clandestine operations. According to the South African based Security watch think tank the Institute of Security Studies (ISS):
“The GSU acts as the uniformed paramilitary cousin of the security and intelligence units. The GSU handles violent crime, outbreaks of communal violence, and demonstrations. Since 2003, the GSU also has had certain counterterrorism functions, including patrolling around Kenya’s international airports. The General Service Unit (GSU) is a mobile police force that is separately organized from the rest of the Kenya Police. It is a paramilitary police force used for the apprehension of dangerous, syndicated, or armed criminals. The GSU force is equipped with radio communication devices, radar, and computers.”
While the Country Studies Program of the US Library of Congress contends that the GSU is made up of “5,000 strong soldiers” and is equipped with “12 boats, an air wing of seven light, fixed-wing aircraft and three helicopters, and eight armored cars” the reality is that the strength of the GSU and her subsequent fire power, training methods and arsenal are tightly kept secrets only known to a few within the police establishment.
Surprisingly, unlike many other “Special Forces”, in the world which have chest-thumping mottos, the GSU’s one is the best known and humble Kenya Police motto, “Utumishi Kwa Wote” (Service to all). Sadly the nature of their work forbids much to be known about them, yet their zeal and specific operations over the years are tales of heroic exploits in harsh terrains.
In the current Kenyan military incursion into Somalia against Al Shabaab (said to have links with Al Qaeda) the paras and GSU commandos are in the frontlines, with Lieutenant Colonel John Maison Nkoimo (an army paratrooper) as commander of the Southern sector.