Δευτέρα 30 Απριλίου 2012

Marine Raiders


The Marine Raiders were elite units established by the United States Marine Corps during World War II to conduct amphibious light infantry warfare, particularly in landing in rubber boats and operating behind the lines. "Edson's" Raiders of 1st Marine Raiders Battalion and "Carlson's" Raiders of 2nd Marine Raiders Battalion are said to be the first United States special operations forces to form and see combat in World War II.

Four Raider battalions served operationally but all were disbanded on 8 January 1944 when the Corps made the doctrinal decision that the Raiders had out-lived their original mission. The changing nature of the war in the Pacific, with many large-scale amphibious assaults to come against well-defended islands, negated the requirements for small light units that could strike deep into enemy territory.

However, most combat operations saw the Raiders employed as regular infantry, and combined with the resentment within the rest of the Marines that the Raiders were an "elite force within an elite force", led to the eventual abandonment of the experiment.

On 1 February 1944 the 1st Raider Regiment was redesignated the 4th Marine Regiment, thus assuming the lineage of the regiment that had garrisoned Shanghai in the interwar years and fought so gallantly on Bataan and Corrigedor. The 1st, 3rd, and 4th Raider Battalions became respectively the 1st, 3rd, and 2nd Battalions of the 4th Marines. The 2nd Raider Battalion filled out the regimental weapons company. Personnel in the Raider Training Center transferred to the newly formed 5th Marine Division. Leavened with new men, the 4th Marines went on to earn additional distinctions in the assaults on Guam and Okinawa. At the close of the war, the regiment joined the occupation forces in Japan and participated in the release from POW compounds of the remaining members of the old 4th Marines.

Κυριακή 29 Απριλίου 2012

Advanced Sighting System





Military snipers may only get one chance to hit their target. The One Shot program seeks to enable snipers to accurately hit targets with the first round, under crosswind conditions, day or night, at the maximum effective range of the weapon.

To achieve this, the One Shot system provides a measured profile of downrange crosswind and range to target. This information is then used to compensate the bullet trajectory to offset crosswind effects and range-related bullet deviations, substantially increasing the probability of first-shot hit.

One Shot XG Phase represents the next-generation of the One Shot system. In previous phases, the program has conducted two development cycles through numerous field tests, government field test verifications and demonstrations to military services. The program should complete Phase 2E in June 2012, which will reduce system size, weight and power and extend the engagement range. The Phase 2E system will mount on a conventional spotting scope, and prototypes are expected to be available for field evaluation in mid-2012.

Because of interest expressed by services, One Shot XG is being initiated to create a significantly smaller “field-ready system” that can be “clipped-on” directly to the weapon, eliminating the need for a spotter/observer in future sniper operations.

This next-generation One Shot envisions a compact observation, measurement, and ballistic calculation system mountable on either the weapon or spotting scope. The system developed will measure all relevant physical phenomena that influence the ballistic trajectory and rapidly calculate and display the offset aim point and confidence metric in the shooter’s riflescope. The system will provide the ability to see the aim point on the target in either day or night to enable rapid target identification, weapon alignment, measurement of range to target and the crosswind profile. The XG system seeks to exploit new technologies to operate over a range of visibilities, atmospheric turbulence, scintillation and environmental conditions.

If successful, One Shot XG would lead to limited rate production with the military services taking on the requirement and acquisition role for future procurement

Σάββατο 28 Απριλίου 2012

M122A1 Tripod

The M192 is an improved-capability ground mount that replaces the M122A1 Tripod. The M192 is a compact and collapsible ground mount that reduces the Soldier’s combat load and improves Soldier mobility. At 11.5 pounds, the M192 features a lower profile and weighs approximately six pounds less than the M122A1 Tripod it replaced. 

The mount provides an integral traversing and elevation (T&E) mechanism that allows for quicker, more accurate target engagement and allows for onehanded operation. This T&E mechanism eliminates the user’s need for adaptors for separate machine gun pintles and T&E devices. 

Other features include a traverse limit stop, a built-in spent case deflector, and the ability to fold up into the spare barrel bag. The mount is constructed with corrosion-resistant materials.

Παρασκευή 27 Απριλίου 2012

Israel stepping up covert ops: defence chief


Israel's defence chief has confirmed his forces are carrying out increased special operations beyond the country's borders.

In an interview to be published on Wednesday to mark the eve of Israel's independence day, Lieutenant General Benny Gantz also says Israel is ready to attack Iran's nuclear sites if ordered to do so.

"We think that a nuclear Iran is a very bad thing, which the world needs to stop and which Israel needs to stop - and we are planning accordingly," he said.

"In principle, we are ready to act."

But General Gantz says that does not mean he is about to order the air force to strike.

He says 2012 will be a critical year in efforts to halt what Israel and much of the international community believe is an Iranian nuclear arms program.

The United States says it does not believe Iran has so far taken a decision to develop a nuclear weapon or that the time is right for military action, preferring to give international sanctions time to work.

But Israel, which sees a nuclear Iran as a threat to its existence, claims Tehran may be on the cusp of "breakout" capability - when it could quickly build a nuclear weapon - and it does not rule out staging a pre-emptive strike.

General Gantz said he had increased the number of covert Israeli operations in other countries, but gave no details.

"I do not think you will find a point in time where there is not something happening, somewhere in the world," he said.

"The threat level is also higher.

"I'm not taking the credit," he added.

"I'm just accelerating all those special operations."

Πέμπτη 26 Απριλίου 2012

Married special-operations troops feel strains of war



TAMPA - The top enlisted leader of America's most elite and secretive military forces stood with his wife before a classroom of senior commandos here to speak about war's destruction. Not on the battlefield -- but within the walls of their home.

"We're going to share some pretty ugly, personal stuff here today," Command Sgt. Maj. Chris Faris, 50, warns an audience of 30 special ops veterans, nearly all married men.

"This is the way not to make a marriage work," says Lisa Faris, 47, echoing her husband. "We succeeded in that. But let me tell you, there are ways to fix it if you try."

For the next two hours and 16 minutes recently at the Joint Special Operations University, the room full of commandos was a rapt audience for Lisa and Chris -- for years a member of the Army's highly secretive Delta Force and recipient of seven Bronze Stars, including one for valor. They outlined the near-collapse of their 22-year relationship.

"My gut tells me that our story probably rang true for most everybody in this room," Chris Faris says at the conclusion.

"The Chris and Lisa Show," as he labels it with grim humor, is part of a broad initiative by Adm. William McRaven, commander of U.S.Special Operations Command, to deal with mounting emotional strain on his 66,000-member force. Indeed, the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have pushed many troops to their limits, with a spillover effect in military families that can test relationships and often end them. Even as the war in Afghanistan winds down, special operations troops -- including Delta Force, Navy SEALs, Green Berets and Army Rangers-- are expected to continue playing a crucial role, fighting at a high tempo.

In a rare moment for a largely secretive military force of openly acknowledging a decade of war strain, the command allowed a reporter to sit in on the couple's candid presentation.

For more than a year, Chris Faris has talked to small groups of special operations troops about his marital struggles in an effort to help them deal with theirs. Only recently did he ask Lisa to lend her voice to the cause and invite servicemembers' spouses to these sessions.

McRaven says that Chris and Lisa Faris "are doing something very personal and powerful for our community -- they're sharing their story with everyone. Our servicemembers and spouses need to know that they are not alone with their challenges and problems."

Last year, Special Operations Command conducted a broad internal study of stress on its force. Hundreds of focus groups drew 7,000 troops and a thousand spouses at military locations around the world, and the findings were sobering: Many marriages had become lifeless unions in which couples stay together only because military spouses are too busy in combat zones to file for divorce.

Lisa speaks to this inertia at one point when she tells the audience about asking a therapist "how I could get the strength to find out what was wrong with me. And how I could get the strength to walk away from him."

When the session ended, troops in the room were bursting with questions. Citing their own marital struggles, they were eager to learn how to save a relationship -- a growing challenge in the military. Within the Army at large, for instance, divorce has risen by 25% since 2005, from 3.2% to 4%, according to Pentagon data. The national rate in 2009, the most recent year available in federal data, was 3.4%.

Chris and Lisa relayed painful lessons: how shutting down human feelings, a skill sharpened during intense combat, becomes a hazard at home; how years away at war robs a couple of the ability to listen, understand and simply like one another.

The deleterious effect of a long war, Chris says, "was insidious and it was slow and it crept into our lives."

He began fighting for his marriage in 2008 only after an 18-year-old daughter's simple admonition regarding the last time he was home for her Dec. 27 birthday.

"She goes, 'Dad, I was 10,' and she turned around and walked out of the room," Chris Faris says. "Every day that (has) passed, I realized I'm going to die with regrets."

Anger, and accepting death

Chris Faris was already a member of Delta Force when he met and quickly fell in love with Alicia Hill at a comedy club outside Fort Bragg, N.C., in 1990. She was equally smitten, and they married about four months later.

By October 1993, he and other Delta Force operators were fighting for their lives on the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, during the famed Black Hawk Down incident that left 19 Americans dead. What began as an incursion by U.S. forces to safeguard international efforts to end famine turned into a hunt for insurgent warlords, the focus of the mission that day.

Seeking refuge in an outhouse from a fusillade of fire, Faris remembers pain from the impact of a bullet that, while not penetrating body armor, caused internal bleeding. A crippling fear welled up, Faris says, and he fought to overcome it in two ways: He turned it into anger; and -- more consequentially -- he forced himself to accept his own death, bidding his wife and two young daughters farewell.

Faris says this helped him survive that day. But as Lisa tells the audience, the Chris that returned home from that fight was different.

"Something had died inside of him and he was there. But he wasn't there," Lisa says.

With all of the funerals for soldiers killed in Mogadishu, Lisa said she wanted to savor the husband who had come home to her: "He was like chocolate, and I just wanted to eat him." But he kept his emotional distance, she says, "separating himself" while readying for the next mission.

Those missions, some of them classified, continued through the 1990s. But there were still moments of happiness as their daughters grew up, Chris and Lisa say. Everything changed after 9/11.

From 2001 to 2011, he was at war a total of nearly six years. It was a period of advancement as he rose to senior non-commissioned officer for Delta Force by 2004; and, by 2008, to Joint Special Operations Command-- which overseas all classified operations such as Delta and SEAL Team 6, the commandos who killed Osama bin Laden last year.

Between war abroad and his leadership duties stateside, Faris was home during those years for no longer than two months at a time.

Detachment and rage

"Around 2006 is when she looked at me," Chris tells the audience, "and she said, 'It's too hard to try to reintegrate with you. ... Let's just live together as roommates."

Immersed in the heart of the war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan -- in a world where special operators went out every night to capture or kill al-Qaeda fighters -- Faris says his alienation from his family was nearly complete, as war consumed him.

"Now the killing starts and the wounding starts and the dying starts," Faris tells the audience.

During the worst of the fighting in Iraq, in 2006-07, elite special operations troops were being killed at rate of two every month. Faris was managing troops whose morale was becoming fragile. When he was home, he found himself studying his watch when he knew nightly missions were underway in Iraq. He dreaded phone calls bearing dire news from the front. And he would personally handle death notifications and the withering reaction of families in shock, witnessing "the most blood-curdling screams you'll ever hear," Faris says. "I'm coming home and I'm angry and I'm pensive and I'm tense."

At this moment of critical mass in his marriage, Faris says, he walked into the dining room where his wife and daughters were at the table discussing American Idol one evening, and he exploded: "Shut the (expletive) up. What is wrong with you? Have you no concept of what is important in the world? Do you know what's going on? The three of you disgust me."

Faris pauses in his telling of this, allowing the words sink in.

"It was a full-on rage," he adds finally. "And I felt completely justified."

'Walking away'

"When that happened," Lisa says, "we were so far gone. ... Any bit of drive that I had to make it work -- it was like he killed it."

To the world outside, they were this strong Army couple ministering to families in grief. At home, it was arguments, strained dinner conversation and simmering resentments.

From their home in Fayetteville, N.C., she had her own vision of the war. "I lost more friends. There were so many casualties from home. Not from death. But from (wives) just quitting. From (them) walking away from their situations because they just did not have the strength to do it anymore."

Lisa was also deciding secretly by 2006, she says, that the marriage was over -- something her husband said he never realized until they both began telling their stories this year.

It was the epiphany Chris had in 2008 -- triggered by his younger daughter's chastening remark about missed birthdays, and a long contemplative plane ride back to Afghanistan -- that began the turnaround. The next year, he came home pleading with his wife to begin marriage counseling.

"I'm on bended knee, 'Hey, I got it. I screwed up. This is the last chance. I love you,' " Chris says.

She was reluctant. They had attempted counseling without success. But this time, the counselor helped them see the walls they built between them, and the bricks began coming down.

"She actually gave us the desire to try," Lisa says.

A work in progress

"By no stretch of the imagination should you walk out of this room thinking that our marriage is fixed," Chris tells the troops. "It's not. We're still working at it. But the key is, we're committed to working at it."

This month, Chris and Lisa dissected their marriage again before Navy SEALs and their spouses in San Diego. This week, they are addressing audiences of Army elite troops and spouses in sessions at Fort Bragg. They will continue the presentations to reach as many special operations troops and their families as possible.

The message for their ongoing discussion is always the same.

"The commander and I are absolutely committed to preserving the force," Chris says.

The first step is seeking help, he says.

"All we need," Chris says, "is for you guys, without going into any detail at all, to simply raise your hand and say, 'Yes, my story is similar to Sgt. Maj. Faris' and Lisa's."

Τετάρτη 25 Απριλίου 2012

MARSOC Marines shift focus beyond Afghanistan



CPL. KYLE MCNALLY / MARINE CORPSA member of 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalion gives a "thumbs up" during parachute training. Operations with 3rd MSOB have spanned the globe, from the Arctic Circle to the Brazilian rainforest.
By Gina Cavallaro 

The boomerang rotations to Afghanistan that most Marine special operators have been on for years will soon shift as operations there shrink and the special operations community turns its attention to the rest of the globe.

For Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, the other-than-Afghanistan deployments have long been the purview of 3rd Marine Special Operations Battalion out of Camp Lejeune, N.C., whose critical skills operators quietly have gone about building foreign relationships and gaining military and cultural experience.

Except for sporadic support for the Afghanistan mission, 3rd MSOB’s operators have deployed in small teams to remote locations, without benefit of the established military logistics supply chains and mobility resources in Afghanistan.

Marines going to the war zone “are husbanded all the way to a point in Kabul, or wherever they’re going,” said 3rd MSOB commander Lt. Col. Darren Duke, whose battalion consists of about 350 troops. “Our guys are on a team level — a captain and 11 or 13 Marines and sailors, and that captain will take his small band of merry men and make his way to a small Pacific island or small base in the middle of the rainforest in Brazil.”

The teams’ deployments are training evolutions that fall under the Joint Combined Exchange Training program, or JCET, a U.S. Special Operations Command program in which special operations forces from each service component work and train overseas with foreign military forces, a traditional SOF mission.

It is more than likely that as things wind down in Afghanistan, greater numbers of operators from 2nd MSOB at Lejeune and 1st MSOB based at Camp Pendleton, Calif., will deploy in support of the JCET mission.

What that means for MARSOC is the growth of a deeper bench of operators and support personnel who understand the ways of the world’s military forces and the particularities of the way their countries do business.

“As our cultural immersion capacity increases, so will our reach,” said MARSOC spokesman Maj. Jeff Landis.

Operators assigned to 3rd MSOB have spent up to two months at a time in Brazil, the Philippines, Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, Thailand and Indonesia. Marines are teaching and learning.

The Philippines, for example, “is a wonderful opportunity for us to get out as amphibious creatures and practice our amphibious capabilities in terms of boats and working in and around the water,” Duke said.

Operators may deploy to an austere base in Africa, where the nearest military support facility is 3,000 miles away, or to a remote Pacific island with no airfield, forcing the team to move equipment and personnel via barges or boats.

The mission, Duke said, “matures our operators and our Marines who provide support.”

“It makes them more cosmopolitan in a military sense,” he added. “Somebody who’s traveled the world makes better decisions.”

Training for JCET deployments, Duke said, takes place in locations all over the country, and in some overseas locations, such as the Arctic Circle. Marine operators were there in 2010 to train with British and Norwegian forces.

To get them ready for that event, the Marines conducted survival training in Alaska.

“We wanted them to show up capable of integrating into combined forces, like the Brits and Norwegians who operate routinely in those locations,” Duke said.

Language and cultural understanding also is learned up front, with native role players who work with the Marines in the U.S. in anticipation of JCET deployments.

MARSOC recently sought to contract Tagalog speakers to act as role players in scenarios intended to simulate the Philippines. The training was to take place at Camp McCrady in Eastover, S.C.

“We give them training on the region and culture before they go,” Duke said, “When they get there, they are not starting from scratch.

Κυριακή 22 Απριλίου 2012

Competition In The Shadows

SOCOM (Special Operations Command) is being called on to do more in the next decade as U.S. military policy pulls back from large scale combat in favor of special operations. The SOCOM leadership, never known for shyness, has made it clear that if more is expected from SOCOM more resources will be needed. Recruiting additional operators (commandos, Special Forces, and other field specialists) is not an option because there are simply not a lot of people qualified to do this sort of demanding work. But what SOCOM can use more of is support (specialized aircraft, intelligence resources, and support specialists in general) and greater authority to commandeer local American resources when sent out to do something. This last proposal has caused unease among senior military commanders because for decades they have enjoyed a lot of autonomy when they were given a major geographic command (like CENTCOM). Now SOCOM wants the authority to grab what is needed to accomplish a mission (rather than negotiating, as is the current custom, and sometimes being turned down).

Then there are the problems with several intelligence agencies. Over the last three years SOCOM (Special Operations Command) and the CIA convinced Congress to allow the two organizations to merge some of their operations and share personnel and other resources. This is a process that started during World War II and, despite some political ups and downs, never completely stopped. By the time September 11, 2001, rolled around the CIA was routinely requesting Special Forces operators to work directly for them, a custom that goes back to the early days (1950s) of the U.S. Army Special Forces.

In the last decade SOCOM (which controls the Special Forces as well as U.S. Navy SEALs and U.S. Air Force special operations aircraft) increasingly found that they could compete with the CIA in producing quality intelligence. The Department of Defense now allows Special Forces troops to be trained for plain clothes and uniformed espionage work in foreign countries. The Special Forces have unofficially been doing this sort of thing for decades, sometimes at the request of the CIA. In 1986, the Special Forces even established an "intelligence operations" school to train a small number of Special Forces troops in the tradecraft of running espionage operations in a foreign country. In practical terms, this means recruiting locals to provide information and supervising these spies, agents, and informants.

By law the CIA controls all overseas espionage operations, and many senior CIA people are not happy with this SOCOM competition. Lower ranking CIA operatives are more open to cooperation. That's because the CIA and Special Forces were both founded by men who had served with the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) during World War II and the close relationship continued after the OSS veterans retired from their CIA and Special Forces careers. While senior CIA people tend to lose sight of this, the field operatives can still clearly see the advantages.

The army wants to more aggressively use Special Forces troops for espionage so that the "battlefield can be prepared" more quickly. This is seen as necessary in order to effectively run down fast moving terrorist organizations. Currently, the Special Forces depend on the CIA to do the espionage work in advance of Special Forces A-Teams arriving. In practice some Special Forces troops are often there, along with CIA personnel, doing the advance work of finding exactly who is who, what is where, and, in particular, who can be depended on to help American efforts. The CIA has not made a big stink about this Department of Defense effort, if only because the CIA is short of people and is still aggressively recruiting people for anti-terrorism operations. Besides, a prime source of new CIA agents has long been former or retired Special Forces operators. With the new espionage training Special Forces troops are getting the CIA will be able to hire these guys later and put them to work without having to train them in a lot of espionage techniques. SOCOM is also believed to be hiring retired CIA personnel to help run SOCOM intel operations.

SOCOM isn't the only ones thinking outside the box. In 1998, the CIA revived an organizational name they originally created in the early 1960s: the Special Operations Group. The original SOG (which eventually had its name changed to "Studies and Observation Group" for security reasons) used CIA personnel, Special Forces troops, and local tribesmen to run intelligence patrols into Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam during the early days of the Vietnam war. Actually, the CIA was doing this since the late 1950s. But once SOG was set up the CIA handed it over to the Special Forces but continued to run their own SOG missions in other parts of the world until bad publicity and Congressional hostility pretty much brought the organization to a halt in 1990.

As the Cold War ended the CIA was getting out of the daredevil field work business. The 1998 SOG was created to do what the original SOG did, go into hostile territory and get the information any way you can and do something with it. The new SOG had only a few hundred agents. Most of them are former military, with preference given to Special Forces, SEALs, Air Force paracommandos, and marines with interesting service records. Some of the SOGs are retired military, with at least twenty years of experience. The minimum requirement is five years military experience. The starting pay was about $50,000 a year and you had to get through a one year training course first.

But while the CIA was recruiting military people for field operations, the Department of Defense was setting up its own espionage service that duplicated a lot of what the CIA does. Part of this is driven by dissatisfaction with the inability of the CIA to provide the military with timely intelligence. These lapses have frequently come to light after the fact and the generals have not forgotten. When SOCOM was set up in the 1980s, a major capability it acquired was the thousands of Special Forces troops who spent several months to a year overseas working with foreign armies. This was always seen as an excellent way to collect quality intelligence and even the CIA depended on the Special Forces reports to keep current. This was one reason the CIA revived its SOG. While this growing duplication seems inefficient it also provides competition. If the president doesn't like what he's getting from the CIA he can ask SOCOM to take a look. This keeps everyone on their toes. Competition in the shadows, so to speak. The new law, if passed, would simply formally recognize a lot of the cooperation that has been going on for over half a century.

Σάββατο 21 Απριλίου 2012

Οι στρατηγικές επιλογές για ισχυρή αμυντική ικανότητα της Ελλάδας

Του Ανδρέα Γερολυμάτου

Στο μέσον της οικονομικής κρίσης και μιας κρίσιμης εκλογικής αναμέτρησης, οι προβληματισμοί για τις στρατηγικές επιλογές της Ελλάδας ίσως να μη συνιστούν προτεραιότητα. Ωστόσο, η εθνική ασφάλεια προέχει και δεν μπορούμε να την παραβλέψουμε. Αλλωστε, κάθε χρόνο το 4,8% του ελληνικού ΑΕΠ, 14 δισ. δολάρια, ξοδεύονται για αμυντικούς σκοπούς.

Στις Ενοπλες Δυνάμεις περιλαμβάνονται 116.000 άνδρες και γυναίκες του Στρατού, υποστηριζόμενοι από 1.723 άρματα μάχης. Στην Πολεμική Αεροπορία υπηρετούν 33.000 άνδρες και γυναίκες, με ενεργό στόλο 295 αεροσκαφών, η ραχοκοκαλιά του οποίου συνίσταται σε 156 μαχητικά-βομβαρδιστικά F-16 συν 44 Mirage 2000. Η ισχύς του Πολεμικού Ναυτικού εστιάζεται σε 14 φρεγάτες ανοικτής θαλάσσης. Χρειάζεται άραγε η Ελλάδα ποντοπόρα σκάφη ενώ αντιμετωπίζει πρωτίστως την τουρκική απειλή στο Αιγαίο; Μάλλον ναι, αν θέλουμε να είμαστε σε θέση να υπερασπισθούμε την Κύπρο. Για τον σκοπό αυτό θα μπορούσαν να χρησιμοποιηθούν μεγαλύτερες και ενδεχομένως λιγότερες ναυτικές μονάδες με ενισχυμένη δυνατότητα «αντιαεροπορικής άμυνας περιοχής».

Είτε μας αρέσει είτε όχι, η Ελλάδα επιβάλλεται να διαθέτει αμυντική ικανότητα και να είναι σε θέση να μετέχει στις αποστολές του ΝΑΤΟ. Οι Ελληνες λίγο ενδιαφέρονται γι' αυτές τις αποστολές, δεν βλέπουν να συντρέχει λόγος για περιπέτειες στο εξωτερικό. Τους διαφεύγει ότι η συλλογική άμυνα συνιστά τον πυρήνα του δόγματος της Ατλαντικής Συμμαχίας και παράλληλα το κλειδί της ελληνικής ασφάλειας.

Τον μείζονα κίνδυνο για την ελληνική ασφάλεια συνιστά η Τουρκία. Για τον λόγο αυτό, κύριο βραχίονα της ελληνικής άμυνας πρέπει να αποτελεί μια πολύ ισχυρή Αεροπορία. Αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι η ελληνική Πολεμική Αεροπορία οφείλει να διαθέτει αριθμητική ισοπαλία με τα 485 τουρκικά μαχητικά αεροπλάνα. Αλλά η Ελλάδα οφείλει να διαθέτει ικανό αριθμό σύγχρονων μαχητικών, ώστε να μπορεί να καταφέρει ισχυρό πλήγμα στις τουρκικές Ενοπλες Δυνάμεις και στη βιομηχανική υποδομή της Τουρκίας.

Εάν υποθέσουμε ότι ξεσπά ελληνοτουρκική σύρραξη, οι μάχες μάλλον θα περιορισθούν είτε σε κάποια νησιά του Αιγαίου και στη Θράκη είτε στην Κύπρο. Η συντριπτική τουρκική υπεροπλία (η Τουρκία διαθέτει 666.000 στρατό και παρατάσσει 3.759 άρματα μάχης) προδικάζει τουρκική επικράτηση σ' έναν τελειωτικό πόλεμο. Αλλά ακριβώς η ελληνική στρατηγική πρέπει να διασφαλίζει ότι θα πρόκειται για πύρρειο νίκη. Ενα ελληνικό στρατηγικό δόγμα που θα εστιάζει στην αποδιάρθρωση της τουρκικής βιομηχανίας μπορεί να λειτουργήσει ως ισχυρή αποτροπή. Η νεότευκτη τουρκική ευημερία εδράζεται στο βιομηχανικό της δυναμικό. Αν αυτό πληγεί, το οικονομικό θαύμα της Τουρκίας θ' αποτεφρωθεί.

Κατά συνέπεια, η Ελλάδα έχει ανάγκη από περισσότερα μαχητικά αεροπλάνα, πιο ολιγάριθμο Πολεμικό Ναυτικό, πολύ μεγαλύτερη ακτοφυλακή και επαγγελματικό στρατό βασισμένο σε 2-3 τεθωρακισμένες ταξιαρχίες και σε συστοιχίες πυραύλων εδάφους-εδάφους, καθώς και ποικίλες ειδικές δυνάμεις και τεχνικές μονάδες. Η υφιστάμενη ταξιαρχία αλεξιπτωτιστών και καταδρομέων που σήμερα αριθμεί περί τις 3.200-3.500 άνδρες, η Διοίκηση Υποβρυχίων Καταστροφών και το 31ο Σμήνος Ειδικών Αποστολών πρέπει να ενισχυθούν και να είναι διαθέσιμα για αποστολές του ΝΑΤΟ εκτός Ελλάδος. Αυτό θα επιτρέψει τη μεταμόρφωση της Ελλάδας σε ενεργό μέλος της Συμμαχίας, αντί της σημερινής παθητικής της συμμετοχής.

Η τρέχουσα συμμαχία με το Ισραήλ αποτελεί άλλο ένα στάδιο ενεργού ελληνικής συμμετοχής σε συλλογικό αμυντικό σχήμα που αυξάνει τη δυνατότητα των ελληνικών Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων ν' αποκρούσουν και να πλήξουν την Τουρκία. Η ισραηλινή Αεροπορία παρατάσσει 400 F-16 και F-15, από τα οποία τα 58 είναι μαχητικά αεροπορικής υπεροχής που μπορούν να εξουδετερώσουν οιοδήποτε οπλικό σύστημα διαθέτει η Τουρκία. Στην πραγματικότητα, αναβαθμισμένη ελληνική Πολεμική Αεροπορία σε συνεργασία με την ισραηλινή θα μπορούσε να διαλύσει την αεροπορική ισχύ της Τουρκίας, να καταστρέψει το Ναυτικό και τον Στρατό της, καθώς και ικανό τμήμα της βιομηχανίας της στις δυο πρώτες μέρες του πολέμου.

Η μόνη δυσχέρεια για αυτές τις προοπτικές έγκειται στα χρήματα. Η Ελλάδα, στο χείλος της χρεοκοπίας, δεν έχει τα απαιτούμενα κεφάλαια για την αναδιοργάνωση των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων - και μάλλον θα υποχρεωθεί να τις ελαττώσει δραστικά. Σε τελευταία ανάλυση, η δημοσιονομική βιωσιμότητα είναι το θεμέλιο της εθνικής ασφάλειας. Για να την κατοχυρώσει η Ελλάδα έχει δύο δύσκολους δρόμους:

Ο ένας είναι να εγκαταλείψει το ΝΑΤΟ και να υποκύψει στον πειρασμό των Σειρήνων, εν προκειμένω στις προσφορές φθηνού δανεισμού από τον κ. Πούτιν, με αντάλλαγμα ναυτικές βάσεις.

Ο άλλος δρόμος έγκειται στην αξιοποίηση του ορυκτού και ενεργειακού της πλούτου και στη δημιουργία πρωτογενούς ανάπτυξης που δεν θα είναι στο έλεος φιλοδωρημάτων ή του τουρισμού. Η Ελλάδα διαθέτει σημαντικά αποθέματα χρυσού, ενδεχομένως πετρελαίου και φυσικού αερίου, που μπορούν να διασώσουν την οικονομία. Αυτά τα εθνικά περιουσιακά στοιχεία πρέπει να ξεφύγουν από τη διαχείριση εγχώριων πολιτικών που τα προσεγγίζουν με γνώμονα το ίδιον όφελος και τη διαπλοκή με σκοτεινούς επιχειρηματικούς κύκλους.

O Ανδρέας Γερολυμάτος είναι καθηγητής και διευθυντής του Κέντρου Ελληνικών Σπουδών Ιδρυμα Σταύρος Νιάρχος στο Βανκούβερ του Καναδά

Παρασκευή 20 Απριλίου 2012

The Future of Special Forces

Never in their history have U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) been more respected, capable, or effective than they are today. With a series of high-profile direct action missions, punctuated by the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, these elite forces have steadily risen in the public eye and earned the trust and confidence of the nation’s leadership. While SOF will continue to conduct such missions, the Defense Department’s recent strategic guidance suggests that in the future SOF’s traditional competencies in indirect action will be of greater demand, and on a global scale. 

However, if the next administration hopes to benefit from SOF successes in indirect mission areas similar to those they have enjoyed in kinetic missions, changes in SOF’s capabilities, authorities, and resource allocation will be required. The next administration must seize on SOF’s current political clout and national popularity to ensure they evolve into a truly global, full-spectrum force—and do so quickly. If SOF are mismanaged internally or externally during this period of critical transition, the next administration could lose the capabilities of this highly effective force as well as the capacity to employ it. 

In coming years, SOF are likely to find themselves in new environments across the globe, conducting a variety of indirect missions intended to minimize threats before they require kinetic action. Whether training local military forces in Uganda or building relationships with villagers in Indonesia, SOF will increasingly be called on to perform missions that draw on their ability to engage with host nation forces and indigenous populations. With the proper resources and support, SOF can excel in virtually any environment, yet this new global direction presents challenges for which they are currently not fully equipped. 

Due to constant operations in Title 10 combat zones where the U.S. military has the lead, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF’s traditional proficiency in conducting indirect action on a global scale has atrophied. Further, with roughly 80 percent of SOF personnel deployed to the Middle East, SOF capabilities have narrowed to focus largely on one region. Rebuilding their capacity for worldwide indirect action will require SOF to not only emphasize indirect over direct action skills, but improve manpower management to ensure the force has the range and depth of regional understanding to execute its missions. 

Further, SOF will need to address internal resourcing challenges as they seek to enhance the capabilities needed to operate on a global scale, most notably fixed and rotary-wing lift. It will take time and effort for SOF to rebuild the capabilities that have dissipated over the past decade, necessitating that they immediately shift their focus toward preparing for this new global mission. 

Even as SOF leaders work to strengthen capabilities internally, if they are to successfully undertake missions beyond Title 10 areas and meet the requirements set forth in the Defense Department guidance, the force will require greater external support in the form of authorities and resources. SOF relationships with Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), which under current authorities dictate how and when SOF are employed in a given region, remain inconsistent. Regional commanders vary in their understanding of the nuanced SOF skill set and often myopically view SOF activities as too risky and problematic. As a result, SOF often find their regional mission objectives and resource requirements lost in the GCCs’ larger set of priorities. 

While Admiral William McRaven, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), has put forward a vision to enhance SOF’s relationship with the GCCs, his efforts ultimately will be contingent on regional commanders’ willingness to embrace and employ such assets. The most noteworthy challenges, however, extend beyond the Department of Defense. Interagency partners such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State wield significant power in the environments in which SOF will increasingly operate, yet their willingness to work with and support these forces, while improved during the last decade, remain sporadic. SOF will find it challenging to operate on a global scale if their governing authorities and the resources available to them keep them beholden to both the GCCs and other departments and agencies. Addressing this dearth of authorities and resources will require national-level support and will dictate SOF’s ability to succeed as a global force. 

If it wishes SOF to remain optimally effective and relevant, the next administration will not only have to address these internal and external challenges, but do so within a shrinking window of opportunity. Although SOF currently enjoy the support among senior leaders necessary to affect these changes in capabilities, authorities, and resources, memory of recent victories will rapidly fade, and support for SOF along with them. As a result, quick action will be needed to capitalize on SOF’s successes. 

If this transition is properly managed, SOF will present the president with options no other force can offer. Their adaptability and scalability suit them for a broad array of difficult and sensitive missions, from advising host nation forces to confronting pirates. But if these challenges are not quickly met, SOF may find themselves relegated to providing little more than support for General Purpose Forces. If SOF are not given the support necessary to quickly pivot from direct action missions in the Middle East to indirect action on a global scale, and if the GCCs, the interagency, and ultimately the president do not fully embrace SOF and their role as a global force, the next administration could rapidly lose one of the most effective tools in its national security arsenal. 

(Part of the CSIS’ 2012 Global Forecast report at http://csis.org/publication/2012-global-forecast)

Πέμπτη 19 Απριλίου 2012

The Age of American Shadow Power


The Obama administration’s severe unilateral sanctions on Iran and attempts to cut that country off from the world banking system have a shadow power aspect, says Juan Cole.

Covert operations are nothing new in American history, but it could be argued that during the past decade they have moved from being a relatively minor arrow in the national security quiver to being the cutting edge of American power. Drone strikes, electronic surveillance and stealth engagements by military units such as the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), as well as dependence on private corporations, mercenary armies and terrorist groups, are now arguably more common as tools of US foreign policy than conventional warfare or diplomacy. But these tools lend themselves to rogue operations that create peril for the United States when they blow back on us. And they often make the United States deeply unpopular.

Shadow power has even become an issue in the presidential campaign. Newt Gingrich advocates ramped-up “covert operations” inside Iran. President Obama replied to Mitt Romney’s charge that he is an “appeaser” by suggesting that his critics “ask bin Laden” about that.

Obama often speaks of the “tide of war receding,” but that phrase refers only to conventional war. In Afghanistan, where the administration hopes to roll up conventional fighting by the end of 2013, it is making plans for long-term operations by special forces through units such as JSOC. It is unclear what legal framework will be constructed for their activities, other than a wink and a nod from President Hamid Karzai.

Although the Iraqis managed to compel the withdrawal of US troops by the end of last year, Washington is nevertheless seeking to remain influential through shadow power. The US embassy in Baghdad has 16,000 employees, most of them civilian contractors. They include 2,000 diplomats and several hundred intelligence operatives. By contrast, the entire US Foreign Service corps comprises fewer than 14,000. The Obama administration has decided to slash the number of contractors, planning for an embassy force of “only” 8,000. This monument to shadow power clearly is not intended merely to represent US interests in Iraq but rather to shape that country and to serve as a command center for the eastern reaches of the greater Middle East. The US shadow warriors will, for instance, attempt to block “the influence of Iran,” according to the Washington Post. Since Iraq’s Shiite political parties, which dominate Parliament and the cabinet, are often close to Iran, that charge would inescapably involve meddling in internal Iraqi politics.

Nor can we be sure that the CIA will engage only in espionage or influence-peddling in Iraq. The American shadow government routinely kidnaps people it considers dangerous and has sent them to black sites for torture, often by third-party governments to keep American hands clean. As usual with the shadow government, private corporations have been enlisted to help in these “rendition” programs, which are pursued outside the framework of national and international law and in defiance of the sensibilities of our allies. How the United States might behave in Iraq can be extrapolated from its recent behavior in other allied countries. In November 2009 an Italian court convicted in absentia twenty-three people, most of them CIA field officers who had kidnapped an alleged Al Qaeda recruiter, Abu Omar, on a Milan street in the middle of the day and sent him to Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt for “interrogation.” Obama has explicitly continued this practice as a “counterterrorism tool,” though he says torture has been halted. Iraq is likely to continue to be an arena of such veiled struggles.

The Obama administration’s severe unilateral sanctions on Iran and attempts to cut that country off from the world banking system have a shadow power aspect. Aimed at crippling Iran’s oil exports, they are making it difficult for Iran to import staples like wheat. Although Washington denies carrying out covert operations in Iran, the US government and allies like Israel are suspected of doing just that. According to anonymous US intelligence officials and military sources interviewed by The New Yorker’s Seymour Hersh, the United States has trained members of the MEK (Mojahedin-e Khalq, or People’s Jihadis), based in Iraq at Camp Ashraf, to spy on Iran and carry out covert operations there, just as Saddam Hussein had done, though any American support for the organization would directly contradict the State Department listing of it as a terrorist organization. The MEK is suspected of carrying out a string of assassinations against Iranian nuclear scientists, but US intelligence leaks say Israel’s Mossad, not the CIA, is the accomplice. Indeed, the difficulty of disentangling Washington’s shadow power from that of its junior partners can be seen in the leak by US intelligence complaining that Mossad agents had impersonated CIA field officers in recruiting members of the Jundullah terrorist group in Iranian Baluchistan for covert operations against Iran. Jundullah, a Sunni group, has repeatedly bombed Shiite mosques in Zahedan and elsewhere in the country’s southeast. Needless to say, the kind of overt and covert pressure Obama is putting on Iran could easily, even if inadvertently, spark a war.

The recent release of more than 5 million e-mails hacked from the server of the private intelligence firm Stratfor shows that it did more than analysis. It engaged in surveillance and intelligence activities on behalf of corporate sponsors. Dow Chemical, for example, hired Stratfor to monitor a protest group agitating on the issue of the catastrophic 1984 gas leak in Bhopal, India, which killed at least 3,500. WikiLeaks maintains that Stratfor exemplifies the “revolving door” between private intelligence firms and the US government agencies that share information with them.

The increasingly frequent use of civilian “security contractors” -- essentially mercenaries -- should be a sore point for Americans. The tens of thousands of mercenaries deployed in Iraq were crucial to the US occupation of that country, but they also demonstrate the severe drawbacks of using shadow warriors. Ignorance about local attitudes, arrogance and lack of coordination with the US military and with local police and military led to fiascoes such as the 2007 shootings at Baghdad’s Nisour Square, where Blackwater employees killed seventeen Iraqis. The Iraqi government ultimately expelled Blackwater, even before it did the same with the US military, which had brought the contractors into their country.

The bad feelings toward the United States generated by hired guns can also be seen in the infamous Raymond Davis incident in Lahore, Pakistan. On January 27, 2011, Davis, a CIA contractor, was waiting at a traffic light when two Pakistanis pulled up next to him on a motorcycle. Davis, who later alleged that one of them had a gun, became alarmed and shot the men. The driver survived the initial volley and tried to run away, but Davis shot him twice in the back. Instead of fleeing the scene, he spent time searching and then photographing the bodies and calling the US consulate for an extraction team. Undercover CIA field officers raced toward the site of the shooting in a consulate SUV, hoping to keep Davis out of the hands of Pakistani authorities, who were approaching, sirens blaring. In its haste, the extraction team killed a motorcyclist and failed in its mission. Davis was taken into custody. His cellphone yielded the identities of some forty-five members of his covert network in Pakistan, who were also arrested.

The incident provoked rolling street demonstrations and enraged Pakistanis, who are convinced that the country is crawling with such agents. Davis was jailed and charged with double homicide, and only released months later, when a Persian Gulf oil monarchy allegedly paid millions on behalf of the United States to the families (in Islamic law, families of a murder victim may pardon the murderer on payment of a satisfactory sum). It was a public relations debacle for Washington, of course, but the salient fact is that a US public servant shot two Pakistanis (likely not terrorists) in cold blood, one of them in the back.

American drone strikes on individuals and groups in the tribal belt of northwestern Pakistan, as well as in Yemen, also typify Washington’s global shadow wars. The United States has 7,000 unmanned aerial vehicles, which it has deployed in strikes in six countries. Both the CIA and the US military operate the drones. Rather than being adjuncts to conventional war, drone strikes are mostly carried out in places where no war has been declared and no Status of Forces Agreement has been signed. They operate outside the framework of the Constitution, with no due process or habeas corpus, recalling premodern practices of the English monarchy, such as declaring people outlaws, issuing bills of attainder against individuals who offend the crown and trying them in secret Star Chamber proceedings.

Despite President Obama’s denials, the Britain-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism has found that not only are civilians routinely killed by US drone strikes in northern Pakistan; often people rushing to the scene of a strike to help the wounded are killed by a second launch. The BIJ estimates that the United States has killed on the order of 3,000 people in 319 drone strikes, some 600 of them civilian bystanders and 174 of those, children. Some 84 percent of all such strikes were launched after Obama came to office.

Moreover, the drone operations are classified. When asked about strikes, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refuses to confirm or deny that they have occurred. The drones cannot be openly debated in Congress or covered in any detail by the US media. Therefore, they cannot be the subject of a national political debate, except in the abstract. The Congressional intelligence committees are briefed on the program, but it is unlikely that any serious checks and balances can operate in so secret and murky a realm, and the committees’ leaders have complained about the inadequacy of the information they are given. No hearing could be called about them, since the drone strikes cannot be publicly confirmed. Classified operations create gods, above the law.

The WikiLeaks State Department cables reveal that Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh secretly authorized US drone strikes, pledging to take the blame from their angry publics. But a private conversation with a single leader, repeatedly denied thereafter in public, is hardly a treaty. The only international legal doctrine (recognized in the United Nations charter) invoked to justify drone strikes is the right of the United States to defend itself from attack. But it cannot be demonstrated that any drone strike victims had attacked, or were in a position to attack, the United States. Other proposed legal justifications also falter.

The doctrine of “hot pursuit” does not apply in Yemen or Somalia, and often does not apply in Pakistan, either. The only due process afforded those killed from the air is an intelligence assessment, possibly based on dubious sources and not reviewed by a judge. Those targeted are typically alleged to belong to Al Qaeda, the Taliban or some kindred group, and apparently thought to fall under the mandate of the September 14, 2001, Congressional Authorization for the Use of Military Force by the president against those behind the September 11 attacks and those who harbored them. The AUMF could probably legitimately be applied to Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Al Qaeda faction, which still plots against the United States. But a new generation of Muslim militants has arisen, far too young to be implicated in 9/11 and who may have rethought that disastrous strategy.

Increasingly, moreover, “Al Qaeda” is a vague term somewhat arbitrarily applied by Washington to regional groups involved in local fundamentalist politics, as with the Partisans of Sharia, the Yemeni militants who have taken over the city of Zinjibar, or expatriate Arab supporters in Pakistan of the Haqqani network of Pashtun fighters -- former allies of the United States in their struggle against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. How long will the AUMF be deployed in the Muslim world to authorize cowboy tactics from the skies? There is no consistency, no application of the rule of law. Guilt by association and absence of due process are the hallmarks of shadow government. In September the Obama administration used a drone to kill a US citizen in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki. But since the Supreme Court had already ruled, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), that the AUMF could not authorize military tribunals for Guantánamo detainees that sidestepped civil due process -- and since the subsequent Military Commissions Act of 2006 allows such tribunals only for aliens -- it is hard to see how Awlaki’s right to a trial could be summarily abrogated. Two weeks after he was killed, his 16-year-old son, also a US citizen and less obviously a menace to the superpower, was also killed by a drone.

By contrast, the United States and its allies are sanguine about a figure like the Libyan Abdel Hakim Belhadj, now in charge of security in Tripoli, who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union and was later held in US black sites. Released, he emerged as a rebel leader in Libya last year. The circumstantial case against him would easily allow a US drone strike on him even now under the current rules, but he was rehabilitated because of his enmity toward Muammar el-Qaddafi.

Among the greatest dangers to American citizens from Washington’s shadow power is “blowback,” the common term for a covert operation that boomerangs on its initiator. Arguably, the Reagan administration marked a turning point in the history of US infatuation with shadow power. Reagan strong-armed King Fahd of Saudi Arabia into providing funds to the right-wing Contras in Nicaragua, and the president developed his own resources for the Contras by illegally selling weapons to Iran (despite its being on the terrorist watch list and ineligible for such sales). Washington also joined Fahd in giving billions of dollars of arms and aid to the fundamentalist mujahedeen in Afghanistan (“freedom fighters,” Reagan called them, “the equivalent of America’s founding fathers”), where Arab volunteers ultimately coalesced into Al Qaeda. They later used the tradecraft they had absorbed from CIA-trained Afghan colleagues to stage operations in the Middle East against US allies and to carry out the 9/11 attacks. Two allied groups that received massive aid from the Reagan administration became among the deadliest US enemies in Afghanistan after 2002: the Haqqani network and the Hizb-i-Islami. Blowback goes hand in hand with covert operations.

The use of mercenaries and black units by the US government undermines discipline, lawfulness and a strong and consistent chain of command. Regular armies can be deployed and then demobilized, but Al Qaeda-like networks, once created, cannot be rolled up so easily, and they often turn against former allies. Black intelligence and military operations with virtually no public oversight can easily go rogue.

Reagan’s shadow government was a disaster, but it was a pygmy compared with Obama’s. Americans will have to be prepared for much more blowback to come if we go on like this -- not to mention further erosion of civil liberties at home, as the shadow government reaches back toward us from abroad. (Electronic surveillance without a warrant and the militarization of our police forces are cases in point.) Moreover, the practices associated with the shadow government, because of the rage they provoke, deepen mistrust of Washington and reduce the international cooperation that the United States, like all countries, needs. The shadow government masquerades as a way to keep the United States strong, but if it is not rolled back, it could fatally weaken American diplomacy.

"Juan Cole is the Richard P. Mitchell Professor of History and the director of the Center for South Asian Studies at the University of Michigan. His latest book, Engaging the Muslim World, is available in a revised paperback edition from Palgrave Macmillan. He runs the Informed Comment website".

Τετάρτη 18 Απριλίου 2012

U.S. Special Forces to Spend $600 Million on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles



AAI Unmanned Aircraft Systems, an operating unit of Textron Systems, a Textron Inc. company, recently announced that it has won the competitive Mid-Endurance Unmanned Aircraft Systems (MEUAS) II award from the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

More from the Textron press release:

The three-year award, valued at just under $600 million, includes support operations using AAI’s Aerosonde® Small Unmanned Aircraft System (SUAS). Total initial funding for these activities is $20 million.

“The team is galvanized and working closely with our new USSOCOM customer on this critical new activity,” says Senior Vice President and General Manager Steven Reid of AAI Unmanned Aircraft Systems. “Our hallmark is a full-service orientation – understanding the mission, equipment, logistics and other factors behind customer requirements in order to create and execute a total solution. Such is our goal for the MEUAS II program.”

The Aerosonde SUAS is a high-performance system that incorporates a heavy-fuel engine for superior endurance. The Aerosonde aircraft’s single electro-optic/infrared payload delivers day-and-night, persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, while its large payload size, weight and power can accommodate another payload of choice for multi-mission flexibility. It utilizes AAI’s one-piece Launch and Recovery Trailer and the Expeditionary Ground Control Station for expeditionary land- and sea-based operations.

“Features like payload flexibility and efficient, expeditionary operations are important when considering the special operations mission,” says Vice President, SUAS Stephen Flach of AAI Unmanned Aircraft Systems. “Our team focused on those unique requirements to ensure that the Aerosonde system can provide the required performance regardless of operational and environmental constraints.”

Fellow Textron Systems operating unit AAI Logistics & Technical Services will provide worldwide operations and maintenance support for the MEUAS II program. The company’s experienced UAS operators and field service representatives have been deployed successfully around the globe in support of customer requirements.

“There is no better way to understand the mission than working alongside the customer in the field, and we take great pride in those relationships,” says Senior Vice President and General Manager Diane Giuliani of AAI Logistics & Technical Services. “Our operators and maintainers stand ready to employ their expertise on behalf of our new USSOCOM customer.”

Τρίτη 17 Απριλίου 2012

Special Operations Boost Demand for Helicopters






Special operations forces have a dedicated fleet of tricked-out helicopters at their disposal, but as their workload grows, they are increasingly reliant on conventional aircraft to get their jobs done.

A high operational tempo in Afghanistan has married conventional and special operations forces like never before, forcing a heightened level of cooperation at all levels, from commanding generals to aircraft pilots and crews.

It wasn’t always so, especially when it came to sharing information and aircraft, according to Maj. Gen. Anthony Crutchfield, commander of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence. 

As a combat aviation brigade commander in Afghanistan, Crutchfield was once asked to provide aircraft in support of a special operations mission, he said at the Army Aviation Association of America’s annual symposium. 

Seeking information from his special operations counterpart, Crutchfield was turned away because he “didn’t have a need to know.”

“That was not the right answer … telling that to a brigade commander who is supplying the aircraft for you to fly the mission,” he said. “Quite frankly, it pissed me off.”

Now the once-tense relationship has changed, at least from the perspective of Army aviation, which takes the lead on most rotary wing development and acquisitions. At least until the close of the war in Afghanistan, the services will be forced to continue that cooperation. At present, half of all special operations missions flown in that conflict are carried out using conventional aircraft.

“Since 9/11, special operations forces have become increasingly reliant on general-purpose forces to complete [their] mission,” said Brig. Gen. Kevin Mangum, commander of Army Special Operations Aviation Command. “We can’t do what we do without the great work our combat aviation brigades are doing on the battlefield.”

Special operators fly versions of the UH-60 Black Hawk and CH-47 Chinook that are upgraded to fly farther and faster and with better sensor capabilities than standard aircraft. They also fly the CV-22, a version of the tilt-rotor Osprey operated by Air Force Special Operations Command. 

Both the conventional and special operations versions of the various aircraft are essentially the same when built. All the elite gear for SOF is added after the basic model is manufactured.

“You’re typically going to have improvements like extra fuel capacity, self-protection and additional sensors,” said Douglas Royce, an aerospace analyst with Forecast International. “Generally, it’s stuff that makes the aircraft fly farther and gives it greater situational awareness. But in order to create a special operations version of any aircraft, it takes money. This way, it is much cheaper to adapt an existing design than to develop a new aircraft.”

While many SOF aircraft are similar at the core, for many special operations missions, there are technologies required that are either too expensive or unnecessary for conventional troops. Aircraft flown by Navy SEALs and Marine Corps special operators have to be weatherized to withstand maritime environments, for example. The A/M-H6 Little Bird light attack helicopter was specially designed and is exclusively used by special operations forces. It is too small and expensive to be useful for large-scale operations by conventional forces.

The door swings both ways, however. Conventional ground forces often travel in larger numbers and shorter distances into enemy territory. Therefore it is to their advantage that their helicopters are not weighed down with high-end sensors and unnecessary add-ons like mid-air refueling nozzles. 

Those unique capabilities on the “fringes” of overall helicopter design are where special operations aviation should focus its funding, Mangum said.

One of those SOF-unique equipment packages is the common aviation architecture system, built by Rockwell Collins. The CAAS cockpit will eventually be installed in all special operations Blackhawk and Chinook helicopters. 

In 2001, when Rockwell Collins began working with special operations aviation, there were five different cockpit configurations in Chinooks and Blackhawks, said Daniel Toy, principal marketing manager for rotary wing systems for Rockwell Collins. The diversity of systems created logistical difficulties for forces that were, by definition, supposed to travel light and remain nimble. 

With the installation of the CAAS cockpit, SOF aircraft are being upgraded and standardized simultaneously. The equipment provides an unprecedented level of interoperability while reducing logistics costs, according to Toy.

Chinooks are either newly manufactured or recapitalized by Boeing, at which point the specialized cockpit and other SOF-specific components are added. Blackhawks are delivered directly to the Army, in which case Rockwell Collins sends its equipment to an Army depot, where it is installed.

“The multi-function displays in their Chinooks are the exact same as the displays in their Blackhawks,” Toy said. “They’re interchangeable. The software recognizes which aircraft it’s in and reconfigures itself automatically.”

With the upgraded aircraft, SOF can deploy with a mixed detachment of aircraft and only have the need for a single set of common cockpit components. 

The scheme is typical of how special forces in all services retrofit their aircraft, including the most secretive projects that don’t show up on budget documents. The stealth helicopters used in the raid to kill Osama bin Laden were developed under such a cloak. The equipment that went into those aircraft has been speculated upon but not confirmed, said Royce. Still, the stealth aircraft were not newly developed platforms, but modified versions of the Blackhawk and Chinook.

“But that was in the black budget,” said Royce. “It is possible that they are continuing to develop these super-secret aircraft under that cover, but we’ll never know about it. Because the black budget is so big, it’s possible for them to have these sorts of programs.”

Even the portions of SOF’s budget that the public is privy to are getting a boost where rotorcraft are concerned.

In an effort to meet demand for SOF aviation and in anticipation of a future U.S. military strategy that relies heavily on special operations, the command’s fiscal year 2013 budget request includes increases in nearly every rotary wing line item.

Of a total aviation procurement budget of $761 million, more than half will go to rotary wing platforms. That $475 million will buy 16 MH-60M Blackhawks, bringing the total production to 62 platforms. It also calls for procurement of seven MH-47 Chinooks and four CV-22’s, for a total fleet strength of 48 for that aircraft.

Rotary wing upgrade and sustainment jumped by nearly 100 percent from $41.4 million in fiscal 2012 to a $74.8 million request for the current fiscal year. Flight operations funding, which is a portion of the overseas contingency operations budget, also increased by $195 million to more than $1.1 billion for fiscal 2013. Though that total includes fixed-wing aircraft and funding for unmanned aerial vehicles, it is an indication of the high demand placed on special operations aviation in Central Asia. 

Research and development did take a hit in 2013, however. That line item fell by more than half, from $51.1 million in fiscal 2012 to a requested $24.4 million in the current fiscal year. 

In all, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review supports 165 tilt-rotor and fixed-wing mobility and fire support aircraft. It calls for the addition of a company of upgraded Chinooks to the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and two dedicated helicopter squadrons for direct support to naval special warfare units.

But all of that procurement is still within the realm of traditional helicopter technology that is often deemed slow and dangerous. The only new-start platform in the past 25 years in the special operations’ inventory is the CV-22 Osprey. 

Looking to the future, aviation commanders from both conventional and special operations aviation are putting their heads together to develop the future vertical lift platform — a revolutionary technology that will begin to replace existing helicopter fleets by 2030.

The Army, on behalf of all services that use vertical-lift aircraft, leads that ongoing development effort. For the first time, a special operations aviator is working directly with Army aviation leaders to ensure the final product is a common airframe that can be used by both SOF and conventional forces with minimal retooling.

“We’re not developing a special operations aircraft and a conventional aircraft,” said Crutchfield, who oversees FVL. 

The aircraft that results from that program should be designed to ferry special operators deeper and faster while keeping them safer than any aircraft available today. It will likely also differ slightly from the versions of FVL used by conventional forces, but as cooperation between the two groups continues to mature, the differences should diminish, he said. There is the added difficulty that it will be required to be as aerodynamic as possible, meaning that its systems and weapons will be designed into the aircraft itself. The current practice of bolting new systems and weapons to the outside of the aircraft likely won’t be an option. 

No one yet knows what the aircraft will look like — whether it will be an advanced helicopter, a tilt-rotor or have a hybrid fixed-wing/rotary wing design. The Army is looking at all three possibilities, aided in research and development by several companies, including Boeing, Bell Helicopter, Sikorsky and Lockheed Martin. It plans to build two test aircraft by 2017.

Whatever the result, it will amplify the effectiveness of special operations, said Mangum. 

“The speed and lift of that FVL will provide us will be an absolute game changer,” he said. “We will be able to operate over a distributed battlefield where we can cover a huge area with a much smaller force.”

Δευτέρα 16 Απριλίου 2012

Μάχη στην Καμπούλ

Τουλάχιστον 21 νεκροί έπειτα από 16 ώρες μαχών στην Καμπούλ

Ελικόπτερα του NATO εξαπέλυσαν επιθέσεις σε ένοπλους κρυμμένους σε ένα κτίριο υπό κατασκευή που επιβλέπει το αρχηγείο της δύναμης του βορειοατλαντικού συμφώνου και πρεσβείες, περιλαμβανομένων αυτών της Βρετανίας, της Γερμανίας, της Τουρκίας και του Ιράν.

Μαχητές των Τάλιμπαν έριχναν με αυτόματα όπλα εναντίον των ειδικών δυνάμεων του αφγανικού στρατού και της αστυνομίας, στην διάρκεια οδομαχιών που διαρκούν ως τώρα 16 ώρες.

Η επίθεση που εξαπέλυσαν οι αντάρτες από το μεσημέρι χθες, με επιθέσεις εναντίον πρεσβειών, ενός σούπερ-μάρκετ, ενός ξενοδοχείου και της βουλής, χαρακτηρίζεται μια από τις πιο σοβαρές στην Καμπούλ αφότου αφγανικές δυνάμεις με την υποστήριξη των ΗΠΑ και συμμάχων τους ανέτρεψαν το καθεστώς των Τάλιμπαν το 2001. Υπογραμμίζει ότι οι μαχητές έχουν την ικανότητα να πλήττουν την αυστηρά φρουρούμενη διπλωματική συνοικία της πόλης ακόμα και μετά από δέκα χρόνια πολέμου.

Το υπουργείο Εσωτερικών ανακοίνωσε ότι 19 αντάρτες, ανάμεσά τους βομβιστές-καμικάζι, σκοτώθηκαν στις επιθέσεις στην Καμπούλ και τουλάχιστον τρεις ακόμα επαρχίες, ενώ δύο συνελήφθησαν. Δύο αστυνομικοί σκοτώθηκαν, ενώ δεκατέσσερις αστυνομικοί και εννέα πολίτες τραυματίστηκαν, σύμφωνα με την ίδια πηγή.

Την ευθύνη για την επίθεση διεκδίκησαν οι Τάλιμπαν, αλλά ορισμένοι αξιωματούχοι είπαν ότι οι Χακάνι, ένα δίκτυο μαχητών που έχουν σχηματίσει μέλη φυλών στα σύνορα Αφγανιστάν-Πακιστάν, είναι πιθανότατα αναμεμιγμένοι.

"Η εικασία μου, με βάσει την προηγούμενη εμπειρία μου εδώ, είναι πως πρόκειται για ένα σύνολο επιχειρήσεων του δικτύου Χακάνι [που διευθύνονται] από το βόρειο Ουαζιριστάν και τις περιοχές των φυλών στο Πακιστάν", δήλωσε ο Αμερικανός πρεσβευτής Ράιαν Κρόκερ στο τηλεοπτικό δίκτυο CNN. "Ειλικρινά δεν νομίζω ότι οι Τάλιμπαν είναι αρκετά καλοί", πρόσθεσε.

Ο εκπρόσωπος των Τάλιμπαν Ζαμπιχουλάχ Μουτζαχίντ όμως είπε στο πρακτορείο Ρόιτερς ότι "αυτές οι επιθέσεις είναι η έναρξη της εαρινής εκστρατείας μας και τις σχεδιάζαμε για μήνες". Είπε ότι πρόκειται για εκδίκηση για μια σειρά συμβάντων στα οποία ενεπλάκησαν Αμερικανοί στρατιώτες στο Αφγανιστάν —περιλαμβανομένης της καύσης αντιτύπων του Κορανίου σε μια βάση του NATO και της σφαγής 17 αμάχων για την οποία κατηγορείται ένας Αμερικανός υπαξιωματικός— και πρόσθεσε ότι θα υπάρξουν κι άλλες τέτοιες ενέργειες. Χθες, οι Τάλιμπαν ανέφεραν ότι οι βασικοί στόχοι τους ήταν οι πρεσβείες της Γερμανίας και της Βρετανίας και το αρχηγείο της δύναμης του NATO. Αρκετοί βουλευτές φέρονται ότι συμμετείχαν στις μάχες για την απώθηση των ανταρτών κοντά στη βουλή.

Οι επιθέσεις χαρακτηρίζονται πλήγμα για τον πρόεδρο των ΗΠΑ Μπαράκ Ομπάμα, ο οποίος βρίσκεται σε προεκλογική εκστρατεία. Σημειώθηκαν περίπου ένα μήνα πριν από τη σύνοδο του NATO στην οποία οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και οι σύμμαχοί τους αναμενόταν να βάλουν τις τελευταίες πινελιές στην διαδικασία μεταβίβασης της ευθύνης για την ασφάλεια στις αφγανικές δυνάμεις, και μερικές ημέρες πριν από την προπαρασκευαστική σύνοδο των υπουργών Άμυνας και Εξωτερικών στις Βρυξέλλες ενόψει της συνόδου κορυφής στο Σικάγο.

Ο Αμερικανός στρατηγός Τζον Άλεν εξήρε την αντίδραση των αφγανικών δυνάμεων, τον "επαγγελματισμό" και την "πρόοδό" τους.

Πηγές των υπηρεσιών ασφαλείας είπαν ότι τουλάχιστον τρεις βόμβες έπεσαν στο εσωτερικό της πρεσβείας της Ιαπωνίας. Εκπρόσωπος του υπουργείου Εξωτερικών της Γερμανίας είπε ότι τμήμα του κτιρίου της πρεσβείας της χώρας στην Καμπούλ υπέστη ζημιές. Τουλάχιστον μια χειροβομβίδα έπεσε στην πρεσβεία της Ρωσίας, κοντά στη βουλή.

Τέτοιες επιθέσεις δεν είχαν γίνει στην Καμπούλ από τον Σεπτέμβριο, όταν οι Τάλιμπαν είχαν επιτεθεί στην πρεσβεία των ΗΠΑ και στο αρχηγείο του NATO. Εκείνες οι μάχες είχαν διαρκέσει πάνω από 20 ώρες και 25 άμαχοι είχαν σκοτωθεί.

Επιθέσεις σημειώθηκαν επίσης στην Τζαλαλαμπάντ, στην επαρχία Νανγκαρχάρ, εναντίον στρατιωτικής βάσης του NATO στην πόλη και δυνάμεων της διεθνούς δύναμης κοντά στο αεροδρόμιο. Τέσσερις αντάρτες σκοτώθηκαν. Στην Λογκάρ, "τρομοκράτες κατέλαβαν ένα κυβερνητικό κτίριο" και ξέσπασε μάχη, με αποτέλεσμα τρεις αστυνομικοί να τραυματιστούν. Πέντε αντάρτες επιτέθηκαν στο κυβερνείο στην Γκαρντέζ, πρωτεύουσα της επαρχίας Πάκτια. Τέσσερις σκοτώθηκαν κι ο πέμπτος συνελήφθη, ανέφερε το υπουργείο Εσωτερικών.

Σάββατο 14 Απριλίου 2012

Military orders thermal monoculars





Systems' SkeetIR thermal monocular has been selected for use by the U.S. military's Special Operations Command.

The device, which enables visual augmentation for image intensified devices, can he handheld, used as a clip-on attachment or mounted on a helmet.

"Our primary focus is to allow our operators to see the enemy before they're seen and the SkeetIR does just that," said Vadim Plotsker, president of BAE Systems OASYS in Manchester, N.H., where the devices are designed and produced.

"The SkeetIR has undergone extensive U.S. Department of Defense review and testing and is often referred to as a game changing operational capability."

The SkeetIR has the dimensions of a credit card and can be used for observation in obscure visual conditions or as a targeting device.

The contract to supply the devices is worth $11 million.

Source 

Παρασκευή 13 Απριλίου 2012

Afghanistan War: Special Operations War Plan Proposed





WASHINGTON -- Adm. Bill McRaven, the head of U.S. special operations, is mapping out a potential Afghanistan war plan that would replace thousands of U.S. troops with small special operations teams paired with Afghans to help an inexperienced Afghan force withstand a Taliban onslaught as U.S. troops withdraw.

While the overall campaign would still be led by conventional military, the handfuls of special operators would become the leading force to help Afghans secure the large tracts of territory won in more than a decade of U.S. combat. They would give the Afghans practical advice on how to repel attacks, intelligence to help spot the enemy and communications to help call for U.S. air support if overwhelmed by a superior force.

The Associated Press learned new details of the draft plan this week.

The special operations proposal was sketched out at special operations headquarters in Tampa, Fla., in mid-February, with Central Command's Gen. James Mattis and overall Afghanistan war commander Gen. John Allen taking part, according to several high-level special operations officials and other U.S. officials involved in the war planning. They spoke on condition of anonymity because the proposal has not yet been presented to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta or the White House.

If approved by the administration, the pared-down structure could become the enduring force that Afghan Defense Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak indicated Tuesday at the Pentagon that his country needs, possibly long after the U.S. drawdown date of 2014.

McRaven's proposal amounts to a slimmed-down counterinsurgency strategy aimed at protecting the Afghan population as well as hunting the Taliban and al-Qaida. It's not the counterterrorist plan advanced by Vice President Joe Biden, which would leave Afghan forces to fend for themselves while keeping U.S. special operators in protected bases from which they could hunt terrorists with minimum risk, according to a senior special operations official reached this week.

Thousands of U.S. troops could remain in harm's way well after the end of combat operations in 2014, tasked with helping Afghans protect territory won by U.S. forces.

The Pentagon asked the top officials to draft this and other proposals to present to the White House after NATO allies decide how large a force to keep in Afghanistan, according to a U.S. official familiar with the administration's deliberations.

Leaders of NATO nations are to meet May 20-21 in Chicago to discuss the war, among other issues.

The Pentagon by September will draw down the 23,000 troops that remain from the surge of 33,000 troops sent to Afghanistan in 2010 to buy time for the Afghan military and government to build both the numbers and expertise necessary to defend and govern themselves. Plans for the remaining 68,000 troops in Afghanistan are not yet complete, but most U.S. troops are scheduled to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.

Allen, the commander of forces in Afghanistan, has indicated he would like to keep as many troops on the ground for as long as possible. But with a solid majority of Americans now against the continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the sped-up departure of some of America's NATO allies from the war zone, the Obama administration is feeling some pressure toward a faster drawdown.

The McRaven plan could provide a way to shrink troop numbers quickly without leaving a security vacuum as U.S. troops depart, as has happened in Afghanistan before when NATO forces left an area.

"This is the least bad option," said retired Marine Col. T.X. Hammes, senior fellow at the National Defense University and longtime critic of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. "It's probably the smartest thing we could do to keep the Afghan government functioning long enough to safely withdraw."

In the back-of-the-envelope version of the strategy, a couple thousand special operators, like Navy SEALs and the Army's Delta Force, would keep working with Afghan special forces to raid terrorist targets, the senior special operations official explained.

U.S. commanders would seek to keep the same number of defense intelligence troops in country to feed data to the smaller force and would also rely heavily on the CIA for intelligence, while an as-yet-undetermined number of conventional forces would provide everything from air to logistical support to keep all the special operations teams running, officials said.

Some two-thirds of the roughly 6,000-strong special operations force would head to Afghanistan's rural towns and villages to advise inexperienced Afghan forces. This would include expanding the Village Stability Operations program in Afghan villages, in which special operators help what is essentially an Afghan government-backed armed neighborhood watch to keep the peace.

Reliance on the program already had forced it to grow so quickly, however, that U.S. commanders had put regular military forces into some of the sites. That is how Army Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, a regular soldier with no prior Afghanistan experience, ended up at one of the sites. He stands accused of killing 17 Afghan villagers in a shooting spree last month.

U.S. officials say they will take more care with selecting who gets deployed into such sensitive and remote posts in the future.

The commanders building the new team also would draw heavily from the group known as "Afghan Pakistan hands," the 700-plus force of troops and civilians given months of extra language training in Pashtu, Dari or Urdu, the three main languages of Afghanistan and Pakistan, officials say. Around 50 of the "hands" are deployed to the Village Stability Operations to serve as translators, both of language and culture, between special operations troops, Afghan government officials and local villagers.

The insider knowledge of both the "hands" group and the special operators with multiple Afghan tours is intended to minimize the chance of further antagonizing Afghans and driving them to support the Taliban.

U.S.-Afghan relations have been strained in the past year, exacerbated by the killings of at least 16 U.S. and NATO troops by their Afghan allies in recent months, the inadvertent burnings of Qurans by U.S. troops in January and the shootings of the 17 Afghan villagers. Afghan President Hamid Karzai initially asked that the U.S. retreat from rural areas.