Τμήμα Ειδικών Ομάδων: Το αθέατο δόρυ της Διοίκησης Καταδρομών της Κύπρου

Το Τμήμα Ειδικών Ομάδων (ΤΕΟ) της Διοίκησης Καταδρομών (ΔΚΔ) της Εθνικής Φρουράς παραμένει, δεκαεπτά χρόνια μετά τη συγκρότησή του, ένα μυστήριο για εχθρούς και φίλους. Αθόρυβα και μεθοδικά εκπαιδεύεται και ενεργεί, μακριά από τα φώτα της δημοσιότητας, σε αποστολές μείζονος σημασίας και αποτελεί το μακρύ χέρι της ΕΦ σε εδάφη επιχειρησιακού ενδιαφέροντος. Ο «Φ» παρουσιάζει για πρώτη φορά ένα μέρος των δυνατοτήτων του επίλεκτου αυτού τμήματος αφού η συγκρότηση, ο ειδικός εξοπλισμός, οι αποστολές αλλά και οι επιχειρησιακές του δυνατότητες παραμένουν αυστηρά διαβαθμισμένες.

Η ανάδειξη του σημαντικού ρόλου που διαδραματίζουν οι ειδικές επιχειρήσεις κατά τη διάρκεια κρίσεων ή πολεμικών συρράξεων και οι πολλαπλές επιπτώσεις που προκαλούν στην έκβαση των σύγχρονων συγκρούσεων, είναι πλέον αδιαμφισβήτητες. Άλλωστε η διατήρηση στα κατεχόμενα εδάφη της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας μεγάλου όγκου τουρκικών δυνάμεων σε καθαρά επιθετική διάταξη και πλήρη πολεμική επάνδρωση, με δυνατότητα αιφνιδιαστικής έναρξης επιχειρήσεων σε διάστημα μερικών μόνον ωρών, και η παράλληλη ύπαρξη – εκτός του τουρκικού συντάγματος καταδρομών (από τρεις μοίρες καταδρομών) – ειδικού τμήματος Βordo Βereli της τουρκοκυπριακής Διοίκησης Δυνάμεων Ασφαλείας (Guvenlik Κuvvetleri Κomuntaligi) στα κατεχόμενα εδάφη, δεν μπορούσε να αφήσει την Εθνική Φρουρά αδιάφορη.

Η πρώτη ομάδα του Τμήματος Ειδικών Ομάδων συγκροτήθηκε το καλοκαίρι του 1995 μετά από απόφαση του ΓΕΕΦ, που λήφθηκε τον Ιούνιο του ιδίου έτους, κατά τη διάρκεια της αρχηγίας του Αντιστρατήγου Νικόλαου Βορβολάκου. Το ΤΕΟ είναι ανεξάρτητη υπομονάδα που υπάγεται επιχειρησιακά, μέσον του Δ/ΔΚΔ, στον Αρχηγό ΓΕΕΦ, και έχει την δυνατότητα να εκτελεί αποστολές σε ολόκληρη την χερσαία επικράτεια της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας. Το προσωπικό του, όπως άλλωστε είναι αναμενόμενο, αποτελείται από μόνιμα στελέχη – υπαξιωματικούς και ΕΠΥ – τα οποία υπηρετούν στο Τμήμα για μεγάλο χρονικό διάστημα. 

Η διαδικασία επιλογής είναι παρόμοια με αυτή που εφαρμόζεται σε ανάλογα ειδικά τμήματα των Ελληνικών Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων και η αξιολόγηση του προσωπικού που επιθυμεί να υπηρετήσει σε αυτό είναι ιδιαίτερα σχολαστική. Έκτος της επιτυχούς συμπλήρωσης των προβλεπόμενων ειδικών σχολείων εκπαιδεύσεως (καταδρομών, αλεξιπτωτιστών, διαβίωσης-αιχμαλωσίας-διαφυγής, κοκ), απαιτείται η τριετής υπηρεσία σε ενεργές Μοίρες Καταδρομών, πριν γίνει αποδεκτή η αίτησή για τοποθέτηση στο ΤΕΟ. Μετά την εισδοχή στο Τμήμα το προσωπικό ακολουθεί υποχρεωτικά, ανάλογα με την επιχειρησιακή εξειδίκευση που λαμβάνει η κάθε ομάδα, διάφορα άλλα προκεχωρημένα σχολεία εκπαιδεύσεως όπως του Υποβρυχίου Καταστροφέα της ΜΥΚ, το σχολείο ελευθέρας πτώσεως, το σχολείο επιχειρησιακής ελευθέρας πτώσεως και άλλα εξειδικευμένα σχολεία.

Η εκπαίδευση του Τμήματος σε επιχειρησιακά αντικείμενα και τεχνικές ειδικών επιχειρήσεων είναι συνεχής και αδιάκοπη καθ’ όλη τη διάρκεια του έτους ενώ συχνά, αναλόγως της καταστάσεως, το ΤΕΟ συμμετέχει σε διάφορες αποστολές. Κυρίαρχο στοιχείο στο ετήσιο πρόγραμμα του είναι οι συνεχείς αναγνωρίσεις που διεξάγει σε όλη τη χερσαία επικράτεια της ελεύθερης Κύπρου, από τα Κόκκινα μέχρι και τη Δερύνεια. Το Τμήμα έχει πολύ στενή συνεργασία με την ΜΥΚ της Διοίκησης Ναυτικού, την 460 ΜΕΔ της Διοίκησης Αεροπορίας, την ΜΜΑΔ (Μηχανοκίνητη Μονάδα Άμεσου Δράσεως), τον ΕΑΟ (Ειδικό Αντιτρομοκρατικό Ουλαμό) και την ΜΑΕ (Μοίρα Αεροπορικών Επιχειρήσεων) της Αστυνομίας Κύπρου. Κατά το παρελθόν συνεργάστηκε με το ΕΤΑ, με κλιμάκιο Γάλλων Πεζοναυτών και συμμετείχε σε επιχειρήσεις έρευνας-διάσωσης σε δύσβατες περιοχές της οροσειράς Τροόδους.

Καταδρομέας με πιστόλι FiveSeven και υποπολυβόλο P90. Φορά την παλαιού τύπου παραλλαγή.

Ορόσημο το 2000

Το έτος 2000 υπήρξε ορόσημο στην επιχειρησιακή εξέλιξη του Τμήματος μετά την ανανέωση του συμβατικού οπλισμού και των υλικών που διέθετε με ειδικό εξοπλισμό και την ολοκλήρωση της πολεμικής του συγκρότησης. Έκτος της προμήθειας σύγχρονου φορητού οπλισμού της σειράς υποπολυβόλων τύπου FΝ Ρ90 και πιστολιών FΝ FiveSeven διαμετρήματος 5.7χλσ., το ΤΕΟ, κατά τα επόμενα χρόνια, προμηθεύτηκε εξειδικευμένα υλικά υψηλής ποιότητας· από το επίπεδο της ένδυσης-υπόδησης, των εξαρτήσεων και της διαβίωσης μέχρι το επίπεδο του ειδικού εξοπλισμού, των επιχειρησιακών παρελκομένων οπλισμού, των υπερσύγχρονων μέσων επικοινωνιών και υλικών απόρρητης φύσης.

TAMΣ «ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ-12/1»

Μετά από σχετικές συνεννοήσεις με τη Διοίκηση Καταδρομών διευθετήθηκε η παρακολούθηση συγκεκριμένων δραστηριοτήτων του ειδικού τμήματος, αφού μεγάλο μέρος των τακτικών και των μέσων που χρησιμοποιεί είναι διαβαθμισμένα. Η εξαήμερη Τακτική Άσκηση Μετά Στρατεύματος (ΤΑΜΣ) μικρής κλίμακας με την επωνυμία «ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ-12/1» σχεδιάστηκε από τη διοίκηση του Τμήματος Ειδικών Ομάδων και εγκρίθηκε, με ελάχιστες τροποποιήσεις σε θέματα συντονισμού, από τη Διοίκηση Καταδρομών.

Αξίζει να σημειωθεί ότι στο πλαίσιο της επιχειρησιακής του αυτονομίας η ΔΚΔ παρέχει μεγάλη ελευθερία στο σχεδιασμό και την εκτέλεση των εκπαιδευτικών του δραστηριοτήτων αλλά και των πολεμικών του αποστολών. Η διοίκηση του ΤΕΟ, υποβοηθούμενη από μικρό αριθμό πολύ έμπειρων μονίμων υπαξιωματικών που στελεχώνουν την Ομάδα Επιχειρήσεων του Τμήματος, σχεδίασε με μεγάλη επιμέλεια το σενάριο της τακτικής άσκησης. Για την καλλιέργεια πνεύματος αυτονομίας και πρωτοβουλίας των ειδικών ομάδων, η τακτική πλαισίωση και η εξέλιξη της δραστηριότητας σκοπίμως δεν γνωστοποιήθηκε στο προσωπικό των συμμετεχουσών ομάδων. Η συγκεκριμένη διαδικασία παρέχει σημαντικά πλεονεκτήματα αφού το ολιγομελές προσωπικό εξοικειώνεται στην αυτόνομη δράση και την ανάπτυξη δεξιοτήτων και ψυχικού σθένους για την αντιμετώπιση διαφόρων άγνωστων καταστάσεων υπό συναισθηματική πίεση.

Η διεξαγωγή της τακτικής άσκησης είχε δύο κύριους σκοπούς: α) Την επιχειρησιακή αξιολόγηση – από τη διοίκηση του ΤΕΟ της ικανότητας των οργανικών του ομάδων να επιχειρούν αυτόνομα, να ενεργούν και να επιβιώνουν σε εχθρικό έδαφος, να ανασυγκροτούνται και να ενεργούν εναντίον του εχθρού βάσει των δικών τους εκτιμήσεων μετά από απώλεια επαφής με τη διοίκηση του Τμήματος, και να οργανώνουν τη διαφυγή τους σε περίπτωση δυσμενούς εξέλιξης της αποστολής τους· β) Την αξιολόγηση της διοίκησης του ΤΕΟ – από τη Διοίκηση Καταδρομών – και συγκεκριμένα της ικανότητας σχεδιασμού μεικτών αποστολών (με άλλα κλιμάκια που το υποστηρίζουν) και ελέγχου των αυτόνομων ομάδων του κατά τη διάρκεια επιχειρήσεων.

Η ΤΑΜΣ «ΑΟΡΑΤΟΣ-12/1» άρχιζει με την έκδοση προειδοποιητικής διαταγής από τη ΔΚΔ προς το ειδικό τμήμα. Ο Διοικητής του ΤΕΟ συγκεντρώνει άμεσα τους επικεφαλής ομαδάρχες των ομάδων οι οποίοι με τη σειρά τους ενημερώνουν τους άνδρες τους. Λόγω των χαρακτηριστικών της εχθρικής απειλής (μέγεθος απειλής, επιθετική διάταξη κατοχικών στρατευμάτων, πολεμική επάνδρωση, κοκ) και των ιδιαιτεροτήτων του κυπριακού επιχειρησιακού περιβάλλοντος (έλλειψη επιχειρησιακού βάθους, εχθρική ικανότητα διεξαγωγής επιθετικών επιχειρήσεων με ελάχιστη προειδοποίηση, εκμετάλλευση ουδετέρας ζώνης, κοκ) η ενεργοποίηση της Εθνικής Φρουράς για την αντιμετώπιση θερμού επεισοδίου, κρίσεως ή συρράξεως, προσλαμβάνει εντελώς διαφορετική διάσταση από τον χερσαίο ή νησιωτικό ελλαδικό χώρο όπου η στρατηγική προειδοποίηση κατά τη διάρκεια κλιμάκωσης ανέρχεται σε μερικά 24ώρα (τουλάχιστον 48 ώρες). 

Οι ομαδάρχες θέτουν σε ετοιμότητα τους άνδρες τους για ταχεία αραίωση του τμήματος σε Προωθημένο Χώρο Διασποράς (ΠΧΔ) σε ημιορεινή περιοχή της επαρχίας Λευκωσίας. Με προειδοποίηση 15 λεπτών το Τμήμα διατάζεται να κινηθεί προς τον ΠΧΔ «Κ161» (κωδική ονομασία για σκοπούς άσκησης) και οι ομάδες αρχίζουν να κινούνται αυτόνομα προς τον προορισμό τους χωρίς να προσελκύουν το ενδιαφέρον κατά τη διάρκεια της κίνησής τους στο οδικό δίκτυο. Η τακτική πλαισίωση της άσκησης – η οποία εξακολουθεί να παραμένει άγνωστη στο προσωπικό των ειδικών ομάδων – προβλέπει την ανάπτυξη αριθμού ομάδων σε ολόκληρη σχεδόν τη χερσαία επικράτεια της ελεύθερης Κύπρου με κλιμάκωση ενεργειών. 

Επιδίωξη της διοίκησης του ΤΕΟ είναι η εκμετάλλευση της μορφολογίας του κυπριακού εδάφους και των συχνών μεταβολών και διακυμάνσεων που παρουσιάζει σε περιοχές επιχειρησιακού ενδιαφέροντος και η ταυτόχρονη δράση αυτόνομων ομάδων σε δασώδης ορεινές περιοχές, σε παραθαλάσσιες τοποθεσίες και εντός κατοικημένων τόπων.

Στελέχη της Διοίκησης Καταδρομών με τη νέα “ψηφιακή” παραλλαγή.

Προοπτικές των Ειδικών Δυνάμεων

Παρά τη μακροχρόνια απουσία ούριου ανέμου στην ΕΦ την τελευταία δεκαετία, η Διοίκηση Καταδρομών, με τις προσπαθείς των διοικητών της και τους αξιέπαινους κόπους του μόνιμου και κληρωτού προσωπικού της, κατάφερε σε αυτή τη δεκαετία της πολιτικής-πολιτειακής οπισθοδρόμησης και της κοινωνικής απαξίωσης των εθνικών αξιών, να κρατήσει πολύ ψηλά το επίπεδο, το ήθος, την πειθαρχία, και την επιχειρησιακή ετοιμότητα των Δυνάμεων Καταδρομών στην Κύπρο. Η παρουσία στην αρχηγεία της ΓΕΕΦ του Αντιστρατήγου Στυλιανού Νάση και η αφοσίωση που επιδεικνύει για την επιχειρησιακή αναδόμηση της ΕΦ έχει καταλυτικές συνέπειες για τη μελλοντική πορεία και μετεξέλιξη των ειδικών δυνάμεων στη μεγαλόνησο. 

Ο Αρχηγός, έχοντας ουσιαστική αντίληψη της διεξαγωγής ειδικών επιχειρήσεων στο διεθνές περιβάλλον αλλά και πλήρη συναίσθηση της κατοχικής απειλής, προωθεί κρίσιμες επιχειρησιακές αλλαγές για αναβάθμιση τόσο του ρόλου και των αποστολών του ΤΕΟ όσο και της επιχειρησιακής αξιοποίησης της ΔΚΔ. Το ενδιαφέρον εστιάζεται στην ουσιαστική ενίσχυση (οπλισμός, αποστολές, συγκρότηση, πολεμική οροφή) του Τμήματος Ειδικών Ομάδων και του επιχειρησιακού ρόλου των Μοιρών Καταδρομών (κληρωτό προσωπικό, μόνιμα στελέχη, οπλισμός, αποστολές, ειδικές επιχειρήσεις). 

Το επιχειρησιακό όραμα του Α/ΓΕΕΦ σε συνδυασμό με την αποφασιστικότητα της ΔΚΔ, το υψηλό επίπεδο των αξιωματικών και υπαξιωματικών που υπηρετούν στις Δυνάμεις Καταδρομών της ΕΦ και την πολύτιμη ελλαδική στρατιωτική παρουσία, αποτελούν ελπιδοφόρα συγκυρία για τη μελλοντική πορεία των ειδικών δυνάμεων στην ημικατεχόμενη εσχατιά του Ελληνισμού στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο.

Πέτρος Σαββίδης, Μ.Ρhil. Ηistory (Glasgow) για την εφημερίδα Φιλελεύθερος. Το ρεπορτάζ παρουσιάζεται στο περιοδικό αμυντικών θεμάτων Δούρειος Ίππος, τεύχος 11, Ιούνιος 2012.


Πηγή

Irregular Warfare, Village Stability Operations and the Venture Capital Green Beret

After eleven years of non-stop general and limited war in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and elsewhere, Village Stability Operations are returning us to our Irregular Warfare roots. However, it is not the IW of the Cold War but rather the IW of Globalization. And there are three overriding truths driving this IW: investors are more powerful than nation states; stateless actors are more effective than standing armies; and, stability means employment. These truths have driven Special Forces, post 9/11, to move far beyond mastery of only the Military in Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic operations. And yet, though we are meeting with moderate success and ninety percent of the resource development is done, we fail to fully grasp how all these operations fit into a functional whole. This is due to the fact we have yet to add one critical component, the mind of the investor.

The highly skilled mind of the investor is trained to realize one thing only, Return on Investment. And in a world now driven almost solely by economics and finance we need look outwards to this community for a conceptual framework and body of practice which can be adopted and melded to our domain. Fortunately, there is already an almost direct analog for the DIME centric Green Beret, the Venture Capitalist. A skilled generalist, the VC melds unconventional, non-linear thinking with traditional finance and business models so as to realize a ROI from the empowerment of small businesses, from wealth and job creation. For the VC and Green Beret alike, ROI is not derived from doctrine or from top-down thinking and applications of decisions and resources, but from empowering the near limitless capacities of the entrepreneurial spirit resident within even the most illiterate and uneducated members of humanity.

For those who have not had the opportunity to work in both worlds, that of Special Forces and that of the Venture Capitalist, the similarities may not be obvious. Nor may it be obvious why the mind of the investor and in particular the mind of the VC is that critical missing piece of modern IW. To gain an understanding of why this is so, we must first know what Venture Capital does and how such is already an analog for the 21st Century IW Warrior.

Venture Capital

Many argue agriculture and infrastructure need be developed before a widespread business base can arise. Though a certain degree of initial development in agriculture and infrastructure is necessary, it is business alone which can afford to expand, improve and maintain infrastructure. Without the tax base and development demand derived from a thriving commercial sector, welfare and non-welfare governments alike can only provide for limited infrastructure. More importantly, it is only an expanding base of industrial and services companies which can create the necessary number of jobs.

The problem of course becomes one of creating an industrial and services base out of not much more than raw human potential, and in some of the most remote and underdeveloped parts of the world. A top-down “trickledown” approach is incapable of the task, meaning a bottom-up, local and individual driven process must be applied. This is what makes the Venture Capital industry the perfect model. This bottom-up style of economic entanglement, new industry and job creation, is exactly what VC specialize in.

The bottom-up approach is powered by the endlessly creative and entrepreneurial spirit of humanity, and provides access to a near limitless supply of ideas and future business leaders. Venture Capitalists harness this boundless capacity by applying sophisticated filters, derived from proven experience, to weed through the many in order to identify those few business plans and management teams possessing the right combinations to become investable assets.

The sole purpose of the Venture Capitalist, the relationships and access, highly trained tools and practices they employ, is establishing companies which are productive contributors to globalization. For the economy this means a tax base, for the community it means jobs, for the investor it means Return on Investment and for globalization it means stability and growth.

Historically, less than ten percent of companies reviewed receive VC investment. Fifty percent of these fail, and forty percent only break even. This leaves ten percent of companies funded to realize the critical Return on Investment for all. A comfort working with and ability to derive value for stakeholders and shareholders from these success-failure rates is the role of and what differentiates the Venture Capitalist and the Green Beret alike.

Return on Investment is derived in a Venture Capitalist’s investment portfolio, from failure, through Constructive Destruction. This is the process of supporting efficient companies and cannibalizing inefficient ones and redirecting assets to the more efficient companies within the portfolio or the portfolios of other investors. This requires a VC possess the ability to, identify and analyze the value of assets within the portfolio at any given point in time, and to rapidly devise and execute courses of action designed to realize and enhance the value of these assets.

To further understand the nature of Venture Capital and to see how the industry is an analog and model for 21st Century Irregular Warfare requires an understanding of the investment world as a whole. And though such is far beyond the scope of this paper, we can discuss the basic structure of the now global investor community and how they collectively drive the global economy.

The global investment community is a tiered structure with Angel & Seed Venture Capitalists at the base and the Stock & Securities Markets at the peak. Investments move up through the many layers of investors between the base and the peak, with each subsequent investor further refining and defining the asset and improving valuation. At the base are companies with unstable valuations which are not clearly defined and represent higher orders of potential Return on Investment but also much higher magnitudes of Risk & Uncertainty. At the top are assets with stable valuations and which are clearly defined and represent lower ROI and smaller degrees of Risk & Uncertainty.

Where all the many layers of investors above are focused on improving the valuation of existing companies, Angel & Seed investors are the only ones whose role it is to invest in new companies. It is the Angel & Seed investor who comes in when the Risks & Uncertainties are too high, when the ROI is too low and uncertain for even higher level Venture Capitalists to get involved. Without this highly specialized capability and its dedicated practitioners the global Capital Markets would be impossible.

The willingness to look for and the ability to see assets and Return on Investment where the system cannot or will not, the application of conventional and unconventional thinking and the willingness to cannibalize inefficient assets before they lose all value, is what is necessary, to create assets from almost nothing and to develop an economy. This is not made possible by executing a predetermined plan as to which assets and of which type to invest in. The power of A&S investors is their ability to filter and harness the incredibly creative and productive entrepreneurial spirit of the near endless numbers of those seeking to participate in globalization. And this domain is both unique and common to A&S investors and the Green Beret alike.

This does not mean to imply there is not some predetermination as to which companies and business models receive investment. In order to qualify management and the business plan, to model Risk and to identify the ROI potential, investors must possess a well-developed and proven base of knowledge, experience and relationships in the industry in which the potential investment is or intends to be engaged. These abilities, far more than the money, are the real advantage the A&S investor brings to their investments and which provides for entanglement with the greater economic and financial engines and thereby much higher certainty of success.

The real importance of the A&S investor is his highly trained unconventional mind, which, like the mind of the Green Beret, cannot be taught but only refined in those who already possess it. This mind demonstrates its uniqueness in two fundamental capabilities: i) a thorough and fluid understanding of the subset of globalization in which the investment exists and must compete and survive; and ii) an ability to appropriately identify and articulate a quantified (specific) financial value (price) to the asset at any given point in time.

Venture Capitalists know how to put people to work in sustainable businesses. And at its very basest level, non-welfare state job creation is the current and future endstate of Irregular Warfare. We can see the beginnings of this in the Village Stability Operations now being conducted by Special Forces in Afghanistan.

Village Stability Operations

Though globalization has greatly improved the standard of living and quality of life for billions, there remain billions who are only now, or who are only partially benefitting. And there are hundreds of millions not benefitting at all. It is in these places where we do VSO, places walled or partially walled off from globalization, where the enemies of the modern world survive, thrive and recruit.

The purpose of this article is not to define VSO, which is already the topic of a growing body of articles and academic works, rather the purpose is to identify the similarities between VSO and the Start-up world of VC. It is important to detail some of the key issues of VSO in the language of business in order to demonstrate a common framework.

Limited or Ineffective Governance (Leadership):

Absolutely essential to the success of any venture is management and leadership, particularly in early phases when everything is opaque and uncertain. It is also important to note the best managers and leaders are not always obvious and those who are most effective in early phases may not be as effective in later ones.

In the start-up world there are four traits absolutely essential for managers and leaders. The first is vision and the ability to clearly articulate and achieve active buy-in with this vision. Second is a comfort with not having all the answers, with listening and choosing the best Course of Action from amongst those put forward. Third is the ability to rapidly adjust to changes in the environment or to having made a poor COA selection, even if this means changing direction and cannibalizing assets. The fourth is a willingness to fail, to learn from failure and to employ the lessons learned from failure to enhance the next venture.

In the VSO world, where old grudges and hatreds often exist, it is also critical managers and leaders possess enlightened self-interest, the ability to see beyond and to put aside personal anger for shared reward. It is the same in the business and financial world where prolonged competition or aggressive contract negotiations often lead to angry, vengeful and conflicting interests which need be arbitrated.

One of the greatest strengths, if not the single greatest, of the Venture Capitalist is the ability to recognize talented managers and leaders. This constant search for talent often leads to career-long relationships and the same VC working with the same managers and leaders across multiple projects. Identification of local, provincial and national managers and leaders is critical to the long-term success and viability of VSO.

Divided Populace (Inefficiency):

It is the nature of systems, markets, industries, communities, to become inefficient over time, to require a new vision to energize and unify. A vision defines an industry and demonstrates a pathway whereby all constituents benefit from efficiencies. In the VC world it is rare a start-up is funded with the purpose of creating an industry, most receive funding for an innovative vision of how to organize and drive an existing market to improved market share, profits and asset valuations.

Though vision is critical, it is only half the requirement. Leadership, committed to creating consensus amongst enemies, competitors, customers, and suppliers, stakeholders and shareholders, is the other. Where the Vision demonstrates what the table will look like and what will be left on it, Leadership provides the trusted party who ensures all parties have a place at that table.

One of the most difficult tasks is to identify all the direct and indirect participants necessary to the vision’s success and to get them to come to the table. No company or community operates in a vacuum and a vision and leadership alone are not enough. It takes a community, an industry, the active involvement of many contributors and competing interests. And to succeed, requires a thorough understanding of the community, industry, what external forces interact and impact it and of the larger and far more complex web of relationships in which it resides.

Overcoming division requires an achievable and communicable vision driven by leadership out there actively engaged in commitment building. Commitment to a vision is difficult to obtain and sustain where the risks are high, where the asset and value are not obvious, and where Return on Investment is uncertain or delayed. The role of the investor is exactly this, to help define the asset, continually refine its value and assist in attaining commitment from external resources and participants. As management does what is necessary to improve asset valuation, the investor provides access to ever greater external resources which further validates the vision and leadership.

Venture Capitalists and Green Berets excel at identifying which visions are achievable and represent cohesion, at providing access to external resources and recognizing and empowering those leaders capable of realizing the required buy-in. If we are to succeed at Village Stability Operations we must overcome divisions and realize efficiency by empowering leaders as they engage stakeholders and potential stakeholders in sustainable asset development, valuation improvement and Return on Investment.

Lack of economic development (Wealth):

The modern economy is exceedingly complex and virtually indecipherable even to individuals born, raised and highly educated in Capitalism. Imagine how much more impossible it must seem to those in pre-industrialized economies. And yet, all humans are entrepreneurial by nature, even the poorest, least educated and illiterate.

The global investment community wants to invest in the entrepreneurial spirit where we now and in the future will conduct VSO. They are prevented from doing so by a lack of economic development, which does not mean assets are nonexistent. It means those few assets which do exist have not been codified or developed to the state where they are actively increasing in value. This increase in valuation is mandatory if a Return on Investment is to be realized. And without ROI the power of the global investment community cannot be brought to bear. 

It is for the very same reason these villages are unstable breeding grounds and safe havens for insurgents. Where the entrepreneurial spirit is neither understood nor supported, where new assets are not being created, individuals will look for other means to earn a living and generate personal Wealth. This represents itself as a willingness to take from others either through corruption, crime or replacement of the existing Wealth structure.

Perpetual asset creation and improvement is essential for sustainable stability and this requires an active, local entrepreneurial community supported by an active and well connected local investor community. The continual interaction between entrepreneurs and investors drives the creation of new assets, improvements in asset valuations and a broadening of the economic base. More importantly this interaction steadily improves the knowledgebase, capabilities and capacities, the sophistication, of entrepreneurs and investors.

The sole purpose of VSO is to establish the environment in which business assets are identified, valued and improved. Whether we recognize it or not, at the heart of all human endeavors is Wealth creation and every action and decision increases or reduces Wealth. In the world of globalization, it is the Angel & Seed Investors who are responsible for establishing the conditions for new Wealth creation. If VSO is to go on and ultimately be successful the mind and Wealth creation skills and practices of these investors must become an integral skillset of the Green Beret.

With VSO, the members of a SFODA collectively organize their Wealth enabling efforts along three integrated Lines of Operation. A VC trained and enabled ODA would greatly enhance and ensure success along these same Lines of Operation:

Governance: Conducted with the purpose to establish effective and meaningful leadership and management at the local level, which engages in dispute resolution, short and long-term planning and decision making, and which is integrated with the levels of governance above it.

Equally important to effective governance and civic leadership is active and effective local business and financial leadership. Working with, yet independent of, village elders and leaders the VC educated ODA would identify and educate and empower business and financial leaders. The ODA would concurrently work with both to educate as to how governance and business leadership work in a collaborative relationship to develop and improve the community. 

Security: Operations focused on establishing the rule of law and on creating a safe environment in which the community may conduct its business and go about its life. In most contexts today this means establishing a local security force integrated with provincial and national security forces and primarily emphasizes counterinsurgency.

The Rule of Law is costly and requires an active and consistent law enforcement presence, paid sufficiently so that its members are more likely to put themselves in harms-way and less likely to use position to extort the people they are sworn to protect. This requires a sufficient, yet not overly burdensome tax revenue base, to be derived from local commerce and investments. The VC enabled ODA would work with local investors, businesses and civic leaders and with district, provincial and Host Nation governments to establish viable investment and asset taxation models which emphasize covering the costs associated with the Rule of Law.

Development: Though currently focused mostly on infrastructure, livability and quality of life improvements, these operations are ultimately and increasingly about improving the economic viability and sustainability of the community. 

The VC enabled ODA would work with village elders to identify those within the community who should be provided with business and finance training. After filtering to identify those with aptitude and desire, the ODA would conduct business training, work to identify the business assets and capacity of the community and would begin the process of asset creation and improvement and integration with the greater business community of the Host Nation.

With some obvious difference, the Lines of Operation as conducted during VSO missions already follow the same pattern as the Venture Capitalist when making, shepherding and exiting investments:

Shape: Where due diligence, planning, preparation and relationship establishment is conducted. It is during this phase in which many of the kinetic, constructive destruction, activities are conducted in order to remove security impediments to asset creation.

Hold: Once an asset has been identified and its initial form created and invested in it is of critical importance to defend, hold, this asset while it is perfected and hardened. It is most often during this time where failure occurs, when poor relationship/alliance choices or insufficient due diligence and planning becomes obvious in application. It is absolutely essential during this phase that Trust is developed.

Build: Though the most involved, time and resource consuming of the four phases, the Build phase is actually the easiest. It is during this phase the asset is actually created through entanglement, locally, provincially and nationally. This is where all of the assets and access available to the SFODA for VSO support, and the individual Green Beret’s knowledge and experience, are brought to bear in execution of the business plan.

Expand/Transition: As is critical to any and all businesses, and as a natural extension of building the business, it is necessary to expand beyond the scope of the original plan into areas and business lines which further support the mission, goals and survivability of the company. And once the company has reached the degree of entanglement required to sustain itself, it becomes necessary to transition the business to professional, and in the case of VSO, local, provincial and national management which can better handle the day to day and future operations. 

The desired endstate of VSO and a Venture Capital investment are the same, to develop a stable asset out of next to nothing, which can sustain and improve its position in the marketplace and increase in value. The purpose is to create an entity which will continue to add value to both shareholders and stakeholders. In the case of Venture Capital this represents itself as companies, while in VSO it represents itself as local economies and the governance and Rule of Law which enables them.

Green Berets are becoming masters of modern IW through the lessons learned conducting VSO. We have demonstrated a solid understanding of governance and security but are only marginally making improvements in economic development. However, if VSO is to be successful the Regiment and each ODA must also master the VC skillset and become masters at creating Wealth and non-welfare state jobs.

Summary

The threats of today and tomorrow are not rogue nuclear nations or traditional nation states. The threats now come from failed nation states and those states which wall their people off from globalization. Because, wherever there is economic oppression or underdevelopment, wherever globalization is not being allowed to improve the standard of living of the common man, there is instability. And where there is instability the investor community, which is the driving force of the global economy, is hindered in their ability to improve standards of living.

In the world of globalization, powered by economics and finance, there already exists a highly seasoned Irregular Warfare expert. This expert is out there, in every corner of the world, focused on expanding and enhancing stability. These experts are Venture Capitalists and in particular Angel & Seed investors and they are applying unconventional minds and thinking and conventional assets to create Wealth out of nothing more than the raw entrepreneurial spirit at the heart of all seven billion of us.

The mission and purpose of the Green Beret and the Venture Capitalist is the same. Their common mission is to bring stability to the now global economic engine, to bring down the walls which prevent the free flow of ideas, people, Capital and Wealth. The purpose shared by both is the War on Oppression. And both are out there every day employing economics to Free the Oppressed.

In the short time I have been in the Regiment I have come across a number of potentially very successful Venture Capitalists, Wealth creators. They have without exception been rebels, unconventional thinkers uncomfortable with the doctrine based conformity that Special Forces is becoming. Every single one of them is an individual who thinks of nothing but the War on Oppression and how to win it. We must remember Special Forces was established by these very same nonconformists and it was this which once made us great. These voices must once more be heard

Source

One Team’s Approach to Village Stability Operations

Written by: CPT Rory Hanlin

This paper is an effort to demonstrate my team’s approach to VSO using the principles and TTPs that numerous articles have recently highlighted in the July-September issue of Special Warfare Magazine. It illustrates the practical application of the principles of VSO in the current operational environment and details exactly how these principles appear through the prism of the Military Decision-Making Process. This is the product of the team’s assessment, planning, execution, after action review and refinement process over the last 150 days of VSO operations in an austere and isolated location. 

The Village Stability Operations Methodology is a bottom up approach that employs USSOF teams and partnered units embedded with villagers in order to establish security and to support and promote socio-economic development and good governance. Each Village Stability Team is a distinct entity with its own culture, appearances and way of operating, which reflects the Afghan dynamic of that particular site. It is true that Village Stability Platforms (VSP) throughout Afghanistan vary greatly within the context of conducting Village Stability Operations (VSO), yet every VSP applies the same principles of the methodology and shepherds the village through the phases of Shape, Hold, Build, and Expand / Transition; culminating with connecting the village to GIRoA through the district and province. 

Our VSP is one such site that has made significant progress in the year since USSOF teams began the VSO effort. This VSP is no exception to the rule; it has its own unique blend of VSO applied by the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA) and based on the cultural realities of the district. But like all VSO, operations are broadly categorized into Governance, Development and Security. It is useful, then to illuminate the particularities of specific VSPs to determine how the principles of VSO are at play across a broad spectrum of different and distinct sites. This analysis is an effort to do just that: to identify how the principles of VSO filter through the Military Decision Making Process to render a coherent campaign plan with a clear way forward. This analysis will cover the ODA’s plan for the Governance, Security and Development lines of operations with a definition of success in each.

The district in which we are operating presents distinct challenges that arise primarily from its deeply divided human and physical terrain and the lack of coalition and GIRoA presence over the last decade. Since our arrival we have continually developed the ground situation and our understanding of the district’s idiosyncrasies. Based on this continual assessment, progress along the VSO shape-hold-build-transition/expansion model is inhibited by 3 key factors: a defunct system of governance, a divided population, and an under-developed economy based in subsistence farming. These factors collude to form a survivalist culture with a zero-sum worldview.

Currently, both traditional and GIRoA governance systems are defunct. The village elders that make up the traditional governance structures have had all visages of power stripped from them by years of constant fighting, instability and successive regime changes. They do not have access to the resources necessary to establish themselves as local power brokers. The vast majority of the elders represent villages dominated by subsistence farming. These villages do not produce any respectable degree of disposable income, thus the village and elders are denied the most functional source of power.

Tribal disputes between the Barakzai and Alizai tribes also play a key role in dividing the population. The Barakzai account for approximately 50% of the population and have been the traditional power holders. The disenfranchised Alizai tribe is between 25% and 35% of the population. Smaller tribes of less than 5% of the population comprise the remaining population. The Ishaqzi tribe is the most significant actor in this group. Largely discontented with the current government, the Ishaqzi are centered around Sakzi Kalay and are a traditional supporter of the Taliban in the district.

The harsh terrain, exacerbated by austere weather conditions, with no major Main Supply Route and limited movement through mountain passes truncates the lines of communication and interchange between the villages in the district and between the district and Kandahar proper. One of the most inhibiting factors all aspects of progress in the district, the harsh terrain limits the district government’s ability to collect information and project force via the ANP. It raises the cost of moving goods to markets and erodes the opportunities for economic expansion.

The majority of the district survives on subsistence farming. These farms do not yield any surplus income that can be invested in local economic growth. Currently, there are no natural resources in the district capable of driving economic growth other than the arable land. Any local economic growth will be based on increasing the ability of local farmers to produce surplus of agricultural products and preserve those products to take advantage of optimal market conditions.

Because the populace cannot conceive of cooperation in pursuit of a mutually beneficial outcome, it will ensure the survival of the individual, the family, the village and the tribe. The populace fights each other for any and all CF assistance, believing in a zero-sum game which cannot be mutually beneficial to all. To change this unproductive mentality, we are pursuing three key lines of operation in the district that addresses the major issues and problems. First, the ODA is focusing on enhancing the efficacy of the district government, its inner-cooperation and its relationship with the populace. Second, the team is actively fostering economic growth through various agricultural and civil affairs programs focused on the District Center and bazaar. Third, the ODA is expanding the ANSFs’ ability to secure the district, expanding the overall ANSF security apparatus and establishing them as the district’s sole dispute arbiter.

Governance

Inefficiency, corruption and tribal bias characterized governance in the district. The length of tenure, differing tribal affiliation, lifelong connections to the populace and relative prevalence of financial corruption have severely hampered the district leadership’s ability to effectively govern without bias. Our goal is to enhance the district government by focusing on three tasks: empowering the District Governor, establishing ANSFs’ monopoly on the legitimate use of force and improving the efficacy of the district government.

Empowering the District Governor

The tribes of the district recognize the district governor as a fair and impartial judge, and our first effort is to build his power base. The District Governor (DG) has no functioning power over the ANP and lacks the ability to enforce his decisions through force of arms. The DG also lacks resources he can disburse to or withhold from the population. Because of these two factors, the district populace sees the DG as largely unable to address key grievances. To improve the DG’s popular perception, we are executing these four sub-tasks:

Establish the executive shura. This provides the governor with a forum to engage the collective population. We are advising the district governor on the best way to use these shuras to expand and solidify his power base. The district has elected a four man shura to advise the District Governor on where to build small critical infrastructure projects (wells, irrigation ditches, etc). This District Development Assembly provides the necessary connection from the District Governor to the people receiving aid.

Demonstrate the district governor’s access to resources. This requires enabling the governor to provide basic services, specifically popular access to medical care, access to a district school, and year-round low cost transportation to the provincial services and markets in Kandahar.

Empower the district governor to grant or refuse village development projects. We are encouraging the DG to focus on the construction of check dams, storage silos and farm-to-market roads that link towns to the district center.

Enable the DG to build a broad district government. By authorizing the DG to hire key leaders in the district and pay them a stable salary or to fire individuals whose villages defect from GIRoA, we encourage these leaders to assume a personal vested interest in supporting the government.

Improving the Efficacy of Government 

For years, the District Government has consisted of two positions: the District Governor and the District Chief of Police (DCOP). However, this leadership duo has a relationship rife with disagreements, miscommunication, and power struggles. The DG of the Alizai tribe and the DCOP of the Barakzai tribe have held their positions for six and eight years respectively. This dysfunctional relationship leads to an ineffective governing body split largely along tribal lines. Additionally, no governmental staff exists to support these two positions. The DCOP has acted as the district’s judge, logistics officer, tribal affairs officer, general contractor, and cook. Both leaders are forced to govern outside of their traditional roles in order to accomplish marginal successes. To encourage better cooperation between the districts two main political leaders, we are executing these two sub-tasks: 

Persuade the DG/DCOP to act in their governmental roles. As long as the focus and time of the district leaders remains so inefficiently divided, they will never be able to address the district’s most important issues. We are addressing the district leadership’s overextension by advising them to narrow their role, delegate to trusted individuals and focus on improving the entire district.

Improve communication between the two district leaders. To increase both the frequency and quality of the communication among the district leadership, the ODA conducts nightly meetings with the DG, DCOP and NDS Chief. The ODA focuses on constructing positive sum scenarios to create a balance of power between the District Governor and the Chief of Police that encourages mutual cooperation. These nightly meetings also allow the ODA to advise/assist in all major governmental decision-making, ensuring tribal rivalries and past biases are removed from government policy.

Monopolizing the ANP’s legitimate use of force

In recent years, the DCOP and his ANP have aggravated the relationship between the government security apparatus and the local populace. A history of negative actions toward the Alizai and Ishaqzi tribes has bred their deep-seeded mistrust and anger towards the ANP. Additionally, insurgents in the district constantly intimidate and harass the local populace, thereby capitalizing on the pervading survivalist mentality and coercing the populace to acquiesce to their demands. To refute the popular view that ANSF no longer hold legitimate authority to police the district, we are executing these three sub-tasks:

Improve the public image of ANP. The ODA plans on improving the ANP’s image by supervising, advising, assisting and participating in their operations at all times, ensuring they act as neutral mediators in all situations. 

Delegitimize the insurgents’ use of violence. The ODA is using its attached MISO assets to attack the insurgents’ use of force, haphazard IED emplacement and intimidation of villagers. Broadcast radio messages are aimed at delegitimizing insurgent operations in the district.

Train ANP on proper policing procedures. The ODA is addressing ANP’s lack of professionalism by allowing the Embedded Police Mentors (EPM), subject matter experts in policing, to train and advise the ANP in the conduct of policing in the district. These EPMs will also advise the DCOP on proper procedures for the use of force, imprisonment and conflict resolution.

Development

The underdeveloped economic system in the district is one of the most critical factors enabling insurgent activity and freedom of movement in the district. The lack of surplus production and access to markets discourages the residents from economically engaging the rest of Afghanistan. In turn, there is no taxable financial surplus to spark the provincial government’s interest in the district. The lack of security and paved roads combined with a porous border makes commerce in Pakistan more cost efficient than commerce in Afghanistan. These factors combine to make the district disenfranchised and economically isolated from the rest of Afghanistan. Our goal is to improve the economy by stabilizing the supply-demand relationship in the district by executing four tasks: developing the bazaar into an economic center, creating a local surplus of agricultural production, lowering the cost of moving goods to markets and providing basic essential services that support long-term economic and social development.

Developing the bazaar into an economic center

The ODA is focused on creating a bazaar that supports year-round economic activity and functions as the cultural and social hub of the district. In our first step, we renovated the bazaar using the “cash-for-work” concept. To date, local workers cleaned the bazaar, installed trash cans, and dug a network of drainage ditches to keep the roads in the bazaar passable during the rainy seasons, and are planning on install lighting throughout the bazaar to increase the length of the business day. The ANP conduct regular patrols in the bazaar to maintain a security presence. Recently, contractors have arrived to build the District Clinic, a new District Center (DC), and refurbish the district’s police station. Additionally the contractors will build the district’s first road through the bazaar and DC connecting the surrounding villages and farmlands to its main marketplace and seat of governance.

Support a year-round farm-to-buyer connection. This connection requires supporting continuous communication between local farm owners and buyers that have access to capital reserves and broader markets in Afghanistan’s urban centers. We can identify farmers that will grow a surplus of agricultural produce and connect them to buyers in large urban centers. These buyers begin inspecting the farmers’ crops during the growing season and agree on a price prior to harvest time. This guarantees the farmers a set profit and ensures they have a vested interest in maximizing the productive output of their farms. 

Start critical businesses through micro-grants. Attendance in the bazaar will increase proportional to the increase in desirable goods available in the bazaar shops at competitive prices. We can speed up this process by giving micro-grants to individuals —to bring new goods into the market. Goods like the brick-fuel press and services like fee-based VOIP communications are a more efficient alternative to those currently available and spur growth of inter-dependence in the district. 

Creating local surplus of agricultural produce

While enjoying the soil and climate conditions to support year-round planting and harvesting cycles, district farmers work their farms only a few months out of the year due to limited crop diversity and scarce water supply. This problem culminates at harvest time because the majority of the district harvests their crops at the same time. Without the ability to preserve their harvest for the most favorable market conditions, farmers must deliver their surplus crops to market simultaneously. This surplus exceeds demand for these goods and depresses the price to a point where the profit margin disappears. In addition, the crop supply cannot meet the district demand throughout the remainder of the year, destroying the economic incentive for any excess agricultural production. By setting the agricultural conditions that allow the local famers to produce crops beyond basic subsistence, we give them potential access to a profit margin. In addition, farming becomes a profitable alternative to illicit employment. In order to create this agricultural surplus, we are executing three sub-tasks:

Improve crop quality and diversity. To institute a winter growing season with the help of agricultural contractors we are continually distributing higher quality and more durable seeds to the local farmers. In the long term, this harvest will produce enough wheat for each farmer to both feed his family and have enough harvest to plant during the next November and December. 

Improve access to critical and scarce agricultural resources. To increasing farmers’ access to water, seed, fertilizer, and farming knowledge, we are encouraging and supporting the construction of check dams and other water conservation techniques. The winter wheat and other seed dissemination programs are addressing the narrow and limited access to seeds. In addition, we are distributing urea-based fertilizer, as well as offering a urea nitrate for ammonium nitrate exchange program. To enhance farming knowledge, we (in partnership with USDA) have constructed two model farms to teach improved farming practices to the population.

Improve methods to preserve goods for future sales. By teaching produce preservation techniques and building storage silos we can stabilize the market for these crops through the year. This improves the profit margin for the farmers and encourages them to implement their farming practices throughout the round.

Lowering the costs of commerce

The district has no transportation infrastructure. Roads in the district are rough sewn out edges of even rougher terrain that facilitate marginally faster movement by motorcycle or pack animal. Trucks can traverse only a handful of roads. These travel conditions prohibit an efficient transit of goods to market, which greatly incentivizes subsistence farming. To facilitate the efficient trade of goods, we are executing two sub-tasks:

Build farm to market roads in the district. These roads are graveled, improved roads that connect the DC Bazaar to villages and subsequently from villages to the farm. These roads will help encourage farmers to bring their agricultural surplus to market for sale by lowering the cost of moving goods, as well as easing and shortening the journey. The first road has recently been completed, connecting surrounding farmlands to their villages.

Facilitate and supervise construction of the DC Loop. This road will run through the bazaar and the district DC. Currently contractors have begun the road and will complete it late this year.

Provide basic essential infrastructure and services

The District Government has no capacity to address the basic needs of its people. The district has little medical infrastructure, with all of the populace receiving medical aid from local doctors with minimal education and skill. The extremely underdeveloped school system lacks a formal education system with a graduated grade structure. Informal education exists in mosques and madrassas scattered around the district, and consists entirely of religious learning. Lack of support from the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Education exacerbates these problems and renders the District Government unable to provide for its people. To facilitate the district’s delivery of the essential services, we will execute three sub-tasks:

Fund schooling and distribute school supplies. We are working with the DG to determine the locations of schools that will be instrumental in educating the children of the district. Two major schools have opened with a total of 350 students. We have enabled the district to open its own school near the bazaar with 20 students. We have also empowered the DG to be the focal point for all school supply distribution, delivering school supplies monthly to a total of over 1700 children. The program facilitates the transfer of responsibilities to the Ministry of Education representative for the district.

Facilitate the construction of the district clinic. Previously, medical infrastructure was limited to small, private practice doctors operating out of a random assortment of villages detached from the district government. The ODA has addressed this issue by funding a clinic focused on preventative medicine, public health and movement to higher care. It has recently opened in the bazaar. This temporary clinic provides basic medical care to the local populace and provides the district with its first centralized treatment facility in recent history. It houses the district medical staff until a more permanent district clinic is constructed. The clinic has a dedicated doctor with up to ten community health workers. Contractors also have recently started construction on the district clinic, located just northeast of the bazaar. This is a more permanent solution to the issue of lack of medical treatment in the district. This district clinic will eventually offer multiple doctors, nurses and community health workers in a full service setting.

Refurbish the District Police Station, build a new District Center and Refurbish the District Mosque. These three other major infrastructure projects will address the needs of both the local populace and the district government. The current district center is severely lacking in basic hygiene, available living and work space, jail facilities, latrines and showers, electricity, kitchen and mess facilities. The current district center will be refurbished and upgraded to become the District ANP police station. 

The district annex will provide the DG with his advisors and secretaries workspace and lodging. The district mosque remains unfinished in the bazaar next to the district center. The UAE provides funding for mosque construction, while we oversee the contractors. Once built, the mosque will provide a central location for the local populace to gather, pray and interact with one another. We hope it will become an important cultural symbol of the government’s commitment to its people, cooperation between Afghans and their government and the overall progress of the district.

Security

The nature of the district presents numerous unique challenges that severely impede the security infrastructure from protecting the populace. The harsh, mountainous terrain dominates the district, restricting travelers to motorcycle and pack animal movement. The mountains scattered across the district present numerous opportunities for the Taliban to use as bed down locations, training camps and areas from which to stage attacks and emplace IEDs.

The district austerity and its rural populace inhibit the support it receives from higher levels of the Afghan Government. Until recently, the provincial government had completely ignored the district, preferring to treat it with benign neglect. This lack of support from the provincial government has lead to an unsupervised, ill-fitted, under-manned, poorly led and largely untrained Afghan National Police (ANP) force that polices the district with imbibed tribal biases and little self-restraint. In fact, tribal differences in the district play a key role in determining the distribution of power, money and resources. 

These factors collude to create a serious security gap, which the Taliban exploit with their own customs and law to effectively intimidate, harass and coerce the populace into general acquiescence, despite the fact that many of the village elders are ex-mujahedeen fighters. Our goal is to build security by expelling the Taliban out of traditional operating areas in the district by executing three tasks: disrupting insurgent operations, supporting the district ANSF infrastructure and securing the district’s key terrain.

Disrupting insurgent operations

Some patrols focus on engaging the populace, conducting Key Leader Engagements, Afghan Local Police recruitment, Civil Affairs project evaluation, IED location/reduction, intelligence gathering and establishing a security presence in the district. Other patrols focus on IED emplacement disruption/deterrence, reconnaissance/surveillance and overwatch. To successfully disrupt the insurgents operations in the district and build white space, we will execute two additional sub-tasks:

Remove insurgents and disrupt major resupply routes: By taking the Taliban personalities off of the battlefield we deny them the necessary leadership to conduct operations.

Identify/disrupt insurgent district operations. By establishing a robust intelligence network, coordinating and enhancing intelligence collection through the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and ANP, conducting sensitive site exploitation on all IEDs, and increasing Intelligence, Surveillance Reconnaissance collection, we are acquiring a comprehensive picture of Taliban operational Tactics Techniques and Procedures in the district.

Supporting the district ANSF security infrastructure

The provincial government’s denial of support to the district’s ANP, NDS and Afghan Border Police (ABP) has crippled the ability of the security apparatus to effectively project force, recruit, equip and train new members, promote from within and address logistical deficiencies. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) program in the district has the potential to develop into the most important pillar in the ANSF structure and represents a promising way forward for establishing enduring security in the district. Though this program shows potential, the populace has been slow to cooperate. Village elders in the district have been supportive of the idea but are reluctant to demonstrate a substantive commitment, citing Taliban intimidation, coercion and fear of reprisals. With time, the ALP program may prove to be the decisive chapter in closing the book on the Taliban’s hold of the populace and in bringing lasting security to the district as a whole.

Increase the number of ANP. We have recently received two embedded police mentors to assist in training, advising, mentoring and equipping the district ANP. They have a direct connection to mentors with the MOI and have already established more visibility on the true number of ANP in the district, their supply of weapons and ammunition, their logistical infrastructure and the level of corruption. This link will also facilitate a necessary increase in the number of ANP in the district. Since the district ANP have no NCOs, only the DCOP has arrest authority. We plan to promote high achieving ANP soldiers to NCO rank and to populate the patrolman ranks with new recruits.

Expand the NDS role in the district. Historically, the district NDS have added little value to the security and intelligence network of the district. They lacked leadership, purpose, and motivation. After lobbying the NDS provincial leadership, they sent a strong leader to reorganize, reshape and assert control of the NDS mission in the district. Since his arrival, we have established an extremely productive relationship of information swapping. We will continue to pursue a greater relationship with the NDS to improve intelligence gathering.

Solidify the logistical support chain. While the ANP and NDS organizations have logistics officers in the provincial headquarters, they suffer from the district’s austerity and almost completely rely on us for all classes of supply. Recently, we asked the Kandahar PCOP to create a mobile maintenance team (MMT) comprised of a complete package of maintenance and resupply personnel from MOI to travel to the district on a monthly basis to resolve all logistics issues.

Support the ABP Checkpoints. ABP’s checkpoints (CP) along the AFPAK border range from a heavily fortified structure with an array of fully manned guard towers to a small almost abandoned outpost with little to no support. We communicate with the ABP CPs through the DCOP, and we plan on continued support of the checkpoints in the future.

Build ALP. We have trained and equipped ALP mostly centered on the DC. We plan to expand the role of ALP in the security infrastructure as we continue to train more of them further away from the DC.

Securing key terrain

IED emplacement in the river valleys of the district are a threat to local nationals, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Coalition Forces in the district. Both ANP CPs and patrolling will solidify the recent security gains and change the popular negative perception of security among the populace. A robust and permanent ANSF presence will prevent insurgent manipulation of the populace through their use of IED emplacement, night letters, intimidation, harassment and coercion. The support of the village elders in the key villages along the major wadis of the district will determine its future. Additionally, large civil affairs projects that provide the district populace with demonstrable progress are extremely important to secure from insurgent attacks. In addition to the civil infrastructure destruction, a successful attack would be an important victory at a time when the insurgency is perceived as weak.

Build ANSF CPs along the district’s major river valleys. We plan to establish fortified checkpoints manned by ANP and ALP near key villages in support of village security, ALP recruitment, infrastructure protection, IED emplacement interdiction, and demonstration of the government’s commitment to security.

Protect major CA projects in the district. The ANP and NDS stationed at the district center are responsible for securing the planned civil infrastructure projects in the bazaar and district center. Additionally, the ODA will construct two fortified ANSF CPs near the bazaar to prevent a possible insurgent attack.

Success in the District

In Village Stability Operations establishing a common operating picture and defining success in pursuit of executing the commander’s intent is a critical factor that affects the entire team effort. VSO in the district is characterized by managing and completing a vast array of seemingly unrelated tasks that interact in complex unimaginable ways, all in a system of decentralized execution. As the ODA continues along its three lines of operation we are constantly developing metrics to measure progress toward a common understanding of “success.” This common understanding is vital in achieving unity of effort within the context of VSO. Without this common understanding and subsequent unity of effort, the ODA would be left with a disorganized array of concurrent operations that would likely result in either a duplication of effort or even worse, team members working against each other. 

Security

District ANP/ALP have the monopoly on the legitimate use of force and use it responsibly

ALP checkpoint system links villages to the Chief of Police and the ANP; ALP dissuades insurgent intimidation, harassment and coercion

Insurgents are disrupted and freedom of maneuver along major ratlines is significantly degraded

ABP CPs able to effectively repel insurgent attacks and secure the border area

Governance

District Governor promotes and executes development projects through the District Development Assembly shura

District government seen as a legitimate, neutral arbiter of Afghan law. Government able to effectively resolve disputes

DG/DCoP relationship is balanced and adequately effective

Development

Lines of communication are open for the citizens of the district to major urban centers

Economy based on Afghan products and not solely on Pakistani based products

Infrastructure is improved to facilitate faster, easier movement from farm to market and village to village

District Center Bazaar provides a market for the local farmers’ crop surplus and accordingly becomes the economic center of the district.

About the author: 

CPT Rory Hanlin is the Detachment Commander of an ODA in 3rd SFG(A) and is currently deployed conducting VSO in Afghanistan. Previous to his assignment as an ODA Team Leader, he served as an Infantry Rifle Platoon Leader and Executive Officer in the 82nd Airborne Division in Iraq from 2007-2008.

Source

Octave Fusion (2012)

In a mission codenamed Octave Fusion, on January 24, 2012, SEAL Team Six successfully rescued an American woman and a Danish man who had been detained by Somali bandits in north-central Somalia. 

Jessica Buchanan, 32, and Poul Hagen Thisted, 60, had been abducted around the area of Galkayo three months earlier while working as aid workers helping to remove land mines. Officials stated said plans for a rescue operation had been under development for weeks, but acted after discovering that Buchanan's health was deteriorating due to an undisclosed illness.

The special operations forces were prepared to capture the hostage takers but this proved unfeasible as nine "heavily armed" kidnappers were killed. The SEALs parachuted at night before advancing two miles to the enemy compound on foot. After securing the safety of Thisted and Buchanan the team, which suffered no injuries, was extracted by helicopter.

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Dragunov (SVD)

The Dragunov Sniper Rifle (Russian: Снайперская винтовка Драгунова, Snayperskaya Vintovka Dragunova, abbreviated SVD, GRAU index 6V1), is a semiautomatic rifle designed by Evgeniy Fedorovich Dragunov in the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1963. It is basically a battle rifle with a scope. The SVD was the world's first purpose-built military precision marksman's rifle, and is common (along with several variants) throughout the former Eastern Bloc. The Dragunov SVD is one of two rifles made by Dragunov, the second being the Dragunov Tiger.

History

The need for a new precision platoon-level, semi-automatic rifle became apparent to Soviet military leadership in the 1950s, and in 1958 a contest among Soviet arms designers was opened for the creation of such a rifle. The winner of the contest was a rifle designed by a team headed by Evgeniy Fedorovich Dragunov. In 1963, the Dragunov Sniper Rifle was accepted into the arsenal of the Soviet Army.

Ballistics

The SVD is chambered for the 7.62 x 54R rimmed cartridge, with a muzzle velocity of about 830 meters per second. The rifle can accept the older Mosin Nagant M1891/30 cartridge, but a more accurate 7N1 round was designed specifically for it. The 7N1 was the original load developed by Russian armorer Sabelnikov in conjunction with the development of the SVD back in the late 1950s. It has a steel jacketed projectile with an air pocket, steel core, and a lead knocker in the base for maximum terminal effect. The 7N1 was replaced in 1999 by the 7N14 round. The 7N14 is a new load developed for the SVD. It consists of a 151 grain projectile which travels at the same 2723 ft/s, but it has a lead core projectile and is supposed to be the more accurate of the two. Nikolai Bezborodov, head of R&D at Izhmash, stated that it was the most accurate load for the SVD. However, the Soviet Union never offered this ammunition for export, and it is very rare outside of Russia. This ammunition can be identified by its packaging which has Russian: "Снайперские" (Sniper) stamped on its crates, cans, and paper wrap to prevent it from being wasted in other weapon applications.

Although the rifle is lethal at ranges above 1000 m, it is not really intended or designed for ultimate accuracy and can only reasonably engage targets at up to 600 m with standard ammunition, achieving 2 Minutes of arc at that distance. This range and accuracy can be improved upon with the specialty ammunition. Inaccuracy in this weapon is primarily due to the effects of the semiautomatic action of the SVD on the barrel harmonics; the accuracy of the rifle suffers at greater ranges. However, the weapon handles easily for its size, and is designed to be very durable; the gas system and bore are chrome lined to resist against corrosion and it is easy to clean. The rifle also has a bayonet lug for close-quarters combat, although the mounting of a bayonet will cause a slight change in center of gravity, affecting the handling qualities of the rifle, and possibly accuracy.

Equipment

The SVD comes standard with a PSO-1 scope, a 4×24 device which includes a battery-operated reticule and a passive infrared filter. At the time of its development, the PSO-1 scope was considered one of the most advanced sniper scope designs ever fielded. Its reticule consists of multiple aiming points (chevrons) which are used for distances beyond 1000 meters. There is also a range finder built in to the reticule which allows approximate distance calculations based on the height of an average human (which the Soviets felt was 1.7 meters tall). Many other conventional and night-vision optics are available. In case of scope failure, the rifle has non-detachable iron sights, a feature that does not exist on most sniper rifles. The SVD also came with a bayonet identical to that of the AK-47, a cheek rest, a carrying strap, magazine pouch and basic cleaning utensils and maintenance tools.

Battlefield Usage

While the Soviet army was in operation each squad was issued one SVD. Soldiers issued an SVD typically are specially trained for the weapon. They move with their squad and are intended to increase the range of their infantry squad up to and above 600 m (without an SVD, the effective range of a squad when the rifle began production would have been 300 m due to the limitations of the AK-47). As such, it is not a sniper's rifle in the sense used by, among others, the U.S. military, but the first example of what is today known as a designated marksman's weapon.

Designed with the simple purpose of extending a squad's range, the weapon is rugged and durable. This shows in the fact that it is designed to have a mounted bayonet and has backup iron sights in case the scope fails. The rifle's reliability is still recognized, and the weapon is still fielded by the Russian army and Russian law enforcement agencies.

Russian small arms are generally regarded as very sturdy and this has led to widespread use and long "careers" for particular Dragunovs. The rifle has been used in numerous conflicts around the world such as the Vietnam War, the Lebanese Civil War, Chechnya, Operation Desert Storm and in the Iraq War to name only a few. As seen in the picture, guerilla forces may adopt considerably more informal tactics than used by professional armies: this insurgent may make up to some degree for a lack of a spotter by adopting positions on the fly.

Modernization

In the 1980s, Evgeniy Fedorovich Dragunov developed the SVDS (Snayperskaya Vintovka Dragunova Skladnaja), a version of the SVD with a folding metal stock, shortened (590 mm) but heavier barrel, and a shortened flash suppressor, intended for paratroopers and motorized infantry. The bayonet lug has also been removed.

Initial versions of the SVD were manufactured with wooden furniture (stock, pistol grip and handguard). Today the SVD is made with polymer furniture to decrease weight and manufacturing costs and increase ergonomics.

Variants

USSR/Russian: SVD, SVDS, SVU (a bullpup version of the SVD with a shorter (520 mm) barrel, bipod and a flash/sound suppressor), SVU-A (SVU with selective fire capability).

VSS vintores is a silenced and shortened version of the Dragunov SVD.

Chinese: Type 79 and Type 85 (military designation), Norinco NDM-86 (commercial export in .308 Winchester).

Polish: SWD-M, a modernized version with heavier barrel, detachable bipod, new side mount and PCO LD-6x42 scope. About 70 were created in ZM Lucznik for Polish Army and Ministry of Internal Affairs units before the project was canceled in favour of buying new 7.62 mm SAKO TRG-21 rifles.

Civilian version of the rifle is called Tigr (Russian: Тигр, Tiger). It is also available in a variety of large game hunting calibers including .308 Winchester.

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