Special Forces Retrieve "Dead and Wounded" in Somalia

I've discussed this issue twice, here and here, and now more details are being released which suggests I may have been pretty close both times.

U.S. military forces landed in Somalia to retrieve the bodies of dead or wounded militants after a U.S. drone strike targeted a group of insurgents, Somalia's defense minister told The Associated Press on Friday.

The operation is at least the second time U.S. troops have landed in Somalia after a targeted strike, though no forces have been stationed there since shortly after the "Black Hawk Down" battle that left 18 Americans dead.

Defense Minister Abdulhakim Mohamoud Haji Faqi called on the U.S. to carry out more airstrikes against the al-Qaida-linked militants.

Somali officials apparently were not informed about the June 23 operation near the southern coastal town of Kismayo beforehand.It's not over according to reports on the ground.

Low flying jets were seen over the insurgent strongholds of Merka in Lower Juba and Kismayo in Lower Shabelle during the last 24 hours sparking fears in residents that new airstrikes are imminent.

The airplanes started flying over Merka on Thursday evening after Makrib Salat (evening prayers), and the insurgents ordered residents to remain in their houses, according to locals who spoke to Somalia Report.

About 7:00 pm, we saw airplanes flying over the town. They did not fire but the residents are feeling terror because they afraid they will be victims if the planes strike al-Shabaab targets, said Ahmadey Maow, a resident in Merka.

One of the al-Shabaab militia in Merka, who spoke to Somalia Report on the condition of anonymity, said that all al-Shabaab officers in Merka fled from the town last night to Shalanbood and Buulo-mareer.That report is from today, a few hours ago. Somalia has quickly become a hot zone for US military activity, and it has nothing to do with pirates.

I wonder what we are doing with the "wounded" once they are captured?

Πηγή

Actually, Special-Ops ‘Night Raids’ Are Rather Gentl

Anyone who came to the Senate Armed Services Committee to hear Vice Adm. William McRaven deliver the inside account of how his forces killed Osama bin Laden left disappointed. But under a cloud of vagueness, McRaven shed some light on how his shadowy forces wage the stealthy, lethal side of the war on terrorism. To hear him tell it, they’re not always the violent affair you’d imagine.

Soon to be the next leader of the U.S. Special Operations Command, McRaven is leaving his post atop the terrorist hunters of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) on what you might call a high note. Sen. John McCain said McRaven’s plan to kill bin Laden assured him an “enduring place in American military history.” McRaven (pictured above, center) preferred to focus on his team’s contribution to the Afghanistan war, where they’re most famous for the controversial “night raids” on the houses of suspected terrorists.

Night raids have drawn the ire of President Hamid Karzai for their intrusiveness and the civilian casualties they’ve caused. (One of them prompted McRaven to deliver two sheep to an Afghan family as recompense.) But according to McRaven, they’re far from the shoot-’em-ups that the media portrays.

McRaven’s team has conducted over 1700 night raids in the past year alone, he disclosed. Of those, McRaven said, the vast majority — “approximately 84 to 86 percent” — “never fire a shot.”

“Every operation,” McRaven told the Senate panel in written questions for the record, is accompanied by Afghan troops, who “are always in the lead during entry of compounds and call outs.” Teams of women accompany the raids to “reassure women and children” in Afghan compounds that “everyone is going to be safe.”

Stopping the raids, as Karzai wants, would “certainly be detrimental to the special operations aspect to the fight in Afghanistan,” McRaven said.

Of course, McRaven has every interest in portraying the raids as benign affairs, since they’re the most controversial special operations mission in Afghanistan. His JSOC predecessor, Stanley McChrystal,restricted them during his tenure as Afghanistan commander for fear of alienating civilians.

McRaven, who literally wrote the book on special operations, didn’t say much about the shadow wars against terrorists that he’ll soon oversee. He gave little insight into how he’d target al-Qaida affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan, beyond saying he needs “manned and unmanned” intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance tools to succeed. He didn’t anticipate the Pakistanis taking action against the safe havens in their tribal areas — but begged off the enticements of various senators to pledge a replay of the bin Laden raid, which kept the Pakistanis in the dark.

Still, McRaven said that he kept an eye on ammonium nitrate supplies entering Afghanistan from Pakistan for use in lethal bombs. McRaven’s teams “target the networks” importing the material, not the explosives themselves. But he vaguely noted “some technology out there that allows us to detect [homemade explosive materials] before the critical components are there to put it in an explosive.” One such secretive effort, known as Project Ursus, puts chemical detection sensors under an aircraft to hunt for the ammonium nitrate stocks.

There were no questions about the off-the-books detention facilities that JSOC reportedly maintains in Afghanistan. But McRaven said that if a terrorist is caught outside of Afghanistan or Pakistan, he’d be held for a short time on “a naval vessel” while the higher-ups determine if he can be prosecuted or sent to a foreign country.

Releasing such an individual is “an unenviable option,” McRaven said, and supported keeping a long-term detention facility to avoid it — as he testified that sending detainees to Guantanamo Bay isn’t in the cards anymore. To think: Had the bin Laden raid gone differently, the al-Qaida commander might have been held on an aircraft carrier deck, instead of having his corpse pushed off one.

Πηγή

ΔΥΝΑΜΕΙΣ ΕΙΔΙΚΩΝ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΕΩΝ ΤΟΥ ΝΑΤΟ

Ενα μετά το άλλο ξετυλίγονται τα ιμπεριαλιστικά σχέδια για τη συγκρότηση, υπό τη σημαία του ΝΑΤΟ και την καθοδήγηση των ΗΠΑ, μιας παγκόσμιας δύναμης ελέγχου των λαών, καταστολής των κινημάτων τους και καθυπόταξης με κάθε τρόπο των χωρών που δεν συμμορφώνονται στα κελεύσματα των ιμπεριαλιστικών κέντρων, πολιτικών οικονομικών και στρατιωτικών. Εκτελεστικός βραχίονας είναι οι Δυνάμεις Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων του ΝΑΤΟ, πυρήνας και κύριος κορμός των οποίων είναι οι αμερικανικές δυνάμεις ειδικών επιχειρήσεων. Για τη σύζευξη αυτών των δύο συγκροτείται στο πλαίσιο του ΝΑΤΟ «Συντονιστικό Κέντρο Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων του ΝΑΤΟ (NSCC)».

Για την κύρωση του σχετικού μνημονίου διεξάγεται συζήτηση σήμερα στην αρμόδια επιτροπή Εξωτερικών και Αμυνας της Βουλής των Ελλήνων. Πρόκειται για το σχέδιο νόμου με τίτλο«Κύρωση του Μνημονίου Κατανόησης μεταξύ του υπουργείου Αμυνας των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών της Αμερικής του υπουργείου Εθνικής Αμυνας της Ελλάδας και του Ανωτάτου Στρατηγείου Συμμαχικών Δυνάμεων της Ευρώπης (SHAPE), σχετικά με την ίδρυση, οργάνωση, διοίκηση, ασφάλεια, χρηματοδότηση και επάνδρωση του Συντονιστικού Κέντρου Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων του ΝΑΤΟ (NSCC)».

Μαζί έρχονται προς κύρωση δύο ακόμα ΝΑΤΟικά μνημόνια. Τα παραπάνω μαζί με άλλα που προηγήθηκαν το προηγούμενο διάστημα (για τις βάσεις της Σούδας και του Τύρναβου) εντάσσονται στην προωθούμενη ομογενοποίηση του ΝΑΤΟικού χώρου, με στόχο την επιβολή ενός ενιαίου πλαισίου λειτουργίας των στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων εντός των χωρών - μελών του, κάτω από κοινή κεντρική διοίκηση και κοινούς κανόνες και είναι σε εφαρμογή του νέου «στρατηγικού δόγματος του ΝΑΤΟ».

Με το νέο ΝΑΤΟικό μνημόνιο, αυτό για τη συγκρότηση του Συντονιστικού Κέντρου Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων (NSCC), επιχειρείται η καθιέρωση ενός ενιαίου επιχειρησιακού χώρου και αντίστοιχου επιχειρησιακού κέντρου που θα εδρεύει στις Βρυξέλλες υπό Αμερικανό διοικητή, το οποίο θα τίθεται υπεράνω των χωρών μελών και με ανοιχτό μάλιστα το ενδεχόμενο να αναλαμβάνει αποστολές και εντός των χωρών μελών σε συνεργασία ακόμα και με τις αποκαλούμενες «μη κυβερνητικές οργανώσεις».

Σύμφωνα με όσα αναφέρονται στην αιτιολογική έκθεση του μνημονίου αυτού (Memorandum of Understanding /MOU) ως «έθνος - πλαίσιο» του NSCC ορίζονται οι ΗΠΑ. Σκοπός είναι η άμεση σύνδεσή του με τις δυνάμεις ειδικών επιχειρήσεων του ΝΑΤΟ, η παροχή συμβουλών στον SACEUR (ανώτατος ΝΑΤΟικός διοικητής στην Ευρώπη) όσον αφορά «στη χρησιμοποίηση των Δυνάμεων Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων για την υποστήριξη του σχεδιασμού και την εκτέλεση επιχειρήσεων», η ανάπτυξη και έκδοση δογμάτων ειδικών επιχειρήσεων και ο συντονισμός, συγχρονισμός και υποστήριξη της εκπαίδευσης και των ασκήσεων των ειδικών επιχειρήσεων ΝΑΤΟ.

«Αποστολή του NSCC είναι κυρίως η υποστήριξη των ειδικών επιχειρήσεων του ΝΑΤΟ σε ολόκληρη τη Συμμαχία, η παροχή στο Ανώτατο Διοικητή Συμμαχικών Δυνάμεων Ευρώπης (SACEUR) και τους υπόλοιπους Διοικητές των Συμμαχικών Διοικήσεων Επιχειρήσεων έγκαιρων και αποτελεσματικών συμβουλών για τις Special Operations Force (Δυνάμεις Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων) προς υποστήριξη του σχεδιασμού και εκτέλεσης των επιχειρήσεων σε καιρό ειρήνης και κρίσεων». Δηλαδή «ειδικές επιχειρήσεις» και εντός των χωρών μελών του ΝΑΤΟ με ό,τι αυτό σημαίνει.

Στο νομοσχέδιο γίνεται ιδιαίτερη αναφορά στη δυνατότητα συμμετοχής και μη ΝΑΤΟικών χωρών, καθώς και διεθνών οργανισμών αλλά και μη κυβερνητικών οργανώσεων, «οι οποίες συμμετέχουν σε δραστηριότητες του ΝΑΤΟ ή σε ΝΑΤΟικές επιχειρήσεις της NSCC». Αυτό σημαίνεται συνεργασία με πράκτορες, παρακρατικές δυνάμεις, αλλά και ιδιωτικές εταιρείες ιδιωτικών μισθοφορικών στρατών «παροχής πολεμικών υπηρεσιών», όπως ήδη γίνεται στον πόλεμο του Ιράκ.

Το μέγεθος της ελληνικής εμπλοκής δεν αποτυπώνεται στον αριθμό των 3 Ελλήνων αξιωματικών, που προβλέπεται να στελεχώσουν αυτό το πολυεθνικό - διακλαδικό κέντρο (NSCC), στο οποίο θα υπηρετούν συνολικά 145 στελέχη, αλλά στο γεγονός ότι θεσμοθετείται η δημιουργία τέτοιου συντονιστικού κέντρου «ειδικών επιχειρήσεων», πράγμα που εκτός των άλλων αποκαλύπτει ότι υπάρχουν και στις ελληνικές ένοπλες δυνάμεις τμήματα με αποστολή τη συμμετοχή και τη διεξαγωγή «ειδικών επιχειρήσεων».

Η αμερικανική Δύναμη Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων

Το τι ακριβώς σημαίνουν αυτές οι «Ειδικές Επιχειρήσεις» του ΝΑΤΟ, που μάλιστα θα διευθύνονται από αξιωματικό των ΗΠΑ, αρκεί μια ματιά στην αντίστοιχη Δύναμη του αμερικανικού στρατού. Πρόκειται για μονάδες που «μπορούν να διεξάγουν ειδικές επιχειρήσεις, επιχειρήσεις που ούτε τα πυροβόλα, ούτε τα άρματα, ούτε τα πλοία ούτε και τα ελικόπτερα και τα αεροπλάνα από μόνα τους μπορούν να κάνουν», όπως χαρακτηριστικά αναφέρεται σε σχετικό ιστότοπο στο διαδίκτυο.

Είναι χαρακτηριστικό ότι ο ναύαρχος Ολσον, διοικητής της Διοίκησης Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων (SOCOM) των ΗΠΑ μιλώντας το Μάη του 2011 στο Κογκρέσο, είπε ότι «κατά μέσο όρο καθημερινά, 12.000 προσωπικό των Δυνάμεων Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων, διεξάγουν ένα μεγάλο φάσμα δραστηριοτήτων σε πάνω από 72 χώρες διεθνώς και ενεργούν οπουδήποτε και οποτεδήποτε, από βυθούς θαλασσών μέχρι και στις κορυφές των ψηλότερων βουνών της Γης, από αρκτικές περιοχές μέχρι τροπικές ζώνες και από ειρηνικά μέρη, μέχρι και στις πιο άγριες εμπόλεμες ζώνες».

Σύμφωνα μάλιστα με το νέο δόγμα των Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων του αμερικανικού στρατού, που εκδόθηκε φέτος, αυτό περιλαμβάνει 11 κύριες αποστολές που ανταποκρίνονται στις«νέες απαιτήσεις για την "υποστήριξη δυνάμεων ασφαλείας" και διεξαγωγή αντι-ανταρτοπόλεμου, με παροχή βοήθειας σε επιχειρήσεις, εκπαίδευση, οργάνωση και υλικό ξένων δυνάμεων ασφαλείας, συμμάχων χωρών ή καλύτερα, φιλικά προσκείμενων κυβερνήσεων». Σύμφωνα με τον αμερικανικό νόμο, μπορεί να αναλάβει «οποιεσδήποτε δραστηριότητες που θα καθορίζονται από τον πρόεδρο των ΗΠΑ ή τον υπουργό Εθνικής Αμυνας». Δηλαδή, από τα βασανιστήρια στο Ιράκ και το Γκουαντάναμο μέχρι τα πραξικοπήματα, τις πολιτικές δολοφονίες και τις προβοκάτσιες ανά τον κόσμο. Πρόκειται για κάτι αντίστοιχο με το νόμο που προβλέπει τα σχετικά με τη δράση της CΙΑ.

Το πεδίο είναι ελεύθερο για κάθε είδους μυστικές αποστολές των Δυνάμεων Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων, με ένα είδος υψηλής εποπτείας από το Κογκρέσο. Σημειώνεται πως σήμερα οι αμερικανικές Δυνάμεις Ειδικών Επιχειρήσεων στελεχώνονται και από γυναικείο προσωπικό, ειδικά στον τομέα των πολιτικοστρατιωτικών υποθέσεων που συγκροτούν οργανωμένες «Ομάδες Πολιτιστικής Υποστήριξης» (Cultural Support Teams, CST) που με αποστολή να έλθουν σε στενότερη επαφή με τον τοπικό πληθυσμό της όποιας περιοχής επιχειρήσεων, ώστε «να κατανοούν τα προβλήματά τους, ενώ παράλληλα να περνούν πληροφορίες, ιδέες και μηνύματα».

Πηγή

New Strategy Focuses On Insurgent Leaders

Wednesday, the White House has unveiled a new counterterrorism strategy that would focus more on drone strikes and special operations and less on large-scale ground conflicts. NPR spoke with two experts in national security — Sean Burke, a vice president and senior fellow for the Center for National Policy and Ken Gude, managing director of the National Security and International Policy Program of the Center for American Progress — to get their thoughts on the strategy.

Q: To what degree, if any, is this change in strategy related to taking Osama bin Laden out of the equation and the lessons learned from the operation against him?

Gude: I think this change in strategy form the Obama administration has been in the works from the very beginning — lessening the emphasis on the use of ground forces and more effort on the discrete kinds of counterterrorism operations that we've been seeing. So, I don't think it was as a result of the bin Laden operation. I think, in fact, the bin Laden operation is a result of this kind of shift in strategy.

Burke: The killing of bin Laden sort of prompts the necessity of putting something like this out. That said, it's still focused on capturing and killing al-Qaida leaders. The new strategy still puts al-Qaida and its affiliates at the center as the primary threat.

Q: Doesn't the move toward more "surgical" strikes over "boots on the ground" seem like a throwback to the strategy employed before Sept. 11, 2001 in which al-Qaida was targeted with cruise missile strikes?

Burke: I agree, it feels like that. I think the White House would argue that, 'Well, we're in a different era now, we've learned a lot more, we have more sophisticated technology'. But, what does it say about all we've heard over the past several years about how bad our human intelligence is? The upside is that we can use drones for both espionage and target strikes in areas where it's not feasible to put in troops. But it raises a lot of question about not only how effective that is, but how we keep that from getting complicated with our allies.

I think this signals the end of counterinsurgency as a counterterrorism strategy.

- Ken Gude, Center For American Progress

Gude: I think this signals the end of counterinsurgency as a counterterrorism strategy. I think that's a very wise move just looking back at the past 10 years of these large-scale ground invasions and occupations. It has been incredibly resource intensive, not only just in the incredible loss of life and casualties that Americans have experienced, but in the costs of such operations, with the direct costs now topping $1 trillion and the indirect costs estimated to be more than $2 trillion dollars over the next two years.

Q: Won't such a strategy require more cooperation with intelligence agencies in other countries, such as Pakistan, where such dealings have been shaky at best?

Burke: Absolutely. If we're going to base our drone strikes in those types of operations on that type of intelligence without figuring out a better way, then what's the use? It's kind of like an empty approach.

Gude: We need to continue to push the Pakistanis to continue what has been a two- or three- or four-year process of recognizing that extremist elements within Pakistan are a threat to the Pakistani government and stop hedging their bets by supporting some of these extremist elements within their borders.

Q: As part of the counter-insurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, we've heard a lot about the need to win hearts and minds, but isn't sending in unmanned drones – with the incumbent risk of hitting civilians — is just the opposite of that approach? Does it risk further antagonizing anti-American sentiment?

Gude: Certainly in the border areas of Pakistan, the drone campaign has been particularly effective at putting extremist groups under a significant amount of stress. That has gained the United States a tactically advantage in those areas. What is equally true is that the drones bring some strategic costs. We should not forget that Faisal Shahzad was apparently motivated by those drone strikes to try to detonate a bomb in Times Square in May 2010.

I am concerned that we seem to be relying too heavily on drones as an instrument of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. I think discretely, drones can be effective, but we cannot rely exclusively on a policy that seems to many in affected communities is seen as something akin to 'death from above' and have that be the only U.S. footprint in a particular area.

Burke: Yes, but it's a political calculation. Of course, it's way more palatable on the home front than dropping in a platoon of Special Forces and seeing casualties on the news.

Q: Al-Qaida has a history of being pretty adaptable to U.S. counterterrorism strategies. What's to stop it from shifting tactics again?

Burke: Not much. This threat is evolving. Less sophisticated attacks are a heck of a lot easier to finance and pull off. Al-Qaida can plan and carry out those kinds of attacks below the radar.

This new strategy gives a nod to the idea of national resilience, but gives it short shrift. There is both growing evidence and lots of smart folks in the community saying that resilience – defined as having the ability to withstand, recover from and adapt to a terrorist attack — should be a primary focus here. It's not. It's mentioned in a sort of tertiary paragraph in the middle of the paper.

Gude: Al-Qaida has proven to be very adaptable, but the threat we pose now is significantly different than what we faced before 2001. But I think it's also important to recognize that al-Qaida is now probably at its weakest point since Sept. 11, 2001. Not just because of the death of Osama bin Laden, but also because of the tactical successes of the drone campaign and the fact that the Arab Spring has called into question al-Qaida's message that it is the only pathway to achieve the kinds of political change that the people in the Middle East have wanted.

Πηγή

Air Assault

Huesing, Scott A.
Marine Corps Gazette
July 1, 2011

Capitalizing on existing U.S. Army air assault training for the Marine Corps GCE

The Marine Corps has three active duty infantry divisions and thousands of other ground combat elements (GCEs) and logistics combat elements that are in need of extensive air assault training. There is currently a deficit in subject matter expert (SME) availability and resources to conduct air assault training in the Marine Corps. For purposes of this article, air assault is defined as:

Operations in which air assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support), using the firepower, mobility, and total integration of assault support assets in their ground or air roles, maneuver on the battlefield under the control of the mission commander to provide mobility and firepower of the designated mission.1

Over the past 18 months I have invested a significant amount of time and research into several areas that pertain to how the Marine Corps conducts ground-air integration training (GAIT). Specifically, the areas in which the Operating Forces are starved for knowledge and training are listed next.

Updating Current Doctrine

Our current doctrine, Marine Corps Reference Publication 3?euro?11.4 Helicopter Operations, is dated 2004. The additional resource that many GCE units go to for information is the 2002 Guide for MAGTF Planners, How to Conduct Helicopterborne Operations. Both of these documents are devoid of any mention of the MV?euro?22 Osprey and many other new tactics, techniques, and procedures on how to conduct GAIT. In August 2009 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS?euro?1) held an SME conference in Coronado, CA, to begin compiling a new resource to address many of these gaps in doctrine, specifically intended to be titled Marine Corps Instructional Publication 3 ?euro? 24.01 (Draft), Marine Corps Air Assault Operations , which is intended to address more aviation combat element (ACE) and GCE integration, planning, and training considerations. Specific emphasis has been placed on how to integrate the MV?euro?22, unmanned aircraft systems, and a multitude of end user checklists on how to conduct GAIT more effectively.

Formal Hands-On Training Venue

A trend that has been repeatedly noted at Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER, Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, or from recurring after-action reports coming from Afghanistan to date (as recently as March 2010 during a major named operation) is that the Operating Forces harp on the single issue that on-off drills and getting true GAIT training with ACE units is lacking, from tactics to integrated staff planning.

Grunts want a place to train. They need facilities and hardened structures and curriculum to give them the skills to succeed. Additionally, the ACE component, both assault support pilots and crew chiefs, want to get better at integration. Only in a MEU construct do we rise to the needed level of training between the ACE and GCE; crew chiefs eat with stick leaders on the mess deck; grunts plan and train with pilots during workup cycles. They know each other?euro(TM)s names, they know each other?euro(TM)s capabilities, and in the end the force is better trained to conduct GAIT and air assault operations.

The Marine Corps needs static air assault training facilities. Simply put, we need to invest in providing the force with a training area that has Marine Corps and joint assault support aircraft training platforms. This could be utilizing decommissioned assault support platform fuselages that are configured in a dedicated training area and maintained and upgraded with current seatbelt and internal communications systems that would provide units with a realistic training venue, vice the current eyesores of dilapidated aircraft crumbling away in abandoned training areas. MAWTS?euro?1 and Training and Education Command are currently interested in exploring this option in order to develop the template to reproduce Corps-wide.

Recommendations

Institutionally we could tackle this problem in a couple of ways. One approach is to capitalize on the existing formal training venues that the U.S. Army currently has in place at The Sabaluski Air Assault School (TSAAS) located at Fort Campbell, KY. TSAAS has the infrastructure, personnel, existing curriculum, and willingness to train Marine Corps personnel. If we as Marines can either break past our bravado or work with the Army and allow Training and Education Command to fund individual Marine students to attend TSAAS courses, we would be well on our way to enhancing our infantry battalions within the Marine Corps to be able to conduct more effective air assault operations.

Many may ask what the Army can do for us in regard to this training deficit. First and foremost, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) knows a few things about air assault. Having spent a week with TSAAS and the 101st Airborne Division in March 2009, I gained a great appreciation and perspective for what they can provide to the Marine Corps.

TSAAS

TSAAS is a 10-day course that teaches air assault techniques and procedures and qualifies its soldiers to wear the Air Assault Badge. The school is located at the home of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The school teaches helicopter insertion techniques, landing zone operations, and hands-on training on preparation, rigging, and inspection of several certified or suitable external loads. Additional training includes:

* Aircraft safety.

*Aircraft orientation.

* Aero-medical evacuation.

* Pathfinder operations.

*Hand and arm signals.

* Close combat attacks.

* Combat assault operations.

Pathfinder Course

A pathfinder is a servicemember who is put in place in order to set up and operate drop zones, pickup zones, and helicopter landing sites for airborne operations, air resupply operations, or other air operations in support of the GCE. Pathfinders use a wide array of skills, including air traffic control, ground-to-air communications, sling load operations and inspections, and drop zone and helicopter landing zone support in order to ensure that the mission is a success. This follow-on curriculum that the Pathfinder Course offers could greatly enhance the infantry battalion in augmenting or replacing helicopter support team personnel.

Another option would be to wait and develop our own infrastructure to address the training deficiencies related to air assault operations. This would obviously be cost- and time-consuming, and a significant gap would exist in the interim. However, if we are solely concerned with making sure that our target audience receives only Marine Corps-specific assault support aircraft and air assault training, this would be a long-term solution. Either way we tackle this problem, training needs a home.

The Marine Corps is deficient in SMEs for air assault training. (Photo by LCpl Brennan O?euro(TM)Lowney.)

Grunts want a place to train.

The Corps needs static air assault training facilities. (Photo by PFC Michael T. Gams.)

Another option would be to wait and develop our own infrastructure to address the training deficiencies related to air assault operations.

Πηγή

Trainers teach knot-tying techniques

CAMP GONSALVES, OKINAWA, Japan — Marines with Special Operations Training Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group, III MEF, trained instructors from the Jungle Warfare Training Center here in advanced knot-tying techniques during a nine-day course June 21 through July 1.

The JWTC instructors learned to master 12 knot-tying techniques used to improve movement over obstacles in the jungle terrain.

Every six months, new JWTC instructors arrive here and learn knot-tying techniques and receive the Helicopter Rope Suspension Training class. It is the same training they teach their students, said Capt. Standford Shaw, the operations officer for JWTC and the deputy camp commander of Camp Gonsalves.

“A lot of terrain in this area of operations has cliff-faces,” said Shaw. “It’s important to be able to overcome this harsh terrain.”

After completing the course, the students are expected to be able to use their newly-acquired skills in actual exercises and operations. The training helps build a foundation for Marines to act confidently in situations where these skills may be necessary.

“In the event that a unit in the real world has to rappel, it’s better to get them familiar in a setting that they’re more comfortable in,” said Sgt. John W. Hooser III, an instructor with the expeditionary warfare branch of SOTG.

The students were taught how to make a one-roped bridge, which provides units a means to travel across a river or gorge without swimming or climbing up and down hills, said Hooser.

Practical uses of the rope, like the one-roped bridge, allow JWTC instructors more maneuverability during search and rescue operations within the training area, said Petty Officer 1st Class Windell Kellogg, an independent-duty corpsman with JWTC.

“Each search and rescue team needs to be able to get down to the patient and assess them,” said Kellogg. “If they’re in a place where they can’t feasibly descend, they need to be able to rappel or hasty rappel to that casualty. If they’re going to be JWTC instructors, they need to know everything from this course.”

The students also learned the Marine Corps’ principles of using a rope in a field environment. A rope should always be inspected to see if it is safe to use. If it has been used before but there is no record of its use, then that rope cannot be used, said Gunnery Sgt. Ashton Benn, the chief instructor for HRST, SOTG.

A Marine should always use two ropes, he added.

“Anyone can be trained to rappel, but the intricate ins-and-outs of tying knots and all the safety aspects of it are very important,” said Kellogg. “In a training environment, safety is a key objective.”

Πηγή

Instant Custom Camo For Commandos

Commandos strive to gain every advantage possible before carrying out a high-risk mission. Now they can quickly get camouflage uniforms optimized for the local terrain, colors and structures. This is because there is now available "direct-garment-printing" that enables the special camouflage pattern and colors to be quickly applied to "blank" (monochrome) uniforms and shipped to the troops planning the mission. While this special camouflage may only make the troops wearing them a few percent more difficult for the enemy to detect, that is one more edge the commandos have.

Other edges include years of specialized training, lots of intel on the target, careful planning, some kind of mockup of the target area for practice runs and, most importantly, the element of surprise. None of these advantages, by themselves, will assure victory. But all together, they make a decisive difference. Thus it should be no surprise to hear that elite troops like commandos and paratroopers have, on average, suffered lower casualty rates than regular infantry. These elite forces also tend to accomplish more difficult tasks. Instant custom camo is one more reason why.

Πηγή