Seminar On Defeating Terrorism Sri Lankan Experience

Colombo - 31st May to 2nd June 2011

Invitees and Delegates ::

BACKGROUND

1. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) waged an insurgency (civil war) in search of a separate state for the Tamil minority, for a span of almost three decades, mainly in the countries North & East. The magnitude that the insurgency escalated prompted the government of Sri Lanka with the use of its three forces to take stern action to curtail/defeat the insurgency, which was an ardent task for a country of this state. Though the experiences were bitter to the extreme it was a learning platform right from the beginning both militarily & politically in fighting the separatism. The escalation of insurgency to a civil war was a rapid occurrence due to the out side (International) sympathy which was lend towards the terrorist outfit. The result was a fully fledged civil war which took away thousands of life’s & damaged to the state owned property.

2. There were many times in the long drawn history of separatist war that peace full resolutions were made to solve the issues peacefully, which made the LTTE to become opportunists to be a more forceful and a ruthless outfit. This prompted the government of Sri Lanka to launch a military campaign against the LTTE in mid 2006, which resulted eradicating the menace of terrorism/separatism in less than three years from the soil of Sri Lanka. The approach of the Government of Sri Lanka in the final phase of the counter insurgency was a paradigm shift from the universally accepted and practiced features of the Biggs Plan.

3. The probability of overt war as an instrument of state policy in the foreseeable future is likely to diminish due to the overarching potential of nuclear war, the transfer of global wealth and economic power from West to East and the quest for highly strategic resources. The decreasing relevance and acceptability of conventional warfare, makes states in strained relationships opt for indirect interventions in enemy territory in order to destabilize and weaken the polity. Consequently low intensity conflicts will prevail as a viable alternative to all out war. Transnational linkages that sub-national groups within a state have and the reach of modern communications make target states vulnerable to exploitation by the adventurous. Insurgency and counter insurgency will continue to pose a threat to National Security especially in the developing world. The nature and scope of insurgency has transformed from the period of the Malayan Campaign to the Global war on Terror especially in terms of lethality, reach, strategy and tactics rendering to doubt the relevance of concurrent multiple lines of operations. Responding to insurgency in the most appropriate manner will be the key to National Security in the foreseeable future.

SCOPE

4. The Sri Lankan approach that succeeded in defeating the LTTE was the result of learning from years of fighting insurgency, strong political will and harnessing popular support. They transcend beyond the traditional approach. Though unique, their linkage with the traditional approach, research and theory prevails.

5. The panel presenting the Sri Lankan Experience  shared their knowledge on Counter Insurgency and enumerate contributory factors in militarily defeating the LTTE, “The most ruthless terrorist organisation in the world”by emphasising on the predominance of the political effort, military effort, efficient politico military gearing and rapid resettlement as the core contributors to the success

6. The summit convened key delegates from across the globe both to discuss the Sri Lankan counter insurgency campaign with a debate on current anti terrorist trends. It  proposed adequate measures to manage and counter global terrorism and discussed strategies for nation building while introducing a Sri Lankan perspective in counter terrorism.

OutCome

7. A better understanding and sharing of knowledge in:

a.Comprehensive and effective counter terrorism strategy

b.Operational and tactical level lessons covering; intelligence, field engineering, medical, and operating behind enemy lines

c.Evolution of tactical level training.

d.The role of Human Rights in Counter Insurgency operations.

e.Rehabilitation programmes to integrate ex-combatants into society and measures taken to mitigate factors that might lead to resurgence of violence.

f.Political reforms to accommodate all ethnic communities and nation building.

g.The need to revisit the traditional model for counter insurgency and benchmark the Sri Lankan experience.

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