What Has the Army Learned From Iraq and Afghanistan?

Over at Tom Rick’s Best Defense there is an interesting discussion regarding “what the Army has learned from the wars of 9-11?” I have posted a very long comment to his original blog post; I would recommend you read the blog and the comments and then come back and read my comments which are posted here at OP-FOR.

Tom,

Your question “what has the Army learned over the last ten years of war?” is very perceptive.

Since I first read the question yesterday I have been giving it a lot of thought. I read through some of the comments today and found some great insights and others that merely repeated oft heard commentary.

Brian Linn in his book Echo of Battle identified the three cultures within the Army; one of which is the Guardians. This culture guards what they believe are the historic ethos of the nation. Today the Guardians are the dominant culture in the Army; as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, they are determined to ensure they restore the Army they are comfortable with, the Army that focuses on winning the grand wars and to avoid fighting wars of stability. They are the culture that plays up the future threat of China and Iraq, and seek to define the need for the Army within the traditional boundaries understood since the end of World War II. But in order to dominate the culture of the Army they will have to work hand in hand with the Manager culture. The Managers are the ones who adhere to the rigid proprieties of the system—in some ways these two sub-cultures complement each other. The last sub culture with the Army is that of the Heroic. These are the ones who understand how to fight wars, where it be grand wars or insurgencies. They will be losers and will find it hard to deal with the bullshit of the Guardians and Managers.

I mentioned Linn for one reason; because few in the Army understand it roles and responsibilities. One of your commentators stated, “The failure in the use of analytics to make effective core decisions in how the US Army leads, plans, and executes its military operations and its Title X operations (train & equip) ultimately is a failure of basic leadership.[,]” highlighted one of the greatest failure of those in the Army, they Army does not plan or execute Operations. When I speak of the Army—of course I am referring to HQDA and the Institutional Army. Rather they support Joint Operations by providing trained, ready, and equipped forces to the Joint Commander. (Let me also be a little snarky—I am tired of seeing it written as Title X, whenever I do see it written this way it means the individual has never picked up a copy of Title 10.) But the author of that comment highlighted a fundamental problem with the Army over the last ten years—it has not adjusted it processes to support the war. Most of the Army’s uniformed Senior leaders do not understand what Title 10 means or how it effects the Army. Just like the commentator many believe they have a say in Operational matters, unless a Joint Task Force Commander their only role is to support.

Some of the failures of Army processes:

Procurement; why did the Army continue to procure Up-Armored HMMWV when it was evident in 2004 that they were death traps when hit by an IEDs, that they were overweight, top heavy, and underpowered because of all the additional weight. It took Secretary Gates to push the Army and USMC out of their comfort zone in order to procure the MRAP. He literally had to circumvent the overly bureaucratic service procurement processes.

Promotions; the Army has not adjusted it promotion guidelines to fast track those who have demonstrated ability to execute and fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Army failed to cull the deadwood. One of the great things George Marshall did at the beginning of World War II was to cull the deadwood within the officer corps.

While the Army instituted Operational Needs Statements (ONS) early in the conflicts, it allowed the system to become “Toys for Boys” where every Battalion Commander, when influenced by contractors, got what he or she considered to be the latest greatest toy. The end result was the Army bought a lot of kit that ultimately turned out to be crap.

The Army Combat Uniform. Enough said.

Rather than flattening command levels, the Army maintained the status quo and allowed the Headquarters to become too large. (Army HQs 1000+; Corps 800+; Division 700+; Brigade 200+). The larger the Headquarters makes harder it becomes to get the important information to the leaders.

Rotating General Officer forward through positions so they can get the coveted right sleeve patch.

In short, as much as possible the Army has maintained the “Status Quo Ante Bellum.”

Now we see the Guardians and Managers throwing around the buzzwords of a bureaucracy seeking to recreate the Army they grew up in:

Realigning Division to Corps, and Brigades to Divisions; we have suddenly determine that a Brigade Commander must be on the same post as a two star division commander in order to be properly supervised.

Realigning Combat Aviation Brigades with Corps and Divisions—remember the whole point of modularity was to make Brigade self-contained elements that could deploy with any type of Headquarters.

Realigning Fires Brigades with Division Headquarters.

While it has been articulated yet look for us to align Expeditionary Sustainment Commands with Corps, and Sustainment Brigades with Divisions.

There is concern within the Senior Leadership we have a whole generation who doesn’t know how to operate in garrison. True they do have to learn something about how to maintain and account for their kit, how to conduct their own training. But I have a startling thought for the Senior leaders, most of our junior leaders are pretty smart and will figure it out. An ass chewing from the Brigade Commander for shoddy maintenance or a Report of Survey or whatever we are calling it today will get a leaders attention on accounting for property. Sure they will need some mentoring. What I am afraid is the code word for how to operate in garrison means unnecessary meeting and formations; CSM deciding the rocks need painting white etc. All the bullshit the Army is famous.

The Sergeant Major of the Army talking about overweight soldiers, standards, getting rid of the bad apples I can see it now the soldier who has served four, five, or six tours in either Iraq or Afghanistan is going to be thrown out because he is overweight but can pass his PT test! There is no question there are bad apples we need to get rid of, but the Army being the Army we will mange to throw the baby out with the bath water.

Can starching uniforms be far behind—walking around the Pentagon I am amazed at the number who have their ACUs starched!

The Army as a Profession—while a needed discussion I worry is about getting rid of those who don’t fit our Senior leader mold of what a “professional is or should be.”

The Army says it needs to keep mid-grade leaders for expansibility—but based on the latest O6 board results, not so much. There was a 34% selection rate—including a number of former battalion commanders who had 2 or more 1 block OERs. This is a direct result of a number of factors—grade plate review, MTO&E changes, etc which when institute the second and third order effect were not considered or were ignored by the Colonels who developed the plans. (Remember a hog don’t slaughter itself!) Of course if the Army choose to get cull the herd of Colonels and Lieutenant Colonels who have no promotion potential and who are essentially robbing oxygen until they hit their mandatory retirement date.

The Guardian-Managers are going to make the rules and will make life hard for those who rightly belong to the Heroic sub-culture.

One of the points you touched on was why the Army can’t seem to develop Strategic leaders. Very simply it does not tolerate intellectuals. Yes there have been a few in recent years; I will name the ones I think fit that mold during my time in the Army (1976-2009): Bernard Rogers, Shy Meyer, John Galvin, Colin Powell, Max Thurman, Donn Starry, Eric Shinseki, David Petraeus, Gary Luck, Martin Dempsey and Dan Bolger. Rogers, Meyer, Galvin, Thurman, and Starry were a product of an era where being smart was not necessarily a sin. Powell because of his assignments developed into a Strategic thinker. The others developed their ability because of education, assignments, and mentorship. Because of their mentors they able to overcome the prejudice against smart people.

In recent years the Army created a functional area “Strategic Plans and Policy.” Many of those in this functional area have come be believe they are “Strategists.” While smart few of them are Strategists. (In fact the career field is misnamed it should be Operations, Plans, and Policy; with some being selected based on their performance to be a select core of Strategists.) The Army seems to believe that if you recreate the education experience of David Petraeus you will create the next generation of strategists. Unfortunately before someone can be a Strategist they must first be a creative thinker.

Most officers entering the Army are not creative thinkers. Either they are graduates of academically deficient institutions or they major in a discipline that was the path of least resistance. In short by and large the Officer Corps is intellectually deficient. Someone who has the potential to be a strategist must first be intellectually curious, a creative thinker, and willing to take on the status quo. Lastly the Army’s educational system does not encourage either creative thinking or intellectually curiosity. As they use to say at Command and General Staff College, “it is only reading if you read it.”

Back to your original question will the Army learn anything from the last ten years. Probably not. . .certainly the Center for Military History is not interested in what has happened in the last years. The Combat Studies Institute at Leavenworth is studying some areas of what has happened in the last ten years. But if we really want to know what the Army has learned or how it has changed it is going to be the work of someone outside the Army.

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Combat Lessons

Notes On Training

From Combat Lessons Volume Three

July 3, 1944

Note: At full strength per the Army’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), a World War II U.S. Army infantry company consisted of three rifle platoons and one heavy weapons platoon. The company commander was a Captain in rank. A platoon consisted of three squads plus a small headquarters team. The platoon leader was a Lieutenant. Rifle squads consisted of 12 men each, lead by buck sergeant.

How I Would Train a Company Now" by Captain Robert C. Gates, Infantry, ITALY: 

“If I had to train a rifle company again, I would stress the following: 

Basic discipline, by which I mean smart saluting, alertness of bearing, cleanliness and neatness of person, clothing, and equipment — shoes shined, hair cut, etc. Get perfection in this early, as it is the basis of much later training. 

Combat firing on a course which included a lot of surprise targets. Proper distribution of small arms fire over a suspected target area is very important. 

Use of the rifle sling, particularly in combat firing. Most men fail to use it even when in a defensive or other situation where its use is perfectly practicable. Practice until the use of the sling is so natural that a man must consciously decide not to use it when the situation is such that its use is inappropriate. 

Sniper training for the upper 20 percent qualified in marksmanship in each rifle platoon. Organize at least two 3-man sniper teams in each platoon. Allowing for casualties and sickness, you could count on having about two 2 man teams in each platoon in combat. A sniper’s rifle and a pair of binoculars per team are essential. 

BAR training to be given to every man in the squad until he has a thorough knowledge of the weapon. It is one of our more effective weapons but must be in the hands of a trained man to be really valuable. A BAR man in one of our companies got twenty Germans ‘for sure’ in one hour during one of their counterattacks; this was one-half the casualties his platoon inflicted. 

Scouting and patrolling need plenty of emphasis. My company landed in Sicily with about 7 noncommissioned officers and 25 privates efficient in this. As a result, they were worked to death. There numbers became reduced and the replacements that we received knew little about the subject. Therefore, our patrolling grew progressively weaker as the campaign went on. This training should include passage of minefields, compass work and map reading, and patrolling against actual enemy groups. 

Terrain appreciation, to teach the men advantages and disadvantages of terrain features. Teach them to visualize how the ground on which you are located looks from the enemy’s viewpoint, i. e., what he can see and what he can’t see; where you can take positions unobserved, etc. 

Camouflage and camouflage discipline, particularly the discipline. Pound into the men the necessity of not making trails, not moving around when the enemy can observe your position, and similar matters, until each man always thinks about it. 

Organization of the squad chain of leadership to the point where if only two men are left in the squad they will know automatically which one is the leader. Keep the squad organized this way regardless of casualties and consequent replacements. 

    

The weapons platoon should be worked into the company team to a point where the company commander habitually uses it to its utmost capacity. Too often, the 81mm mortars and the artillery are called on to accomplish work that could be handled by the weapons platoon. 

Living in the field under adverse circumstances should be taught. This means that the men should know how to cope with cold, rain, snow, mud, and ice, when they are on the front line for many days. The men should know how to put a shelter half over a foxhole or slit trench, leaving a small hole through which to observe and to fire. They should know that they must remove the shelter half and re-camouflage the trench or hole whenever the weather clears. They should also be trained to remove their shoes and socks each day and massage their feet. Such training will really pay dividends. 

Messenger Service. 

Messengers should receive specialized training in scouting and patrolling, make them practice and practice until they can repeat a simple verbal message exactly as it was given to them. Do not permit them the slightest deviation from the wording of the message. Also these men should receive intelligence training, as frequently they have opportunities to see and report things of value to the commander. All messengers in my regiment have been sent to an intelligence school and it has helped. 

In selecting noncommissioned officers, I am convinced that steadiness is the first asset, resourcefulness is the second, and intellect only third.”

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