Central Asia: US Special Forces Help Train Praetorian Guards

US Special Forces have trained units in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that have served as “praetorian guards” for those respective countries' presidents, according to diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks.

In one 2007 cable, the US Embassy in Dushanbe described US training of Tajikistan's National Guard. According to the cable, National Guard units had undergone four training sessions with officers from US Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). The cable noted also that the National Guard “is primarily designed to protect the Rahmon regime and respond to him personally. Essentially, they are President Rahmon's own Praetorian Guard and they clearly receive the priority of fill and perks within the Tajik defense establishment.” The cable noted that a fifth training session was scheduled for the following January.

In another cable, from January 2009, the US Embassy in Bishkek described the training of Kyrgyz special forces: “Through SOCCENT programs, we have already constructed several ranges and facilities for Kyrgyz Special Forces units; to include the Ministry of Defense's 25th Scorpions and the National Guard's Panthers. We have also purchased new equipment for these units.”

In 2010, local media reported that the Panthers were disbanded and their personnel, equipment and barracks were reassigned to a new unit, named Arstan (Lions), under the direct control of then-president Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Arstan failed in its mission, however: just two months later,Bakiyev was overthrown.

“In the last two years of Bakiyev's rule, the entire structure of the military changed,” said Erica Marat, an analyst of Central Asian politics who has studied regional security forces. “Bakiyev put in his relatives and political allies to key military and security posts so that the whole structure belonged to him and his brother and there was no oversight -- it was his personal military. And he saw an opportunity to get money from the United States for 'anti-terror' programs.”

Officials from the US State Department, which administers military aid, declined to comment to EurasiaNet.org. Representatives from US Special Operations Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the US embassies in Bishkek and Dushanbe did not respond to requests for comment.

According to the most recent State Department budget documents justifying military aid to the region, “assistance to the Tajikistan Ministry of Defense and the National Guard will continue to support more professional and capable ground forces. Reforms to the defense establishment will result in a force prepared to cooperate with United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in peacekeeping and other multilateral operations.”

Assistance to Kyrgyzstan “will be used to provide equipment to military forces to enhance their ability to protect the country from terrorist threats. The US Government will work directly with Kyrgyz Security Forces to identify shortfalls in equipment necessary to complete the security mission.”

US law prohibits military aid going to units that have committed human rights violations. But there is nothing that forbids assistance on the grounds that it would help a particular president, rather than the country's security as a whole.

But situations like this raise the question of whether the aid is “given as quid-pro-quo for access, as opposed to help promote security reform to Western standards,” said Alexander Cooley, a professor of political science at Barnard College, and an expert on Central Asia and US security assistance. [Editor’s Note: Cooley serves on the advisory board of the Open Society Foundations’ (OSF) Central Eurasia Project (CEP). EurasiaNet.org operates under OSF’s auspices].

Without proper oversight, assistance projects like this “can easily turn into junkets, or methods by which authoritarian governments use the pretense of combating security threats, such as terrorism, to procure external assistance to secure their own regime’s survival,” Cooley said.

Marat suggested Rahmon and Bakiyev used US assistance for their personal benefit. They saw it as "something the United States just has to do, and they can do with it whatever they want,” Marat said. She added that it is too early to tell how the new president of Kyrgyzstan, Almazbek Atambayev, will treat American aid.

The exercises in Tajikistan included training in “counterterror tactics,” weapons training, communications, combat lifesaving, patrolling, night operations, marksmanship, close quarters battle and the law of war, according to reports that the Department of Defense must submit to Congress every year on the Special Forces exercises it undertakes with other countries. In 2007, US Marine Corps and Army Special Forces trained with 175 Special Forces troops from Kyrgyzstan and 250 from Tajikistan. One training event in Kyrgyzstan was of the Panthers and another Special Forces unit, dubbed Alpha. Another event was with “Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorist Elements,” according to the report.

At a subsequent 2008 training event involving the Alphas, according to another cable, a misunderstanding resulted in Ministry of Interior forces took the US soldiers' weapons, gear and money, which they did not manage to recover by the time they left. There were apparently no hard feelings: when General David Petraeus, then commander of US Central Command, visited in 2009 he told Kyrgyzstan officials that “he wanted to expand the cooperation between SOCCENT and the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) "Alphas" unit. Petraeus also congratulated the government for carrying out a successful operation against terrorists in southern Kyrgyzstan.”

The US military also has pursued special operations training with Turkmenistan, according to Wikileaks cables. In January 2010, the commander of Special Operations US Central Command, Maj. Gen. Charles Cleveland, met with Turkmenistan's Minister of Defense Gen. Major Yaylym Berdiev and other defense officials. At the meeting, Maj. Gen. Cleveland proposed “developing a relationship with Turkmen forces with special operations type missions,” according to the cable.

“Some examples of such cooperation might include the possible training of MoD snipers, close quarters combat/clearing buildings, and medical training. Other possibilities, such as working with the Turkmen navy, were brought up,” the cable continued. The Turkmen side was receptive, the cable reported; “while the Ministry's comments could be a polite ‘we'll see,’ there seemed to be genuine interest and a possibility for following up these meetings and turning the proposals into more concrete events, from subject matter expert visits and information exchanges to US training of Turkmen SOF, and eventually even joint US-Turkmen SOF training events.”

It's not clear if the “events” outlined in the January 2010 cable actually took place.

According to the DoD reports to Congress, US special forces have engaged in a handful of recent exercises with Georgia and Azerbaijan. In September of 2009, US special operations soldiers conducted a month-long training with 40 commandos from Azerbaijan's Ministry of National Security, the intelligence-gathering group that is the successor to the KGB of Soviet Azerbaijan. In 2008, US Army and Navy Special Forces trained with 39 troops of the same ministry over two separate JCET events. In 2007, US Special Forces soldiers trained with 40 troops from Azerbaijan's Naval Special Mission Unit 641, and 40 more the following year.

In 2009, US Army Special Forces were to train with undisclosed forces in Armenia, but according to the SOCOM documents, that event was cancelled at the “host nation request.”

In 2008, US Army Special Forces trained with 100 members of a Georgian Special Forces brigade. The month-long training ended July 1, shortly before Georgia and Russia went to war. The previous year, elite US troops had trained with 400 soldiers from a Georgian Special Forces battalion. Two exercises had been scheduled for Georgia in 2009, but were canceled “post-Russian incursion.”

In 2007, US Special Forces were scheduled to train with their Kazakh counterparts, but the event was canceled because the US unit was unavailable.

Πηγή

ANA Commandos Demonstrate Ability to Operate Independently

HERAT PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Commandos from the Afghan National Army’s 2nd Company, 9th Kandak, conducted air and ground operations in the Herat province, including a patrol in the Deh Lattah village, Guzarah district, Dec. 16.

The operation, which was the company’s second Mi-17 helicopter-supported mission, was implemented to search out the presence of insurgents, identify more efficient patrol routes, and develop rapport with the local population of Deh Lattah.

The mission was completely planned, coordinated, and executed by the Commandos, with very little guidance from coalition special operations forces. Based on intelligence acquired by the Commandos, 2nd Company was able to plan, request, and synchronize the Mi-17 air support.

While patrolling the Deh Lattah village, local citizens were very receptive to the ANA presence and assisted the Commandos in navigating the area during their search for insurgent presence. The Commandos also met with the villagers and handed out pamphlets to provide information about the local and national government.

“The local Afghan population realizes that the Afghan government, through the Afghan National Security Forces, is actively providing security and stability for locals in the Guzurah district of the Herat province,” said a SOF team leader.

During the past six weeks, 2nd Company conducted the Kandak’s first independent ground assault-force mission and its first two Mi-17 supported missions. Commandos from the 2nd Company are setting an example for the other companies of the Kandak to follow, leading all of their own operations, and building local confidence through their professional conduct and demeanor.

“It’s clear that 2nd Company is the strongest company [in the Kandak] and has raised the bar for standards within the Kandak,” added the SOF team leader.

Both the 9th Commando Kandak commander, Lt. Col. Natibullah, and executive officer, Maj. Abdul Satar, stated the Commandos did a decent job while performing these operations. They said they have confidence in 2nd Company’s ability to operate in remote areas and secure the Afghan people against any kind of danger.

Commandos from 2nd Company, 9th Commando Kandak are the first to conduct air assault operations with the Mi-17 helicopter. Other companies in the Kandak are following suit and will begin conducting first-ever, independent operations in the near future.

Πηγή

U.K. Special Forces To Use Wildcat Variant

Britain's special forces will use a new version of the Wildcat light reconnaissance and attack helicopters being developed for the British Army and Royal Navy, according to sources familiar with the plan.

The scheme to replace the Lynx rotorcraft used on special forces operations includes acquiring an additional four Wildcats and switching a further four machines from an existing order to create an eight-strong light assault helicopter force.

A Ministry of Defence spokeswoman declined to confirm the plan, saying the department doesn't comment on matters involving special forces.

Defence procurement minister Peter Luff confirmed in response to a Parliamentary question that his department is planning to extend the number of AgustaWestland Wildcats to be delivered to British forces from 62 to 66.

The additional rotorcraft, along with four other machines originally destined for battlefield reconnaissance and other duties, will be configured as light assault helicopters, he said in a response to a member of Parliament.

Luff didn't specify who would operate the light assault helicopters, but the sources said the variant would replace existing Mk7 and other Lynx types currently used for special forces operations.

News of the existence of a light assault Wildcat version emerged in the small print of a late-November National Audit Office (NAO) report into the procurement performance of major defense projects.

The report by the government-spending watchdog contained no mention of who would use the new helicopter type.

The MoD's signing of a deal with AgustaWestland in 2006 to deliver and support 62 Wildcats - a next-generation version of the Lynx family - was one of the programs looked at by the NAO.

The change in the order will see Army Wildcat reconnaissance numbers slip to 30 from 34, with a further eight rotorcraft forming a light assault capability. A further 28 similar machines destined for the Royal Navy for use in a maritime attack role remains unchanged.

Luff said the "costs of conversion are still under consideration."

AgustaWestland said it wouldn't comment on the potential additional order.

Deliveries of Army Wildcats from the Italian-owned company's Yeovil plant in southwest England will commence next year. Navy deliveries are scheduled to start in 2013. The timing of assault role rotorcraft deliveries is not known.

News the MoD is increasing its Wildcat numbers comes just days after the last of 22 Lynx Mk9As upgraded in a 92 million-pound ($144 million U.S.) deal with the Ministry of Defence was handed over by AgustaWestland.

The extensive upgrade included incorporation of the same engine being used on the Wildcat to enable the Mk9A to cope with the hot and high conditions of Afghanistan; a new surveillance sensor suite; secure communications; and a 0.50 cal heavy machine gun for escort and other duties in theater.

Πηγή

Jægerkorpset - Danish Special Forces

Operation Chavín de Huantar (1997)

The Japanese embassy hostage crisis began on December 17, 1996 in Lima, Peru, when 14 members of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) took hostage hundreds of high-level diplomats, government and military officials andbusiness executives who were attending a party at the official residence of Japan's ambassador to Peru, Morihisha Aoki, in celebration of Emperor Akihito's 63rd birthday. Although strictly speaking the crisis took place at the Ambassadorial residence in the upscale district of San Isidro rather than at theembassy proper, the media and others referred to it as the "Japanese embassy" hostage crisis, and that is how it is conventionally known.

Most of the hostages were soon released. After being held hostage for 126 days, the remaining dignitaries were freed on 22 April 1997, in a raid by Peruvian Armed Forces commandos, during which one hostage, two commandos, and all the MRTA militants died. The operation was perceived by most Peruvians to be a great success, and it gained worldwide media attention. President Alberto Fujimori initially received much credit for saving the lives of the hostages.

Reports have since emerged suggesting that a number of the insurgents had been summarily executed after surrendering. These findings have prompted civil suits against military officers by relatives of dead militants. In 2005, the Attorney General's office in Peru allowed the charges and hearings were ordered.

The Siege

The surprise ambush and seizure of the Japanese ambassador's residency was the highest profile operation of the MRTA in its 15-year history. The attack propelled Peru in general, and the MRTA in particular, into the world spotlight for the duration of the crisis. Guests reported that the guerrillas blasted a hole in the garden wall of the ambassador's residence at around 8:20 p.m. the night of the 17 of December. The complex had been guarded by over 300 heavily armed police officers and bodyguards.

The Japanese ambassador's residence had been converted into a fortress by the Japanese government. It was surrounded by a 12-foot wall, and had grates on all windows, bullet-proof glass in many windows, and doors built to withstand the impact of a grenade. It was, therefore, an easy site to defend from the inside.

The news of the MRTA's daring assault on the ambassador's residence caused the Lima Stock Exchange to close three hours early, as domestic stocks plummeted. One newspaper political columnist commented, "It is a setback of at least four years. We've returned to being a country subject to terror." The news came during a period of low popularity for President Fujimori (down to 40% from a 1996 high of 75%), who had until then been credited with restoring peace to the country after terrorist activity largely ceased through the country during his first presidential term.

Preparations

In preparation for the raid, one of the hostages, Peruvian Navy Admiral Luis Giampietri (later elected Vice President of Peru for the term 2006-2011), who was an expert on intelligence and command operations, was secretly provided with a miniature two-way radio set and given encrypted instructions instructing him to warn the hostages ten minutes before the military operation began, telling them to stay as far away as possible from the MRTA members.

Light-colored clothes were systematically ferried in to the hostages, so that they could be distinguished easily from the dark-clad insurgents during the planned raid. Cerpa himself unwittingly helped with this part of the project when, hearing noise that made him suspect that a tunnel was being dug, he ordered all the hostages placed on the second floor.

In addition, sophisticated miniature microphones and video cameras had been smuggled into the residence, concealed in books, water bottles, and table games. Giampetri and other military officers among the hostages were given the responsibility for placing these devices in secure locations around the house. Eavesdropping on the MRTA commandos with the help of these high-tech devices, military planners observed that the insurgents had organized their security carefully, and were particularly alert during the night hours. However, early every afternoon, eight of the MRTA members, including the four leaders, played indoor football for about one hour.

Fujimori later unveiled a scale model of the building that was especially built to prepare for the rescue operation, which included the tunnels from adjacent houses used by commandos to enter the building.

Special Forces Raid

On 22 April 1997, more than four months after the beginning of the siege, a team of 140 Peruvian commandos, assembled into a secret ad-hoc unit given the name Chavín de Huantar (in reference to a Peruvian archeological site famous for its underground passageways), mounted a dramatic raid on the residence. At 15:23 that afternoon, Operation Chavín de Huántar began.

Three explosive charges exploded almost simultaneously in three different rooms on the first floor. The first explosion hit in the middle of the room where the soccer game was taking place, killing three of the hostage-takers immediately — two of the men involved in the game, and one of the women watching from the sidelines. Through the hole created by that blast and the other two explosions, 30 commandos stormed into the building, chasing the surviving MRTA members in order to stop them before they could reach the second floor.

Two other moves were made simultaneously with the explosions. In the first, 20 commandos launched a direct assault at the front door in order to join their comrades inside the waiting room, where the main staircase to the second floor was located. On their way in, they found the two other female MRTA militants guarding the front door. Behind the first wave of commandos storming the door came another group of soldiers carrying ladders, which they placed against the rear walls of the building.

In the final prong of the coordinated attack, another group of commandos emerged from two tunnels that had reached the back yard of the residence. These soldiers quickly scaled the ladders that had been placed for them. Their tasks were to blow out a grenade-proof door on the second floor, through which the hostages would be evacuated, and to make two openings in the roof so that they could kill the MRTA members upstairs before they had time to execute the hostages.

At the end, all 14 MRTA guerrillas, one hostage (Dr. Carlos Giusti Acuña, member of the Supreme Court, who had pre-existing heart health problems) and two soldiers (Lieutenant Colonel Juan Valer Sandoval and Lieutenant Raúl Jiménez Chávez) died in the assault.

According to the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), MRTA member Roli Rojas was discovered attempting to walk out of the residency mixed with the hostages. A commando spotted him, took him to the back of the house, and executed him with a burst that blew off Rojas' head. The DIA cable says that the commando's intent had been to shoot just a single round into Rojas' head, and due to the mistake the commando had to partially hide Roja's body under that of Nestor Cerpa. The cable also says that another (female) MRTA member was executed after the raid.

Military and Judicial System

On 7 June, at a ceremony organized by the army to commemorate loyalty to the national flag, the commandos were honored and decorated, including those whom the judicial branch had under investigation for alleged involvement in the extrajudicial executions. On 29 July, the Chavín de Huántar commando squad was selected to lead the independence day military parade. This appeared to have been done to exert more pressure on the Supreme Court justices who had to decide the jurisdiction question raised by the military court, in order to make certain that it would be the military court that investigated the extrajudicial executions.

On 16 August, the Supreme Court convened to hear the oral arguments of the parties to the jurisdictional challenge brought by the military tribunal. The military prosecutor heading up the parallel inquiry being conducted in the military court, who had to bring the charges and prove them, was the person arguing the military's challenge. However, in his arguments he made a defense for the commandos, stating that "heroes must not be treated like villains." The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the military court system had jurisdiction over the 19 officers, thus declining jurisdiction in favor of the military tribunal. It held that the events had occurred in a district that at the time was under a state of emergency, and were part of a military operation conducted on orders from above. It further held that any crimes that the 19 officers may have committed were the jurisdiction of the military courts. It also ruled that the civilian criminal courts should retain jurisdiction over anyone other than the commandos who may have violated civilian laws.

Chronology

December 17, 1996: MRTA members take the Japanese ambassador’s residence in Peru with more than 600 hostages. They soon release about half of the hostages.

December 20 (day 3): Another 38 hostages are released.

December 21 (day 4): Fujimori declares that there will be no talks.

December 22 (day 5): 255 hostages are released.

December 26 (day 9): An explosion is heard in the residence. Police say that an animal detonated a mine.

December 28 (day 11): 20 hostages released.

December 31 (day 14): A group of reporters are allowed into the mansion.

January 21 (day 35): Police and MRTA members exchange shots.

March 2 (day 75): MRTA members refused asylum to Cuba and Dominican Republic

April 22 (day 126): Peruvian special forces storm the residence. One hostage, two commandos and all 14 MRTA members died.

Πηγή

INVISIBLE WOUNDS

ANGEL THUNDER 2011- Pararescue Exercise

Approximately 1,400 U.S. military, federal and state employees and Coalition Forces participate in the 6th Annual Angel Thunder Exercise, the world's largest military CSAR Combat Search and Rescue Exercise in the world. Airman from the 55th Rescue Squadron transport injured personnel to the local hospital in Tuscon, Arizona on October 11, 2011.

Source

Iraqi Special Forces Air Insertion Training Exercise

Video of a joint Iraqi Special Forces and aviation training to certify to conduct air operations using their Mi-17 helicopter in Basrah, Iraq. 

Afghan Special Forces in Ghostex Camouflage

Two months ago HyperStealth Biotechnology Corp. publicly released the Ghostex Kilo-1 camouflage pattern to be utilized by the Afghan Border Police. For a little background, the Ghostex™ Advanced Camouflage System was developed for operators to hand pick a pattern that meets the need of their specific AO. In conjunction with ADS, Inc., Hyperstealth developed these different camouflage patterns with a major focus on US Special Forces and Black Ops.

Given HyperStealth's close ties through ADS, Inc. with Afghan Forces and the wide spread acceptance of their camouflage patterns with the ANA, ANCOP, and ABP, it comes as no surprise to us to come across this video giving an overview of Afghan Special Forces and seeing that they are wearing a Ghostex camouflage pattern.

We are yet unsure if this is the same Kilo-1 adopted by the ABP though, as there are countless possible variants, but it is very comparable with what appears to be a MultiCam colorway and the main pattern. You can skip to minute 1:39 for one of the clearest shots of the pattern and color palette. 

We had previously seen the APU wearing MultiCam uniforms, so their acceptance for this transitional camouflage utilized by many ISAF/NATO forces in OEF is apparent. However they clearly wanted something different in terms of pattern to differentiate from the US, UK, and Australian forces that are utilizing some variant of the Crye Precision design. Clearly it appears Afghan Special Forces are modifying their uniform concealment to fit in with their foreign operating allies, whereas in the past U.S. forces have been known to go old school woodland for the sake of matching.

These are very exciting times for the camouflage design industry so we will be looking forward to see how the different players shake things up by spreading their innovation across the globes fighting forces.

Afghanistan's own Special Forces unit have been demonstrating their skills on a camp just outside Kabul. Engaged in special training under US supervision, these soldiers have been conducting many successful operations on their own.

Πηγή

Ranger School

Special Forces Diver

Black Ops (SOG)

The Quiet Professionals

Air Force Pararescue

Navy EOD

SWCC Basic

Recon Marines Commandeer Ship During Drill

OKINAWA, JAPAN — A helicopter hovers 25-feet above the deck of the ship as combat rubber raiding craft simultaneously crash through the waves toward the hostile vessel.

This was the scene as 30 Marines with Force Reconnaissance Platoon took part in a visit, board, search and seizure exercise aboard the USNS Dahl off the coast of Okinawa Dec. 1-6.

The platoon, attached to the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, conducted the training to prepare Marines in the event they are tasked with seizing a merchant cargo ship from pirates or weapons smugglers.

The Marines secured key locations aboard the ship after fast-roping from a U.S. Air Force UH-60 Sea Hawk to the deck.

The exercise began with classes about maritime law, regarding search and seizure of cargo vessels, structural layout of different classes of merchant ships and history of previous visit, board, search seizure missions, according to a sergeant with Special Operations Training Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group, III MEF.

The Marines then took a tour of the USNS Dahl to familiarize themselves with the interior of a cargo ship.

“It’s important for the Force Reconnaissance Marines aboard the MEU to understand how to seize merchant ships rather than warships because odds are pirates won’t attempt to seize a naval warship,” said Gunnery Sgt. Brian M. Pavlus, a chief instructor with the SOTG. “Training on the Dahl allows us to make the training more realistic.”

The Force Reconnaissance Marines used the top down-bottom up method to clear the ship and secure key locations on the vessel. 

“The best thing about the VBSS was we were able to do a top down and then bottom up clearing of the ship, with a full mission profile,” said 2nd Lt. Ashley Thompson, Force Reconnaissance platoon commander with the 31st MEU. “We started clearing the top of the ship via helicopters, fast-roping in, and boarded the ship from the bottom to take the lower portion.

They took the key areas of the ship very quickly, allowing us to take control of the ship’s navigation,” he added. “They did a very good job of securing other key areas for (casualty evacuation) and the movement of other personnel, so we could hand the ship over to the Navy.”

The training is designed to prepare the Marines for the spring certification exercise, which ensures the 31st MEU is capable to conduct operations such as noncombatant evacuation operations, tactical recovery of personnel, amphibious raids, and assaults and theater security operations, according to Pavlus.

“Given that it is a high-piracy area, it is great practice for us should we ever have to do the real thing,” said Thompson.

Πηγή

US Special Forces Mass on Syrian Border

Following similar reports by former FBI translator Sibel Edmonds, Israeli intelligence sources confirm that US Special Forces are massing in Jordan on the Syrian border having been transferred from Iraq.

On Sunday Edmonds reported that hundreds of foreign troops were witnessed near the Jordanian border village of Al-Mafraq, having moved back and forth between King Hussein Air Base of al-Mafraq and villages adjacent to the Syrian border.

After interviewing an employee in the London-based office of Royal Jordanian Airlines, Nizar Nayouf also reported that, “At least one US aircraft carrying military personnel landed in the Prince Hassan Air base located about 100 km to the east of the city of Al-Mafraq.”

According to Edmonds, the mainstream media has been eager to keep the movement of the troops under wraps, with one journalist from a major publication being told by his editor that there would be no coverage of the story.

The Israeli intelligence outlet DebkaFile has now backed these reports, stating that, “American special forces troops have been diverted to positions in Jordan opposite a Syrian tank concentration building up across the kingdom’s northern border.”

US troops were airlifted out of the Ain al-Assad air base in Iraq to take up positions in Jordan from Thursday onwards, according to the report.

Instead of returning to military bases in Europe or the Persian Gulf, the troops have lined up directly opposite Assad’s forces 10 kilometers from the Syrian border and have constructed “surveillance towers and army posts in the Jordanian villages of Albaej, Zubaydiah and al-Nahdah.”

NATO powers are preparing a new “humanitarian intervention” on the back of disputed reports that the Assad regime has killed 5,000 pro-democracy demonstrators. Skeptical voices have pointed out that, just like Libya, the so-called protesters are in fact militants attempting to overthrow the government in the course of a civil war.

Just as Al-Qaeda terrorists were used to oust Gaddafi, hundreds of Libyan rebels were airlifted into Syria to aid the opposition in carrying out attacks against government forces.

As we reported last week, the United States has deployed a total of three warships to the Middle East, along with several other attack boats, as tensions in the region escalate. Russia has denied reportsthat warships it sent to Syrian territorial waters last month were for the purpose of discouraging any potential military strike on the country.

 Source

US NAVY SEALs

Snipers

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Operation Frankton (1942)

Operation Frankton was a commando raid on shipping in the German occupied French port of Bordeaux during the Second World War. The raid was carried out by a small unit of Royal Marines known as the Royal Marines Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD).

The plan was for six canoes to be taken to the area of the Gironde estuary by submarine. They would then paddle by night to Bordeaux. On arrival they would attack the docked cargo ships with limpet mines and then escape overland to Spain. Twelve men were from no.1 section were selected for the raid; including the C.O. Blondie Hasler and the reserve Colley the total of the team numbered thirteen. One 'cockle' failed to launch which meant three men returned home to the UK on the submarine. Two men survived the raid: Hasler, and his no.2 in the canoe, Sparks.Of the other eight, six were executed by the Germans while two died from hypothermia.The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed the mission shortened the Second World War by six months and Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Combined Operations, deemed the raid "the most courageous and imaginative of all the raids ever carried out by the men of Combined Operations."

The Royal Marines Boom Patrol Detachment (RMBPD) was formed on 6 July 1942, and based at Southsea, Portsmouth. The RMBPD was under the command of Royal Marines Major Herbert 'Blondie' Hasler with Captain J.D. Stewart as second in command. The detachment consisted of 34 men and was based at Lumps fort, and often exercised in the Portsmouth harbour and patrolled the boom at nights.

Background

The port of Bordeaux was a major destination for goods to support the German war effort. In the 12 months from June 1941–1942 vegetable and animal oils, other raw materials, and 25,000 tons of crude rubber had arrived at the port.Hasler submitted a plan of attack on 21 September 1942. The INITIAL plan called for a force of THREE canoes to be transported to the Gironde Estuary by submarine then paddle by night and hide by day until they reached Bordeaux 60 miles (97 km) from the sea., thus hoping to avoid the 32 mixed German navy ships, that patrolled or used the port.

On arrival they hoped to sink between six and 12 cargo ships then escape overland to Spain. Permission for the raid was granted on 13 October 1942, but Admiral Louis Mountbatten Chief of Combined operations increased the number of canoes to be taken to six. Mountbatten had originally ordered that Hasler could not take part in the raid, because of his experience as the chief canoeing specialist, but changed his mind after Hasler formally submitted his reasons for inclusion. The RMBPD started training for the raid on 20 October 1942, which included canoe handling, submarine rehearsals, limpet mine handling and escape and evasion exercises. The RMBPD practised for the raid with a simulated attack against Deptford, starting from Margate and canoeing up the Swale.

Mark II canoes, which were given the codename of Cockle, were selected for the raid . The Mark II was a semi rigid two man canoe, with the sides made of canvas, a flat bottom, and 15 feet (4.6 m) in length. When collapsed it had to be capable of getting in and out of the 24 inches (610 mm) wide submarine hatch. During the raid each canoe's load would be two men, eight limpet mines, three sets of paddles, a compass, a depth sounding reel, repair bag, torch, camouflage net, waterproof watch, fishing line, two hand grenades, rations and water for six days, a spanner to activate the mines and a magnet to hold the canoe against the side of cargo ships. The men also carried a .45 Colt pistol and a Fairbairn-Sykes Fighting Knife.

The men selected to go on the raid were divided into two divisions each having their own targets.

A Division: Major Hasler and Marine Bill Sparks in canoe Catfish.Corporal AF Laver and Marine WH Mills in canoe Crayfish.Corporal CJ Sheard and Marine D Moffatt in canoe Conger.

B Division: Lieutenant J W Mackinnon and Marine J Conway in canoe Cuttlefish.Sergeant S Wallace and Marine R Ewart in canoe Coalfish.Marine W A Ellery and Marine E Fisher in canoe Cachalot.

A thirteenth man was taken as a reserve, Marine N Colley.

Mission

On 30 November 1942 the Royal Navy submarine HMS Tuna (N94) sailed from Holy Loch in Scotland with the six canoes and raiders on board. The submarine was supposed to reach the Gironde estuary and the mission was scheduled to start on 6 December 1942. This was delayed because of bad weather on route and the need to negotiate a minefield. By 7 December 1942 the submarine had reached the Gironde estuary and surfaced some 10 miles (16 km) from the mouth of the estuary. One canoe Cachalot's hull was damaged while being passed out of the submarine hatch, leaving just five canoes to start the raid. The reserve member of the team Marine Colley, was not needed so he remained aboard the submarine with the Cachalot crew Marine Ellery and Marine Fisher.

The five remaining canoes were disembarked at 1730 hours 7 December. The plan was for the crews to paddle and rest for five minutes in every hour. The first night 7/8 December fighting against strong cross tides and cross winds, one canoe Conger had disappeared. Further on the surviving crews encountered 5 feet (1.5 m) high waves and another canoe Cuttlefish capsized and was lost. The crew consisting of Lieutenant Mackinnon and Marine Conway held on to two of the remaining canoes, which were carried to safety and left ashore.

Carrying on with the raid the canoes approached a major checkpoint in the river and come upon three German frigates. Lying flat on the canoes and paddling silently they managed to get by without being discovered. On the first night the three remaining canoes Catfish, Crayfish and Coalfish covered 20 miles (32 km) in five hours and landed near St Vivien du Medoc.

While they were hiding during the day and unknown to the others, Sergeant Wallace and Marine Ewart in Coalfish had been captured at daybreak beside the Pointe de Grave lighthouse where they had come ashore. By the end of the second night 8/9 December, the two remaining canoes Catfish and Cuttlefish had paddled a further 22 miles (35 km) in six hours. The third night 9/10 December they paddled 15 miles (24 km) and on the fourth night 10/11 December because of the strong ebb tide they only managed to cover 9 miles (14 km).

The original plan had called for the raid to be carried out on 10 December, but Hasler now changed the plan. Because of the strength of the ebb tide they still had a short distance to paddle, so Hasler ordered they hide for another day and set off to and reach Bordeaux on the night of 11/12 December. After a night's rest the men spent the day preparing their equipment and limpet mines which were set to detonate at 21:00 hours. Hasler decided that Catfish would cover the western side of the docks and Crayfish the eastern side.

Bordeaux

The two remaining canoes reached Bordeaux on the fifth night 11/12 December the river was flat calm and there was a clear sky. The attack started at 21;00 hours 11 December, Hasler and Sparks in Catfish attacking shipping on the western side of the dock, placed eight limpet mines on four vessels including the fast patrol boat Sperrbrecher. A sentry on the deck of the Sperrbrecher had spotted something and shone his torch down but the darkness and the camouflaged canoe evaded being seen. They had planted all their mines and left the harbour with the ebb tide at 00:45 hours. At the same time Laver and Mills in Crayfish had reached the eastern side of the dock without finding any targets, so returned to deal with the ships lying near the South Basin. They placed eight limpet mines on two vessels, five on a large cargo ship and three on a small liner.

On their way downriver the two canoes met by chance on the Isle de Caseau. They continued down river together until 06:00 hours when they beached their canoes near St Genes de Blaye and tried to hide them by sinking them. The two crews then set out separately on foot, for the Spanish border. Laver and Mills after two days were picked up at Montlieu-la-Garde by the Gendarmerie and handed over to the Germans. Hasler and Sparks arrived at the French town of Ruffec 100 miles (160 km) from where they had beached their canoe, on 18 December 1942, and tried to make contact with someone from the French resistance at the Hotel de la Toque Blance and were then taken to a local farm and spent the next 18 days in hiding.

They were then guided across the Pyrenees into Spain. It was not until 23 February 1943, that Combined Operations Headquarters, heard via a secret message sent via Mary Lindell to the War Office, that Hasler and Sparks were safe. On 2 April 1943 Hasler arrived back in Britain by air from Gibraltar having passed through the French Resistance escape organisation. Sparks was sent back by sea and arrived much later.

Aftermath

On 10 December the Germans announced that a sabotage squad had been caught on 8th dec near the mouth of the Gironde and 'finished off in combat'. It was not until Jan 1943 in the absence of other information all 10 men on the raid were posted missing, until news arrived of two of them. Later it was confirmed that five ships had been damaged in Bordeaux by mysterious explosions. This information remained until new research of 2010 revealed that a six ship had been damaged even more extensively than any of the other five reported. This research also revealed that the other five ships holed were back in service very shortly afterwards.

For their part in the raid Major Hasler was awarded the Distinguished Service Order and Marine Sparks the Distinguished Service Medal (DSM). Corporal Laver and Marine Mills were also recommended for the DSM which at the time could not be awarded posthumously, so instead they were mentioned in dispatches.

Of men who never returned Sergeant Wallace and Marine Ewart were captured on the 8 December at the Pointe de Grave (near Le Verdon) and revealed only certain information during their interrogation, and were executed under the Commando Order, on the night 11 December in a sandpit in a wood north of Bordeaux and not at Chateau Magnol, Blanquefort. Unfortunately (seemingly to encourage tourist traffic) a plaque has been erected on the bullet marked wall at the Chateau as to evidence this, but this can be unquestionably proved this is not the case. This account shows the Blanquefort reference is false and this should be noted lest the reader be misled, despite a French Website quoting this as fact. A small memorial can also be seen at the Pointe de Grave, where they were captured. In March 2011 a major c.100,000 euro memorial is to be unveiled at this same spot.

After having been set ashore, Lieutenant MacKinnon and Marine Conway managed to evade capture for four days, but they were betrayed and arrested by the Gendarmerie and handed over to the Germans at La Reole hospital 30 miles (48 km) south east of Bordeaux, attempting to make their way to the Spanish border. Mackinnon had been admitted to the hospital for treatment for an infected knee. The exact date of their execution is not known. New evidence shows that Lieutenant Mackinnon, Corporal Laver, Marine Mills and Marine Conway were not executed in Paris in 1942 but in the same location as Wallace and Ewart under the Commando Order.

Corporal Sheard and Marine Moffatt were not drowned on the first night but died of the cold. The body of Marine Moffatt was found on the Ile de Ré on 14 December but Corporal Sheard’s body is believed to have been recovered and buried elsewhere further up the coastline Corporal Sheard is remembered on the Hero's Stone at his place of birth, North Corner, Devonport.

In 1955 a fictionalised version of the story was told in the film The Cockleshell Heroes made by Warwick Films, and starring Anthony Newley, Trevor Howard, David Lodge and Jose Ferrer who was also the Director.

In June 2002, the Frankton Trail was opened, a walking path which traces the 100 miles (160 km) route taken through occupied France, on foot, by Hasler and Sparks. The Frankton Souvenir is an Anglo-French organisation, set up to keep alive the story of the raid. It plans to develop the trail, and install explanatory plaques at key points.

On March 31, 2011 a memorial to the Cockleshell Heroes and three French individuals is dedicated. Made from Portland Stone it was transported across care of Brittany Ferries. The memorial cost c.80,000£. Full Story of this in ref given.

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US Marine Recon

‘Top Secret America’: A look at the military’s Joint Special Operations Command

The CIA’s armed drones and paramilitary forces have killed dozens of al-Qaeda leaders and thousands of its foot soldiers. But there is another mysterious organization that has killed even more of America’s enemies in the decade since the 9/11 attacks.

CIA operatives have imprisoned and interrogated nearly 100 suspected terrorists in their former secret prisons around the world, but troops from this other secret organization have imprisoned and interrogated 10 times as many, holding them in jails that it alone controls in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, this secretive group of men (and a few women) has grown tenfold while sustaining a level of obscurity that not even the CIA managed. “We’re the dark matter. We’re the force that orders the universe but can’t be seen,” a strapping Navy SEAL, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said in describing his unit.

The SEALs are just part of the U.S. military’s Joint Special Operations Command, known by the acronym JSOC, which has grown from a rarely used hostage rescue team into America’s secret army. When members of this elite force killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May, JSOC leaders celebrated not just the success of the mission but also how few people knew their command, based in Fayetteville, N.C., even existed.

This article, adapted from a chapter of the newly released “Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State,” by Washington Post reporters Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, chronicles JSOC’s spectacular rise, much of which has not been publicly disclosed before. Two presidents and three secretaries of defense routinely have asked JSOC to mount intelligence-gathering missions and lethal raids, mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in countries with which the United States was not at war, including Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, the Philippines, Nigeria and Syria.

“The CIA doesn’t have the size or the authority to do some of the things we can do,” said one JSOC operator.

The president has also given JSOC the rare authority to select individuals for its kill list — and then to kill, rather than capture, them. Critics charge that this individual man-hunting mission amounts to assassination, a practice prohibited by U.S. law. JSOC’s list is not usually coordinated with the CIA, which maintains a similar, but shorter roster of names.Created in 1980 but reinvented in recent years, JSOC has grown from 1,800 troops prior to 9/11 to as many as 25,000, a number that fluctuates according to its mission. It has its own intelligence division, its own drones and reconnaissance planes, even its own dedicated satellites. It also has its own cyberwarriors, who, on Sept. 11, 2008, shut down every jihadist Web site they knew.

Obscurity has been one of the unit’s hallmarks. When JSOC officers are working in civilian government agencies or U.S. embassies abroad, which they do often, they dispense with uniforms, unlike their other military comrades. In combat, they wear no name or rank identifiers. They have hidden behind various nicknames: the Secret Army of Northern Virginia, Task Force Green, Task Force 11, Task Force 121. JSOC leaders almost never speak in public. They have no unclassified Web site.

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