Air Assault

Huesing, Scott A.
Marine Corps Gazette
July 1, 2011

Capitalizing on existing U.S. Army air assault training for the Marine Corps GCE

The Marine Corps has three active duty infantry divisions and thousands of other ground combat elements (GCEs) and logistics combat elements that are in need of extensive air assault training. There is currently a deficit in subject matter expert (SME) availability and resources to conduct air assault training in the Marine Corps. For purposes of this article, air assault is defined as:

Operations in which air assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support), using the firepower, mobility, and total integration of assault support assets in their ground or air roles, maneuver on the battlefield under the control of the mission commander to provide mobility and firepower of the designated mission.1

Over the past 18 months I have invested a significant amount of time and research into several areas that pertain to how the Marine Corps conducts ground-air integration training (GAIT). Specifically, the areas in which the Operating Forces are starved for knowledge and training are listed next.

Updating Current Doctrine

Our current doctrine, Marine Corps Reference Publication 3?euro?11.4 Helicopter Operations, is dated 2004. The additional resource that many GCE units go to for information is the 2002 Guide for MAGTF Planners, How to Conduct Helicopterborne Operations. Both of these documents are devoid of any mention of the MV?euro?22 Osprey and many other new tactics, techniques, and procedures on how to conduct GAIT. In August 2009 Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS?euro?1) held an SME conference in Coronado, CA, to begin compiling a new resource to address many of these gaps in doctrine, specifically intended to be titled Marine Corps Instructional Publication 3 ?euro? 24.01 (Draft), Marine Corps Air Assault Operations , which is intended to address more aviation combat element (ACE) and GCE integration, planning, and training considerations. Specific emphasis has been placed on how to integrate the MV?euro?22, unmanned aircraft systems, and a multitude of end user checklists on how to conduct GAIT more effectively.

Formal Hands-On Training Venue

A trend that has been repeatedly noted at Enhanced MOJAVE VIPER, Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, or from recurring after-action reports coming from Afghanistan to date (as recently as March 2010 during a major named operation) is that the Operating Forces harp on the single issue that on-off drills and getting true GAIT training with ACE units is lacking, from tactics to integrated staff planning.

Grunts want a place to train. They need facilities and hardened structures and curriculum to give them the skills to succeed. Additionally, the ACE component, both assault support pilots and crew chiefs, want to get better at integration. Only in a MEU construct do we rise to the needed level of training between the ACE and GCE; crew chiefs eat with stick leaders on the mess deck; grunts plan and train with pilots during workup cycles. They know each other?euro(TM)s names, they know each other?euro(TM)s capabilities, and in the end the force is better trained to conduct GAIT and air assault operations.

The Marine Corps needs static air assault training facilities. Simply put, we need to invest in providing the force with a training area that has Marine Corps and joint assault support aircraft training platforms. This could be utilizing decommissioned assault support platform fuselages that are configured in a dedicated training area and maintained and upgraded with current seatbelt and internal communications systems that would provide units with a realistic training venue, vice the current eyesores of dilapidated aircraft crumbling away in abandoned training areas. MAWTS?euro?1 and Training and Education Command are currently interested in exploring this option in order to develop the template to reproduce Corps-wide.

Recommendations

Institutionally we could tackle this problem in a couple of ways. One approach is to capitalize on the existing formal training venues that the U.S. Army currently has in place at The Sabaluski Air Assault School (TSAAS) located at Fort Campbell, KY. TSAAS has the infrastructure, personnel, existing curriculum, and willingness to train Marine Corps personnel. If we as Marines can either break past our bravado or work with the Army and allow Training and Education Command to fund individual Marine students to attend TSAAS courses, we would be well on our way to enhancing our infantry battalions within the Marine Corps to be able to conduct more effective air assault operations.

Many may ask what the Army can do for us in regard to this training deficit. First and foremost, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) knows a few things about air assault. Having spent a week with TSAAS and the 101st Airborne Division in March 2009, I gained a great appreciation and perspective for what they can provide to the Marine Corps.

TSAAS

TSAAS is a 10-day course that teaches air assault techniques and procedures and qualifies its soldiers to wear the Air Assault Badge. The school is located at the home of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The school teaches helicopter insertion techniques, landing zone operations, and hands-on training on preparation, rigging, and inspection of several certified or suitable external loads. Additional training includes:

* Aircraft safety.

*Aircraft orientation.

* Aero-medical evacuation.

* Pathfinder operations.

*Hand and arm signals.

* Close combat attacks.

* Combat assault operations.

Pathfinder Course

A pathfinder is a servicemember who is put in place in order to set up and operate drop zones, pickup zones, and helicopter landing sites for airborne operations, air resupply operations, or other air operations in support of the GCE. Pathfinders use a wide array of skills, including air traffic control, ground-to-air communications, sling load operations and inspections, and drop zone and helicopter landing zone support in order to ensure that the mission is a success. This follow-on curriculum that the Pathfinder Course offers could greatly enhance the infantry battalion in augmenting or replacing helicopter support team personnel.

Another option would be to wait and develop our own infrastructure to address the training deficiencies related to air assault operations. This would obviously be cost- and time-consuming, and a significant gap would exist in the interim. However, if we are solely concerned with making sure that our target audience receives only Marine Corps-specific assault support aircraft and air assault training, this would be a long-term solution. Either way we tackle this problem, training needs a home.

The Marine Corps is deficient in SMEs for air assault training. (Photo by LCpl Brennan O?euro(TM)Lowney.)

Grunts want a place to train.

The Corps needs static air assault training facilities. (Photo by PFC Michael T. Gams.)

Another option would be to wait and develop our own infrastructure to address the training deficiencies related to air assault operations.

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