DemonEye- Equipping the Strategic Corporal for COIN

http://www.army.mil/-images/2011/05/06/107772/size0-army.mil-107772-2011-05-07-020535.jpg

May 6, 2011

By 2LT Derek Wales, 3/1 CAV


DemonEye is a handheld (fits in a SAW gunners pouch) micro laser rangefinder (MLRF) for identifying targets and determining 10 digit grid coordinates with a push of a button, using an integrated laser rangefinder, GPS, optic, digital compass, microcontroller and software that is optimized for compact size and low cost of manufacture. The design and software are 100% Army owned. This article discusses both the why and how of the design coming into being and is representative of the extensive assets being applied to provide warriors with the tools to increase their effectiveness.
-----
"Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife" - T. E. Lawrence
-----
The COIN environment presents the warrior leader with some of the most difficult challenges they will face in their career. Operating against an enemy hidden in plain sight among the local populace while having to patrol in the rugged terrain of Afghanistan further complicates the current fight. Our enemies either strike and fade away, or when they stand and fight, do it in close proximity to civilians. They know Americans value innocent life more than they do. This creates a fight where the insurgents are free to use both direct and indirect fire weapons while coalition forces become reluctant to use indirect fire weapons when civilians are in the area. The reticence to use artillery was at least partially responsible for the deaths of five Americans who were under withering fire for hours in Kunar province at Gangjal on Sep. 8, 2009.
-----
"(A) strike can cause collateral damage that turns people against the host-nation (HN) government and provides insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when justified under the law of war... civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works to the insurgents' benefit." - FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency
-----
Unfortunately, this is a fact, and there is nothing we can do about it, except not miss. The U.S. Army has the best indirect fire systems, both cannon and mortar tubes, in the world. AFATDS and the MFCS allow crews to land unguided rounds within meters of targets. PGK and APMI GPS guided rounds take the accuracy even higher.
-----
The key battlefield issue is no longer the ability to destroy the target, but the capability to find it and accurately report its' location. A single soldier with a radio can now bring in practically unlimited fires. These fires will come from assets that the enemy has no practical means of fighting against, artillery and mortars miles away. The psychological effect on the enemy cannot be discounted. It changes the dynamic of the fight that they are no longer fighting just a squad. They are fighting the big guns. Being struck overwhelmingly with little to no chance of striking back leads to demoralization and reluctance to fire.
-----
"There is no logical reason why bullets or bombs should be wasted on empty air or dirt. Ideally, every shot fired should find its mark." - Col. Phillip Meilinger, Commander, USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies
-----
This is the ultimate goal, and the tools exist to make this happen. The days of walking fire onto a target should be over. The first indication the enemy should have of being under indirect fire should be shells bursting in their positions. But this all depends on accurate target grid locations. At the company level, the attached FIST brings tools such as the GLID and DAGR to accurately locate targets for precision engagement. But our current fight isn't a company fight. It is a platoon fight, with the emphasis being on the engaged squad at the tip of the spear.
-----
"The inescapable lesson of Somalia and of other recent operations, whether humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, or traditional warfighting, is that their outcome may hinge on decisions made by small unit leaders, and by actions taken at the lowest level." - Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Commandant, USMC
-----
The engaged squad. Led by an NCO. Smart, tough and full of fight. But constrained by many factors. They don't have GLIDs, and are already carrying so much weight that they are looking to shave every ounce. At most that squad is carrying a few hundred pounds of ordnance. Put in perspective, a platoon of 120mm mortars can deliver 1920 pounds of steel in a mad minute.
-----
"Contrary to popular belief, we at artillery command do not believe we're God. We merely borrowed His 'Smite' button." - Anonymous
-----
The one unit on the battlefield most in need of steel rain to support the fight and conserve their vital ammunition supplies is the unit least able to accurately bring those indirect fires to bear.
-----
That thought led me to the genesis of DemonEye. A laser targeting module designed for the squad leader, not the FISTer. I had seen video of a firefight in the Korengal, and saw soldiers fumbling with civilian Garmin GPS units and compasses while taking fire from enemy snipers, all in an effort to calculate target grid coordinates for supporting fire. I am an electrical engineer, and knew we could do better. All the components exist in compact form, but they would need to be married together in a package suitable for the demands of the infantryman. Software would have to be written for the microcontroller so all the components could work with each other. The CPU would need instructions on how to convert latitude and longitude into military grid reference, and a trigonometry package to calculate target grids from distances and azimuths, as well as built in calibration algorithms. All those had to be in the box.
-----
DemonEye's short list of requirements were that it had to generate an accurate target grid and be light, rugged, simple to operate, and low in cost relative to other products available. My reasoning was that if four DemonEye units could be built for the cost of one of the heavier competing technologies, DemonEye had a good chance of being affordable enough to the Army for squad level issue.
-----
The Electrical Engineering Department at West Point approved DemonEye as a capstone project, and my specific thanks go out to LTC George Kilby and LTC Scott Crino who were involved at each end of the process in moving it forward. A design team was formed to develop the system. DemonEye combines a laser range finder, digital compass, GPS, tilt sensor, microcontroller and open source software to calculate target locations quickly and accurately. By using low-cost, commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, the design team was able to build a functioning prototype for approximately $1,000. It was presented at the MIT Soldier Design Competition, winning the Lockheed-Martin prize, and at USMA Projects Day, winning the Clark Innovation Award. But the unit was still an un-ruggedized prototype.
-----
In June 2010 I presented the DemonEye concept and delivered the prototype system to the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) at Fort Meade. The AWG felt the idea had merit and Dog Squadron invested the R&D dollars necessary to have the Johns Hopkins University (JHU) Applied Physics Lab (APL) turn the prototype into a ruggedized unit for field testing. My thanks go out to COL James Mis, Dog Squadron Commander, and SGM Daniel Hendrex for their guidance and mentoring. I had the privilege of being temporarily assigned to the AWG to assist in the development of the second generation system. Their aggressiveness in moving the project forward and the skill of the engineering team assembled by Johns Hopkins was amazing. The second generation systems were completed in September and are currently being tested at Aberdeen.
-----
"Third rule of gun-fighting. Bring lots of guns." - Anonymous
-----
When considering the device specifications, I always had an understanding that more performance meant more weight and more cost. More cost meant fewer units produced, fewer squad leaders equipped. But more units produced meant more big guns on target. The key was to find the sweet spot of the 90% solution at 20% of the cost.
-----
Range: DemonEye has a range of 2,000 meters. In order to move beyond a 2,000 meter range requires a significantly heavier and much more expensive laser. Fortunately, 2,000 meters is more than what is needed at the squad level. The auto-detonate range of RPGs is 920 meters, machine guns have a maximum range of 1,100 meters against area targets and almost every engagement with the enemy in Afghanistan occurs at or below 1,000 meters.
-----
Optics: DemonEye has a 7 power optic which is integrated into the LRF, so it added no cost or weight. High enough power to positively identify whether someone is carrying a weapon, but not so high as to tire the eyes through "shake", important in a handheld device.
-----
Weight: Right at two pounds. The unit eliminates the weight of carrying a separate laser rangefinder, GPS unit, compass and binoculars, so it represents a net decrease in the squad leader's load.
-----
Batteries: Uses AA batteries, available anywhere in the world, to eliminate supply chain issues. Off the shelf lithium AAs allow operation in sub-zero weather.
-----
Army Owned Technology: Although my name is on the copyright of the software that makes DemonEye run, since I am a serving Soldier, the Army owns all the intellectual property. As the Colonel heading the Rapid Equipping Force said to me last summer; "well son, you won't make any money from this, but you will get a handshake and a certificate of appreciation." Levity aside, this means the Army gets the device for the lowest cost possible and is not locked in to any one contractor for production or pay change fees. That means more devices in the hands of Soldiers.
-----
Accuracy: At 2,000 meters DemonEye has a maximum dispersion of 24 meters, which is within the lethal radius of even the smallest mortar rounds, and is more accurate than other GOTS/COTS systems used by dismounted infantry.
-----
Simplicity: DemonEye provides a user grid, target grid, azimuth, distance, and saves up to ten locations based upon the time they were recorded at the press of a button. The compass adjusts for declination and auto-calibrates with two button presses.
-----
The software, accuracy and simplicity issues bear discussion as they show how design philosophy drives the process. I knew LRFs are accurate to +/- 1 meter. GPS is accurate to +/- 5 meters. The real Achilles Heel of a targeting module is the digital compass. Being even a degree off on declination is more than 30 meters error at 2,000 meters. A significant challenge lay in wringing the maximum accuracy out of that compass while still keeping the unit simple to use. The nearest competitor has pages of quick reference cards, menus to use GPS, and a 12 step compass calibration procedure that involves drawing six lines on the ground at 60 degree intervals and pointing the unit up and down at 30 degree angles. This is pretty much the industry standard for aligning digital compasses, and may work fine in garrison, but was totally unacceptable in my mind for field use.
-----
Anyone who has done land nav has run into declination as an issue, adjusting magnetic north to grid north. If you draw a line on a map between two points you KNOW the grid azimuth, regardless of what the compass says. Well, the GPS of DemonEye KNOWS where it is to within 3 to 5 meters. If you point the unit at the guard shack as you leave the COP and press the "Calibrate" button, it stores that location. Drive down the road a few hundred meters and lase the same guard shack. The unit knows where it is now, how far apart the two points are to within a meter, and the computer calculates what the grid azimuth MUST be, regardless of what the compass is telling the microcontroller. If the compass is 10 degrees off because of declination and compass inaccuracy, DemonEye subtracts the error out and gives an accurate answer from that point forward. No separate declination adjustment required and totally transparent to the user, which is exactly what we want.
-----
Ease of use, a net weight reduction in load, and positional knowledge. A scout described DemonEye as a "pocket LRAS", with many of the same applications. The uses are not only to call for fire, but to designate TRPs, transmitting locations of LZs for 9-lines, or marking the position of potential IEDs. Any application where it is useful to observe a location from a distance and determine its exact location. DemonEye represents the next step in equipping the "strategic corporal" with the proper tools to fight- and win.
-----
The author, Lieutenant Derek Wales, is an Armor officer currently serving with 3/1 Cavalry, 3d BCT, 3d Infantry Division. He is a graduate of Armor Officer BOLC, the Army Reconnaissance Course, and Air Assault School. He holds a degree in Electrical Engineering from the United States Military Academy.

Πηγή

Overseer of bin Laden raid to head Special Ops Command at MacDill

[U.S. Navy]

                                                 U.S. Navy Vice Admiral William H. McRaven

By William R. Levesque, Times Staff Writer 
In Print: Friday, May 6, 2011

TAMPA — He majored in journalism and loves to write. He wrote a book translated into a dozen languages. His dad played in the NFL. And it's a safe bet nobody else in his journalism class ever offered to sacrifice sheep — and meant it.

One other thing: He helped kill Osama bin Laden.

This is Vice Adm. William H. McRaven, 55, commander of Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC, at Fort Bragg, N.C. He oversaw preparations and planning for the Navy SEAL raid that killed bin Laden.

And he's coming to Tampa.

On April 6, McRaven was nominated by President Barack Obama to become the new chief of U.S. Special Operations Command at MacDill Air Force Base later this year. The command spearheads the nation's fight against global terrorism.

Prospects for his Senate confirmation? Excellent.

"He's got a keen analytical mind," said Bobby Inman, a retired admiral who was director of the National Security Agency. "This was an extremely skillful, tough mission. (SOCom) will be in capable hands."

Inman, who met McRaven at a dinner last year, said McRaven laughed at the incongruity of a journalism grad heading the secretive world of special forces.

Time has dubbed McRaven "the most deadly would-be journalist in the world."

Nan McRaven, McRaven's older sister, said she spoke to her brother after the raid. She said he was tired. "But he sounded good," she said. "He was very complimentary of his team and the president. I just told him how proud we were of him."

McRaven is the youngest of three children, a military child who traveled around the world with his family. His father, the late Col. Claude "Mac" McRaven, was a pilot in World War II who flew British Spitfire fighters, escorting bombers across the channel.

Mac was a college football star. He played one year for the NFL's Cleveland Rams in 1939. He was in Wheaties commercials.

The father was deeply proud of his son, and was alive long enough to see McRaven's climb up the ranks, said Nan McRaven.

William McRaven was himself an athlete. He took up scuba diving before he left elementary school in San Antonio, Texas. "I think it had something to do with the 007 movies," she said.

He eventually joined elite special forces as a Navy SEAL after graduating in 1977 with that journalism degree from the University of Texas at Austin.

His sister said he always intended to join the Navy. Being a journalist just provided a well-rounded education.

In 1995, McRaven published Spec Ops, a standard read in special forces. One line from it could have been ripped from the playbook of the bin Laden raid.

"Special operations forces succeed … when they are able to gain relative superiority through … a simple plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed and executed with surprise, speed and purpose."

In 2008, McRaven became chief of JSOC.

McRaven is known to accompany his men on "snatch-and-grab" raids of terrorists. But with bin Laden, he oversaw his SEALs from a base in Afghanistan.

Perhaps the darkest episode in McRaven's career came last year.

After a botched raid by his men that killed five civilians, McRaven visited an Afghan father whose sons were among those killed. McRaven's subordinate held two sheep.

Under the local culture, a ritual sacrifice at an adversary's door is a way of seeking forgiveness, the Times of London reported.

McRaven, a father of three, offered up the sheep.

"Sir, you and I are very different," McRaven said. "You are a family man with many children and many friends. I am a soldier. I have spent most of my career overseas away from my family.

"But I have children as well, and my heart grieves for you. But we have one thing in common. We have the same God. He is a God who shows great love and compassion. … I pray today that He will show mercy on me and my men for this awful tragedy."

McRaven then presented the man with $30,000 wrapped in a handkerchief. The Afghan was unsure he would forgive. But on one thing he was adamant.

The sheep were spared.


Πηγή

The book the SEALs read: Adm. William McRaven’s ‘Spec Ops’

After years in the shadows of clandestine war, Vice Adm. William H. McRaven has become famous for preparing the elite Navy SEAL team that took out Osama bin Laden last Sunday. Even though many details of the raid remain closely held, anyone seeking more insight on it is in luck: McRaven has written the book on covert missions.

That would be his 1995 book, “Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, Theory and Practice,” a sort of textbook/history of hostage rescues, POW camp raids, battleship assaults and more of the most heart-stopping operations in military history.

In “Spec Ops,” McRaven outlines the principles of successful special operations — simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose — and unpacks eight famous missions, including the 1976 Israeli rescue of hostages from Uganda’s Entebbe airport.

It’s a fascinating read. But if you don’t have time, here’s a cheat sheet on how they conduct special ops at the highest level:

Practice makes perfect: “Certain combat units, such as counterterrorist teams, strategic bombers, and SEAL delivery vehicle teams, perform standard mission profiles as a matter of routine. . . . Most special operations, however, vary enough from the standard scenario that new equipment and tactics must be brought to bear on the problem. When this occurs it is essential to conduct at least one, and preferably two, full-dress rehearsals prior to the mission. The plan that sounded simple on paper must now be put to the test. . . . Invariably when a certain aspect of an operation was not rehearsed, it failed during the actual mission.”

Get it over with: “In a special operations mission, the concept of speed is simple. Get to your objective as fast as possible. Any delay will expand your area of vulnerability. . . . Most special operations involve direct, and in most cases immediate, contact with the enemy, where minutes and seconds spell the difference between success and failure. Of the successful missions analyzed in this book, only in [one] did the attacker take longer than thirty minutes to achieve relative superiority from the point of vulnerability. In most of the other cases, relative superiority was achieved in five minutes and the missions were completed in thirty minutes.”

Go in at night — unless you shouldn’t: “Most attacking forces prefer to assault a target at night, primarily because darkness provides cover, but also because at nighttime the enemy is presumed to be tired, less vigilant, and more susceptible to surprise. But nighttime frequently increases alertness and each mission should consider the ramifications of a night assault. Several of the most successful special operations were conducted in daytime and achieved a high degree of surprise.”

Commit to the part: “The purpose of the mission must be thoroughly understood beforehand, and the men must be inspired with a sense of personal dedication that knows no limitations. . . . In an age of high technology and Jedi Knights we often overlook the need for personal involvement, but we do so at our own risk.”

Cowboys need not apply: “The view of special operations personnel as unruly and cavalier with a disdain for the brass was not borne out in this study. The officers and enlisted whom I interviewed were professionals who fully appreciated the value of proper planning and preparations, of good order and discipline, and of working with higher authorities. They were also exceptionally modest men who felt that there was nothing heroic in their actions and often sought to downplay their public image.”

Carlos Lozada is the editor of Outlook.

 

Πηγή

West Gurkhas in the firing line as special forces escape the axe

Around 150 Gurkhas face the axe as part of controversial Armed Forces cuts, MPs were told yesterday.

Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey said the famous troops – who have a special link with the West – would go among 1,000 Army job losses, along with 1,600 in the Navy, in the first of several waves of redundancies.

Scores of West-based personnel are likely to be among those leaving, at a time when the military is in action in Libya and Afghanistan.

The Royal Marines, including those based near Taunton, and the crack special forces, the Hereford-based SAS and Dorset-based SBS, are exempt from the redundancies.

Bomb disposal officers, the Royal Army Medical Corps and the Intelligence Corps will also not be laid off, along with the infantry – apart from the Gurkhas.

They have a close link with the West as Headquarters Brigade is based at Airfield Camp near Netheravon, Wiltshire.

There is also a significant presence at Blandford Camp in Dorset, where Gurkha Royal Signals operate, and which has a Hindu temple.

Just two years ago Gurkha rights campaigners were celebrating victory after the Government agreed to allow veterans to live in the UK.

Yesterday Brigadier Richard Nugee, head of Army manning, said infantry, engineers, signallers and logisticians would all have to go. He admitted few were likely to volunteer, meaning most of the redundancies will be compulsory.

Peter Carroll of the Gurkha Justice Campaign said: "I can't understand how the Government can make this sort of decision at a time when we have the most amount of troops deployed abroad since the Second World War."

Mr Harvey said personnel would be told in September if they are to lose their job.

He said when notices are issued, no one preparing for or deployed on combat operations would be made compulsorily redundant.

Shadow Defence Secretary Jim Murphy said the handling of the announcement was "simply inexcusable" after details leaked before personnel were told.

Under the coalition Government's Strategic Defence and Security Review, 17,000 Armed Forces jobs, and 25,000 civilian staff, will go over five years, to save £5 billion.

Tory North Wiltshire MP James Gray told the Commons yesterday: "We all very much regret every single redundancy under this deficit-driven SDSR.

"But what is terribly important is they should be given the most generous possible conditions in redundancy."

Around a quarter of the Army redundancies are expected to come from officers up to the rank of brigadier, while the Navy is cutting 121 officers up to the rank of captain, and 15 of the Fleet Air Arm's 59 fixed-wing pilots will also go.

Πηγή

Εταιρείες προσφέρουν προστασία κατά των σομαλών πειρατών

Η ταρίφα για κάθε συνοδεία είναι φιξ: ξεκινάει από τις 55.000 δολάρια με όλα τα έξοδα καλυμμένα και μπορεί να φτάσει ως και τις 350.000 δολάρια, ανάλογα με τον τύπο του πολεμικού σκάφους που θα επιλέξουν ως συνοδεία

ΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ:  07/02/2010, 06:52

Ποσό 35 εκατ. δολαρίων έχουν πληρώσει ως λύτρα οι έλληνες εφοπλιστές για την απελευθέρωση πληρωμάτων και πλοίων όπως το «Μaran Centaurus» (επάνω). Στα χέρια των πειρατών παραμένει ωστόσο το «Νάβιος Απόλλων»

 Τα ναυτιλιακά γραφεία του Πειραιά εδώ και περίπου δύο εβδομάδες δέχονται επισκέψεις από πωλητές εταιρειών που προσφέρουν μια αλλιώτικη υπηρεσία από αυτές που έχουν συνηθίσει να «ψωνίζουν» οι έλληνες εφοπλιστές: οι συγκεκριμένοι πωλητές τούς προσφέρουν τη δυνατότητα να ναυλώσουν πολεμικά σκάφη τα οποία θα χρησιμοποιήσουν ως συνοδεία των πλοίων τους που ταξιδεύουν στις επικίνδυνες ζώνες των ακτών της Σομαλίας. 

Η ταρίφα για κάθε συνοδεία είναι fix: ξεκινά από τις 55.000 δολάρια με όλα τα έξοδα καλυμμένα και μπορεί να φτάσει ως και τις 350.000 δολάρια, ανάλογα με τον τύπο του πολεμικού σκάφους που θα επιλέξουν ως συνοδεία. Προς το παρόν οι έλληνες εφοπλιστές έχουν τη δυνατότητα να ναυλώσουν φρεγάτα ή πυραυλάκατο. 

Αν δεν θέλουν να ναυλώσουν πολεμικό σκάφος, μπορούν να ναυλώσουν ένοπλες ομάδες μισθοφόρων, οι οποίοι θα επιβιβαστούν στο πλοίο και θα το ακολουθήσουν καθ΄ όλη τη διάρκεια του ταξιδιού του στην επικίνδυνη ζώνη. Οι εν λόγω ομάδες αποτελούνται από εκπαιδευμένους άνδρες που θα εμπλακούν με τους πειρατές στην περίπτωση κατά την οποία οι τελευταίοι θα επιχειρήσουν να καταλάβουν το πλοίο. 

Η πρώτη εταιρεία η οποία «ψώνισε» τέτοιες υπηρεσίες ήταν ο δανέζικος ναυτιλιακός όμιλος ΑΡ Μoller, ο οποίος ναύλωσε πυραυλάκατο από την Τανζανία για να συνοδέψει ένα δεξαμενόπλοιό της φορτωμένο με αργό πετρέλαιο που θα ταξίδευε στην περιοχή. 

Προς το παρόν δεν είναι γνωστό αν και άλλες ναυτιλιακές εταιρείες έχουν υποκύψει στον πειρασμό να προχωρήσουν σε μια τέτοια ιδιότυπη ναύλωση, αλλά μετά τα τελευταία λύτρα-μαμούθ που πλήρωσαν δύο ελληνικών συμφερόντων ναυτιλιακές εταιρείες για την απελευθέρωση των πλοίων τους σίγουρα το σκέπτονται πολλοί, διότι άλλο πράγμα είναι να πληρώνεις 55.000 δολάρια για μια φρεγάτα και άλλο πράγμα κάποια εκατομμύρια δολάρια ως λύτρα, πέραν των όσων μπορούν να συμβούν κατά την κράτηση του πλοίου στο πλήρωμα, στο πλοίο ή στο φορτίο. 

Λύτρα ρεκόρ 

Στη διάρκεια της περασμένης εβδομάδας απελευθερώθηκε άλλο ένα ελληνικών συμφερόντων πλοίο, το φορτηγό «Filitsa» της Οrder Shipping Co. Ltd, το οποίο κρατούνταν από σομαλούς πειρατές, αφού προηγουμένως πληρώθηκαν λύτρα ύψους 3 εκατ. δολαρίων, σύμφωνα με διεθνείς πηγές. Καθώς τα λύτρα αυτά είναι ιδιαίτερα υψηλά, και στην περίπτωση του «Filitsa» διαδραματίστηκαν όσα έγιναν λίγες εβδομάδες νωρίτερα κατά την απελευθέρωση του ελληνικού δεξαμενοπλοίου «Μaran Centaurus» της Μaran Τankers του έλληνα εφοπλιστή κ. Ι. Αγγελικούση μετά την καταβολή λύτρων, τα οποία, σύμφωνα με πληροφορίες, κυμαίνονται μεταξύ των 5,5 εκατ. δολαρίων και των 7 εκατ. ευρώ, που σε κάθε περίπτωση αποτελούν νέο ρεκόρ της περιοχής. 

Καθώς τα λύτρα ήταν ιδιαίτερα υψηλά και στις δύο περιπτώσεις, οι συμμορίες των σομαλών πειρατών συνεπλάκησαν μεταξύ τους στη μοιρασιά, με συνέπεια για πολλές ώρες αφότου είχαν πληρωθεί τα λύτρα τα πλοία να συνεχίσουν να βρίσκονται υπό κράτηση, χωρίς κανείς να γνωρίζει την τύχη των ναυτικών. Οι σομαλοί πειρατές όμως αποδεικνύονται σοβαροί businessmen και, όπως ορίζουν οι άγραφοι νόμοι του κόσμου των επιχειρήσεων, τιμούν τον λόγο τους και έτσι ακόμη και μετά από μεγάλες και αγωνιώδεις καθυστερήσεις απελευθέρωσαν τα πλοία όπως είχαν δεσμευθεί από τη στιγμή κατά την οποία έλαβαν τα λύτρα που ζητούσαν. 

Στα χέρια των πειρατών όμως συνεχίζει να βρίσκεται ένα ακόμη πλοίο ελληνικών συμφερόντων, το «Νavios Αpollon», το οποίο ανήκει στην εταιρεία Νavios της κυρίαςΑγγελικής Φράγκου. Και στην περίπτωση αυτή οι συνομιλίες των δύο πλευρών συνεχίζονται προκειμένου να συμφωνηθεί το νούμερο που θα οδηγήσει στην απελευθέρωση και του τελευταίου ελληνικών συμφερόντων πλοίου που κρατείται από σομαλούς πειρατές ως αυτή την ώρα. 

Η περίπτωση όμως του «Μaran Centaurus» συνεχίζει να φιγουράρει στην πρώτη θέση της λίστας των πλοίων που έχουν δεχθεί ως τώρα πειρατικές επιθέσεις στη διάρκεια του τελευταίου έτους, κυρίως γιατί έδωσε για πρώτη φορά στοιχεία για την εμπειρία που έχουν αποκτήσει πλέον οι σομαλοί πειρατές, αλλά και για την κατακόρυφη βελτίωση της ποιότητας των χτυπημάτων τους. Μετά το χτύπημα στο «Μaran Centaurus» σύσσωμη η διεθνής ναυτιλιακή κοινότητα έχει πεισθεί πλέον ότι κανείς δεν μπορεί να κοιμάται ήσυχος όταν πλοίο του ταξιδεύει στην κόκκινη περιοχή. 

Επικίνδυνη ρότα 

Ο Οργανισμός Ηνωμένων Εθνών εξαιτίας των συνεχών επιθέσεων των πειρατών ενεργοποίησε μια διεθνή ναυτική δύναμη αποτελούμενη από πολεμικά πλοία, τα οποία έχουν σπεύσει στην περιοχή για να διασφαλίσουν ότι οι δίαυλοι των εμπορικών πλοίων θα παραμείνουν ανοιχτοί. Στη φωτογραφία, άνδρες της διεθνούς ναυτικής δύναμης καθώς συλλαμβάνουν πειρατές στα ανοιχτά της Σομαλίας

Το «Μaran Centaurus» αποτέλεσε αναμφισβήτητα μια επίδειξη δυνάμεων των σομαλών πειρατών που έδειξαν ότι είναι σε θέση να διαχειριστούν πλοία και εταιρείες αυτού του επιπέδου χωρίς να τους ενοχλήσει κανείς. Μάλιστα οι εκπρόσωποι της πολυεθνικής δύναμης που επιχειρεί στην περιοχή δήλωναν τις πρώτες ώρες μετά το χτύπημα ότι το «Μaran Centaurus» δεν ακολουθούσε τη ρότα που έχουν υποδείξει, χωρίς βεβαίως να συμπληρώνουν ότι όλα συνέβησαν 700 ναυτικά μίλια μακριά από τις ακτές της Σομαλίας, πολύ έξω από τις επικίνδυνες ζώνες στις οποίες οδήγησε το πλοίο του ο έλληνας πλοίαρχος κ. Θ. Οικονομόπουλος ακριβώς για να μην ταξιδέψει στην επικίνδυνη περιοχή. 

Οι σομαλοί πειρατές όμως απέδειξαν ότι καμία περιοχή δεν είναι πλέον ασφαλής στον Ινδικό Ωκεανό, σε αντίθεση με το τι πιστεύει η πολυεθνική δύναμη, η οποία συνεχίζει στον ίδιο καμβά επιχειρηματολογίας κάθε φορά που χάνει πλοία, πειρατές και ό,τι άλλο επιπλέει στην περιοχή... 

Το «Μaran Centaurus» οδηγήθηκε σε ένα πειρατικό καταφύγιο 2,5 ναυτικά μίλια ανοικτά των ακτών της Σομαλίας. Οι ναυτικοί του απομονώθηκαν ο ένας από τον άλλον. Ξεγυμνώθηκαν και παρέμεναν υπό στενή παρακολούθηση μέρα-νύχτα. Ο έλληνας πλοίαρχος περιορίστηκε στη γέφυρα του πλοίου χωρίς καμία δυνατότητα επικοινωνίας. Κανένα μέλος του πληρώματός του δεν μπορούσε να επικοινωνήσει με τον έξω κόσμο, εκτός από έναν έλληνα ναυτικό, ο οποίος, σύμφωνα με τις πληροφορίες του «Βήματος», είχε καταφέρει να κρύψει ένα κινητό τηλέφωνο μέσω του οποίου επικοινωνούσε όποτε μπορούσε και όποτε του το επέτρεπαν οι συνθήκες. 

Πειρατικές κόντρες 

Μέσα στο πλοίο όμως τα πράγματα δεν εξελίσσονταν ομαλά κυρίως μεταξύ των σομαλών πειρατών, που άρχισαν να διαφωνούν μεταξύ τους τόσο για τους χειρισμούς εκείνων που είχαν αναλάβει τη διαπραγμάτευση με την εταιρεία όσο και για το ύψος των λύτρων που θα απαιτούσαν. Μη εξακριβωμένες πληροφορίες του «Βήματος» υποστηρίζουν ότι κατά τη διάρκεια της κράτησης οι σομαλοί πειρατές που είχαν καταλάβει το πλοίο έφθασαν στο σημείο να ανταλλάξουν μεταξύ τους πυρά, με αποτέλεσμα δύο από αυτούς να χάσουν τη ζωή τους. Αν και οι πληροφορίες αυτές δεν έχουν διασταυρωθεί και δεν πρόκειται να διασταυρωθούν ποτέ, εν τούτοις παραπέμπουν σε ένα σκηνικό που μάλλον δεν απέχει πολύ από την πραγματικότητα αν ανατρέξει κανείς στα όσα έγιναν λίγο πριν από την απελευθέρωση του «Μaran Centaurus». 

Μία ημέρα πριν από την απελευθέρωση του σκάφους και ενώ ήδη τα λύτρα είχαν καταβληθεί μια συμμορία σομαλών πειρατών επιτέθηκε στη συμμορία που ήδη βρισκόταν επί του πλοίου διεκδικώντας μερίδιο από τα λύτρα και απειλώντας να τινάξει το πλοίο στον αέρα αν δεν ικανοποιούνταν το αίτημά της. Εξάλλου ποτέ δεν θα γίνει γνωστό και το ακριβές ποσό των λύτρων που κατεβλήθησαν. Από την πλευρά της, η διαχειρίστρια εταιρεία του πλοίου αρνείται να αναφέρει το οτιδήποτε σχετικά με το ύψος των λύτρων που κατέβαλε για να απελευθερωθούν οι ναυτικοί της, το πλοίο και το φορτίο του με το σκεπτικό πως δεν έχει καμία σημασία το νούμερο. Αυτό που έχει σημασία, αναφέρει, είναι η ασφάλεια των ναυτικών και η λήψη μέτρων που θα μειώσουν δραστικά τη δυνατότητα των πειρατών να επιτίθενται. 

Το «Μaran Centaurus» και το «Filitsa» πλέουν τώρα ελεύθερα. Πίσω όμως στις ακτές της Σομαλίας παραμένουν υπό κράτηση 10 πλοία, μεταξύ των οποίων και το «Νavios Αpollon», στα οποία επιβαίνουν 238 ναυτικοί, οι οποίοι κρατούνται ως όμηροι πειρατών. Κατά τη διάρκεια του περασμένου έτους 2009 πειρατικές επιθέσεις δέχθηκαν 210 πλοία, εκ των οποίων οι 43 ήσαν πετυχημένες, με αποτέλεσμα να καταληφθεί από πειρατές αντίστοιχος αριθμός πλοίων. 

Είναι πολλά τα λεφτά 

Ο ΣΥΝΟΛΙΚΟΣ τζίρος των σομαλών πειρατών κατά τη διάρκεια των τελευταίων τριών ετών ανέρχεται- με συντηρητικούς υπολογισμούς- στα 280-300 εκατ. δολάρια, σύμφωνα με τις εκτιμήσεις διεθνών ναυτιλιακών παρατηρητών. Το 10%-12% αυτού του τζίρου προέρχεται από Ελληνες που εκτιμάται ότι έχουν πληρώσει ως τώρα σε λύτρα σχεδόν 35 εκατ. δολάρια. Το συνολικό κόστος που πληρώνει η διεθνής ναυτιλιακή κοινότητα ελέω των πειρατικών επιθέσεων εκτιμάται για την ίδια χρονική περίοδο ότι ανέρχεται σε τουλάχιστον 10 δισ. δολάρια. 

Στην πραγματικότητα γύρω από το φαινόμενο των πειρατικών επιθέσεων, ιδιαίτερα αυτών που εκδηλώνονται στα νερά της Σομαλίας, έχει αναπτυχθεί μια ιδιότυπη «βιομηχανία» στην οποία μετέχουν οι πειρατές, οι διαπραγματευτές, εκείνοι που παραδίδουν τα λύτρα, οι ασφαλιστές, τα Ρ&Ι Clubs κτλ. Ο τζίρος αυτής της βιομηχανίας είναι σχεδόν διπλάσιος από τα 300 εκατ. ευρώ που έχουν δοθεί μέσα σε μια τριετία σε λύτρα, αλλά ποτέ δεν θα μάθουμε το πώς διακινείται όλο αυτό τοχρήμα, αφού οι εφοπλιστές πλοία των οποίων έχουν δεχθεί πειρατική επίθεση μετά το τέλος της περιπέτειάς τους φροντίζουν να ξεχάσουν τα πάντα υπό τον φόβο νέων επιθέσεων που μπορεί να σημειωθούν σε πλοία τους έτσι και διανοηθούν να θίξουντο «θέμα». 

Ετσι κάθε προσπάθεια της διεθνούς ναυτιλιακής κοινότητας να σπάσει το απόστημα των πειρατικών επιθέσεων σε εμπορικά πλοία δεν προσκρούει απλά στον πακτωλό των εκατομμυρίων δολαρίων που δαπανώνται ετησίως για λύτρα αλλά και για «υπηρεσίες διευθέτησης του ζητήματος» αλλά αποτελεί πλέον έναν φαύλο κύκλο εντός του οποίου, πέραν των εφοπλιστών, των ναυτικών, των πειρατώνκαι των κάθε είδους μεσαζόντων και ειδικών, μετέχει πλέον εδώ και πολύ καιρό μια πολυεθνική ναυτική δύναμη η οποία κοστίζει πολύ ακριβά στα κράτη-μέλη που έσπευσαν να τη συγκροτήσουν και η οποία το μόνο που έχει καταφέρει ως σήμερα είναι να διασώσει τα προσχήματα μιας διεθνούς κοινότητας που κάθε ημέρα που περνά αποδεικνύει ότι αδυνατεί να δώσει λύση στο πρόβλημα. 

Εχουν περάσει σχεδόν τρία χρόνια από τότε που το φαινόμενο των πειρατικών επιθέσεων στη Σομαλία άρχισε να λαμβάνει ανησυχητικές διαστάσεις και ακόμη και σήμερα η διεθνής κοινότητα συνεχίζει να αναζητεί(!) τρόπους για την πάταξητου φαινομένου. 

Πηγή

Riverine Squadron 3, Royal Netherlands Marines Cross Training

Riverine Squadron 3, Royal Netherlands Marines Conduct Cross Training

By Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class (SCW) Paul D. Williams, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Public Affairs

CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (NNS) -- Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 3, Det. 1, Sailors spent three weeks aboard Camp Lejeune, N.C., cross-training with Dutch marines from the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps to exchange tactics and refine their skills as combat boat crewmen, March 14 through April 1.

The training was the first portion of a six-week cross-training schedule providing riverines the opportunity to share their knowledge of river warfare. The next phase of training focuses on amphibious ship-to-shore operations provided by the Netherlands marines.

 

 

110322-N-YO394-344 CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C. (March 22, 2011) Boatswain's Mate 2nd Class Shawn Graham, right, assigned to Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) 3, calls out formation orders over the radio to marines from the Royal Netherlands marine corps during riverine combat boat maneuver drills during a three-week cross-training exercise to exchange tactics and refine skills. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Paul D. Williams/Released)

"As Riverines we haven't done over-the-horizon or amphibious operations," said Lt. j.g. Michael Diehl, RIVRON 3, detachment 1 officer-in-charge. "We can give them our experience and knowledge in the brown water, and when we train with the Dutch later this year, they can pass along their experiences and educate us."
The Caribbean-based Dutch marines conduct amphibious based missions out of Aruba and Curassow including hurricane preparation and relief, anti-piracy interdictions and boarding operations. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps recently purchased boats allowing them to integrate river based operations as a part of their mission skill sets.

"We are setting up a riverine capability," said Royal Netherlands Marine Corps Lt. Macheal Bussemaker, platoon commander. "We are primarily trained in using amphibious ships off coastal waters, and we are now bringing up the notion of pushing through to brown water delta areas. We don't have any operational experience in using the brown water, but the Riverines, with their experiences in Iraq, do."

During the three-week training, RIVRON 3 provided Dutch marines with the chance to practice riverine boat maneuvers using the Riverine Patrol Boat and the Riverine Assault Boat. They also provided training on riverine security tactics and combat skills.

This isn't the first time Riverines have trained with other nations' militaries on river combat tactics. In May 2008, Riverines in Iraq shifted their mission from combat operations to a training mission to assist in the turnover of inland waterways control back to the Iraqi military.

Since then they have performed other cross-training missions with the British and the Panamanians, providing a unique capability that allows the U.S. and its allies the ability to conduct maritime security on rivers and inland waterways.

"The capabilities and the equipment that Riverines have are specially made for riverine operations; they are built for combat," said Bussemaker. "Seeing how the Riverines operate is very helpful to us because we can use it ourselves when we are going into our own rivers of operation."

According to Diehl, the Dutch marines have adopted the training provided by RIVRON 3 very quickly.

"The Dutch have been amazing, and these guys are seasoned operators," said Diehl. "They came to the table prepared, and they're well versed warfighters. These guys are now deploying tactics and making smart decisions that, in real river combat, will save people's lives."

Riverine Sailors continue to build allies around the world and create multinational expertise that can be applied across the spectrum of warfare.

Πηγή

Special Operations Forces on the Rise

May 2nd, 2011 by Steven Aftergood
 

U.S. Special Operations Forces continue to experience rapid post-9/11 growth, with swelling ranks, rising budgets and a new set of missions. Special operations forces were reportedly involved along with CIA personnel in the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan on May 1.

“Special operations” are defined (pdf) as military operations that are “conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities…. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets.”

Special Operations Forces operate “from the tropics to the Arctic regions, from under water to high elevations, and from peaceful areas to violent combat zones,” said Adm. Eric T. Olson, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

“Although the precision counterterrorism missions certainly receive the most attention,” he told Congress in the 2011 SOCOM posture statement(pdf) last March, “SOF are conducting a wide range of activities in dozens of countries around the world on any given day.”

“On an average day, in excess of 12,000 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and SOF support personnel are deployed in more than 75 countries across the globe,” he said last year (pdf).

The number of special operations personnel has grown 3-5% each year for the last several years and is now approaching 60,000, about one-third of whom are qualified SOF operators.

Meanwhile, the SOCOM budget has increased sharply since 9/11 from $2.1 billion in 2001 to $9.8 billion in FY2011. The FY2012 request is $10.5 billion, the Congressional Research Service noted (pdf).

New doctrine (pdf) published last month for Special Operations lists 11 “core activities” versus 9 in the previous edition (2003), reflecting the addition of “security force assistance” — aiding the development of foreign security forces — and counterinsurgency. See “Special Operations,” Joint Publication 3-05, April 18, 2011.

In addition to its core tasks, US SOCOM is also assigned by law (10 USC 167j) to perform “such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense.” This is an open-ended category that is analogous to the statutory language used to authorize CIA covert actions, and it can be used to underwrite an almost unlimited variety of clandestine missions. But while there is a well-defined mechanism for congressional oversight of covert action, no similar process for congressional notification and review appears to exist for clandestine SOF missions.

A U.S. SOCOM Factbook, dated November 2010, is available here (pdf).

Traditionally all male, Special Operations Forces are recognizing new roles for women, Adm. Olson said. “Our attached female Cultural Support Teams (CSTs) allow us to reach key elements of the population in some environments which was not previously possible. This concept of attaching females to SOF units is effective and long overdue; we are urging the Services to recognize the capabilities of CSTs as essential military skills.”

Curiously, Adm. Olson cited the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA precursor organization, as an exemplar of innovation for SOCOM to follow, suggesting that more contemporary models were hard to find. “Our efforts to become more innovative include studying the best practices of other organizations. For example, we are inspired by the ability of the World War II’s Office of Strategic Services to rapidly recruit specialized talent, develop and acquire new technologies and conduct effective global operations within the period of its relatively brief existence.”

 

Πηγή