The Colombian Fast Deployment Force (FUDRA)

On December 7th 1999, within the frame of the celebration of the Colombian Infantry Day, the President of the Republic Doctor Andrés Pastrana Arango activated in an imposing military parade, the Army Helicopters battalion in the military base of Tolemaida, which would be called the Fast Deployment Force (FUDRA) of the Colombian Army.

The Fast Deployment Force, “Fudra”, is the symbol of the modernization of the Army and its Troops; it is an antisubversive fight unit composed by three Mobile Brigades and one Special Forces Brigade, equipped with Black Hawk and MI helicopters, from the Army aviation and with the permanent support of the Colombian Air Force with fixed-wings airplanes for transport and combat. 

Its mission is to conduct rapid offensive operations against the subversives throughout the Colombian territory where a guerrilla action occurs or any other illegal armed group acts against the Colombian people or of its forces. 

The Fast Deployment Force is a unit trained and prepared to operate in the jungles, the mountains, or in the desert. As it says its motto: any mission, in any place, at any hour, on the best way, ready to win.

With this new Mayor Operative Unit the Army military operative strategy is complemented and the reaction capacity is optimized, which has allowed from the moment of its creation a greater efficiency in the operational results, fortifying in this way the will and capacity of fight of our Troops

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Tactical Tailor’s CQB Sling

Kit Up! recently received a T&E sample of Tactical Tailor’s CQB Sling with a Daniel Defense EZ Carbine swivel attachment point mount.

First impressions are that while the CQB sling is a really simple design with robust materials that will withstand a lot of abuse, the 2″ webbing can deliver some serious chafing on transition drills and the overall length of the sling is too long to help stabilize your weapon when its in your shoulder.

The Daniel Defense EZ mount is awesome — well made, easy to install and ambidextrous. It attaches right over your carbine’s stock tube (for an adjustable stock) which means you don’t have to do any disassembly to install.

We’ll be taking the Tactical Tailor CQB sling to the range in the next couple weeks to give it a run, and we’ll update our review once we’ve put some rounds on target.

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Commando HUBERT

The Hidden Casualties

 With the withdrawal of 33,000 American troops from Afghanistan by the end of next year, the U.S. has decided to increase the number of special operations troops (Special Forces, SEALs and SOCOM support forces) in Afghanistan. In effect, the U.S. will concentrate more on what SOCOM (Special Operations command) operators do. That is, go after terrorist leadership and specialists. The American troops being withdrawn were mainly concerned with protecting Afghan villagers from the Taliban (who operate like gangsters and bandits these days).

While this plan sounds useful, the reality is that there are not that many additional SOCOM troops available to be sent to Afghanistan. Currently, there are over 7,000 SOCOM troops in Afghanistan, and still 3,000 in Iraq. But by the end of the year, most of the SOCOM troops in Iraq will be withdrawn. Not all of them will go to Afghanistan, that's because SOCOM has a growing problem with burnout. Since the war on terror began, SOCOM has been the most heavily engaged branch of the armed forces. This is wearing out the elite troops that make SOCOM such an effective organization.

Since September 11, 2001 SOCOM has nearly doubled its size, to a current strength of 60,000 troops. This includes many support specialists, as well as the Special Forces, Rangers, SEALs and Marine Corps and Air Force operators. Currently, 10,000 of these commando type troops are in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sounds good, doesn't it? But it’s not enough, considering on all the work SOCOM operators have been asked to do.

Not surprisingly, 60 percent of SOCOMs current troops signed up after September 11, 2001. But an increasing number are leaving the military, despite reenlistment bonuses of up to $150,000. The problem here is overwork. While the number of SOCOM personnel has doubled, the number overseas at any time has quadrupled. That's why SOCOM wants to bring most of the Iraqi based troops back home, for a little rest.

Many SOCOM personnel are spending more than half their time overseas, usually in a combat zone. There, Special Forces troops take the lead in intelligence gathering and capturing or killing key terrorists. It's mentally and physically exhausting work. Unlike past wars, these troops can remain in touch with families back home, for better or worse. While it's been a long war, most SOCOM operators realize that it could easily go on for another decade. Thus SOCOM has learned to say "no" more often, otherwise the expansion will go into reverse as many more exhausted operators leave the service. Thus the reluctance to send a lot more people to Afghanistan.

Trying to recruit replacements is a solution that didn't work. The U.S. Army's effort to recruit another 2,300 operators (as members of the Special Forces are called) has been a hard slog. Qualified candidates are out there, but it's hard to convince them to endure the additional effort, stress and danger to become a Special Forces operator (or a SEAL, Ranger, Pararescue Jumper). Even with higher pay ($10,000 or more additional a year) and high reenlistment bonuses (adding about $10,000 more a year), it's hard to find the men who can meet the high standards, and are willing to put up with the large amount of time spent overseas.

Recruiting and training more operators is a time consuming process, as it takes about three years to get a Special Forces recruit up to a basic level of competence. It takes another few years in the field before such men are ready for anything serious. At least half of those recruited, are lost (quit, wash out) before they reach their full capability. Recruiting to expand the number of operators began right after September 11, 2001. Soon, SOCOM was told to increase its strength by 43 percent, and do it by 2013.

The main problem isn't operators concerned about getting killed, SOCOM casualties have been lower than in infantry or marine units. The big issue is overwork. Keep the operators out there for too long at a time and you'll lose them to resignations, retirement or, rarely, combat fatigue. It's not just the equipment that is being worn out.

Because the Special Forces troops are the product of an exacting screening and training process, they are in big demand by intelligence agencies as well. Special Forces operators who retired or quit in the last decade have been sought out and offered opportunities to get back in the business. If not with one of the five active duty groups, then with training operations, or to work with the intelligence agencies.

Most Americans tend to forget that the U.S. Special Forces are a unique organization in military, and intelligence, history. No other nation has anything like the Special Forces, and never has. While other nations have some operators skilled in understanding foreign cultures, the idea of training thousands of troops to very high standards, then having them study foreign languages and cultures, is unique to the Special Forces. The war on terror is the kind of war Special Forces are perfectly suited to dealing with. But now that this unique kind of war is under way, we find that those soldiers uniquely suited to fighting it are in short supply. This is largely because Special Forces set high standards, and has resisted all attempts to lower those standards. One hard lesson the Special Forces has learned in the past sixty years is that lowering standards just increases the chances of failure, and getting your people killed.

In the past three years, SOCOM has been shifting forces from Iraq (where it had 5,500 personnel three years ago) to Afghanistan (where it had 3,000 troops three years ago). The ratio has been reversed. Many American allies have moved all their commando forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, where they not only do what they were trained for, but also train Afghans for special operations tasks. This has already been done in Iraq, where it worked quite well. The SOCOM troops in Iraq and Afghanistan account for about 80 percent of American special operations forces overseas. The rest are in places like Colombia, the Philippines and Djibouti (adjacent to Somalia).

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Where Have All The SAS Recruits Gone

 Britain is running into problems recruiting commandos for the SAS (Special Air Service) force. This has become an issue for several reasons. First, the SAS decided, seven years ago, to expand its strength by twenty percent. That attracted a lot of the new recruits the SAS would have taken later on. That's because the SAS recruits from people already in the army (usually infantry). Then another obstacle developed. Since 2003, Britain has been sending more combat troops overseas (first to Iraq, now Afghanistan and some new hot spots). Britain does not have a large army, and this meant that most potential SAS recruits were too busy being overseas, or getting ready to go overseas (or recovering from being overseas) to train for the arduous SAS entrance exam. There are few options here. The U.S. Army Special Forces ran into a similar problem a few years back, and tried to recruit directly from the civilian population. That brought in a few good people, but not enough. The best recruits, as always, are those already in the army.

Then there's another problem. The British infantry force is shrinking, for several reasons. Four years ago, the British Army revealed that it was short about 3,000 infantry. The situation has not improved much since then. There are only 51 infantry battalions in the British army, and only 37 are active duty units. That's about 26,000 infantrymen, if the battalions are at full strength. But for the past eight years, troops have been heavily involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. The latest crisis is the accumulation of injuries from repeated deployments that has left 20 percent of active duty infantry unfit for duty in a combat zone. The main reasons are medical, including combat fatigue, and battle wounds, as well as all the exotic diseases one can pick up in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the many accidents (especially vehicular). Since 2001, over 1,500 British troops have been killed or wounded in Afghanistan (there were far fewer casualties in Iraq).

While the British military has been all-volunteer for over half a century, the current shortages were partly driven by the job offers from private security firms, especially for the best people. British troops in elite infantry units (paratroopers, marines, SAS), are particularly attractive to the private firms, and vice versa. Noting the American success with reenlistment bonuses, the British began offering bonuses of about $10,000, for troops who decide to sign up for more time in uniform, or return after having been a civilian for a while. Some of the troops who have gone off to work for the private security companies, have found the work not to their liking, and came back to the army. This bonus system encouraged more such returns.

In addition, Britain has been reducing its infantry force. Battalions are going to be disbanded. It's also been noted that about eight percent of the infantry are tied down in ceremonial functions, a distraction that has largely gone unnoticed. Many infantry get out because of the constant trips to Iraq and Afghanistan. While some young Brits are attracted to the prospect of combat, for others, a taste is enough. Another problem is that not all who join the infantry, have what it takes. The British have high standards, and not everyone can make it through the training.

Finally, a unique problem with infantry battalion shortages is that each regiment (of one or more battalions) does its own recruiting. The regiments are local, except for the five Guards battalions (two of which are always performing ceremonial duties). Some regiments have an easier time attracting recruits than others. But these days, most infantry battalions are going off to Afghanistan shorthanded.

The SAS itself is the model for all modern commando units. The SAS evolved during World War II , from the original commando units (which were more similar to current Royal Marine Commandos and U.S. Army Rangers). SAS developed the concept of elite infantry operating in small groups (as few as 3-4 men) for special operations. Britain has only some 460 men in the SAS, and four 80 man "Sabre Squadrons" form the deployable combat units of the organization. SAS commandos are often sent around the world in groups of less than a dozen men for missions.

The SAS has to recruit and train 20 or more new commandos a year just to maintain its current strength. Several thousand British troops apply to join the SAS each year, but the SAS is very selective in who it takes. Some SAS members felt that expanding to 480 troops would dilute the quality. This is not necessarily so, but the debate over the issue continues within the SAS. Another ongoing dispute has to do with how the SAS is sometimes used. There have been several actions in the last decade where an entire Sabre Squadron was used in one action. As one SAS officer observed, an infantry company would have been more suitable for these operations. But other SAS officers believe that only SAS men could have gotten to scene of the action and launched these attacks in time. Regular infantry may have been able to do the fighting effectively, but the SAS are the best trained force for getting to difficult locations, scouting them out adequately and then quickly coming up with an effective attack plan.

The SAS does not like to speak openly about tactics or internal matters in general. But the current debate over recruiting and tactics have been so vehement that some of it has gotten out to the press. Another problem that does not get as much attention is the frequent inability of senior commanders and planners to recognize situations where the SAS would be the best solution. This is one reason why SAS likes working with the American SOCOM (Special Operations Command) and special international commando task forces for hunting terrorists. The Americans have done more work on developing missions for commandos within larger military operations. The Americans have also ordered SOCOM to take the lead in the war on terror and the hunt for terrorists.

In peacetime, most SAS missions are at the request of the Foreign Ministry, and are usually to solve some problem overseas that does not require a lot of muscle, but must be done quietly. In these situations, the SAS will spend a lot of their time operating as spies, even though all they are doing is reconnaissance for some mission. In peacetime, the SAS rarely operates in groups of more than a dozen men. But the war in Afghanistan found British military planners realizing that the troops that could be moved to that isolated country most quickly were the SAS. For a while in Afghanistan, the only British combat troops available there were SAS. So anything that British commanders wanted to do had to be done by SAS. In effect, the SAS were victims of their own success in being able to get anywhere, anytime, in a hurry.

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Ζ’ ΜΑΚ: Οι φύλακες του Αιγαίου

Μετά την κρίση των Ιμίων, παρατηρήθηκε ένα «κενό» φύλαξης των ελληνικών βραχονησίδων, κενό που εκμεταλλεύτηκαν οι Τούρκοι για δικό τους όφελος. Η αντίδραση των ιθυνόντων του Ελληνικού Στρατού έλαβε «σάρκα και οστά» με την ίδρυση της Ζ’ Μονάδας Αμφιβίων Καταδρομών, μιας ομάδας πλήρους εκπαιδευμένης και οπλισμένης, η οποία είναι σε συνεχή ετοιμότητα ώστε να επέμβει σε κάθε σημείο του Αιγαίου Πελάγους.

Η Ζ’ ΜΑΚ αποτελείται από περίπου 300 άτομα προσωπικό, ηλικίας μικρότερης των 32-33 ετών, και διαθέτει στο οπλοστάσιο της ό,τι πιο σύγχρονο διαθέτει ο Ελληνικός Στρατός. 

Μάλιστα σε ότι αφορά τον οπλισμό της, πρέπει να τονίσουμε ότι αυτός προσαρμόζεται σε ποσότητα και σε είδος, ανάλογα με το είδος της υπό διεκπεραίωση αποστολής. Η ανάγκη για συνεχή ετοιμότητα της μονάδας, την κάνει να βρίσκεται σε συνεχή εκπαίδευση καθώς ο μεγαλύτερος εχθρός της είναι η απραξία. Στο πλαίσιο της εκπαίδευσης βοηθούν και φίλιες χώρες όπως η Ισπανία και η Ιταλία.

Η μονάδα αποτελείται από τρεις λόχους: δύο λόχους κρούσης όπου το προσωπικό τοποθετείται κυκλικά και έναν λόχο διοίκησης. . Οι δύο λόχοι κρούσης είναι πάντοτε πλήρως επανδρωμένοι, πανέτοιμοι επιχειρησιακά και με δυνατότητα ανταπόκρισης εντός ολίγων ωρών. 

Η δημιουργία ενός τέτοιου σώματος προσφέρει ένα επιπλέον πλεονέκτημα στην «Φαρέτρα» του Ελληνικού Στρατού για την προάσπιση των εθνικών συμφερόντων στο ευαίσθητο κομμάτι του Αιγαίου.

Η συνεχής προσπάθεια της Άγκυρας για «γκριζοποίηση» ζωνών και βραχονησίδων στο Αιγαίο δεν θα ήταν δυνατό να παραμείνει αναπάντητη. Με την Ζ’ ΜΑΚ υπάρχει η δυνατότητα αποτροπής τέτοιων προσπαθειών και η ανακατάληψη ελληνικών περιοχών, σε περίπτωση κατάληψης τους από εχθρικές δυνάμεις.

Το πλήρως εκπαιδευμένο προσωπικό της Ζ’ ΜΑΚ εγγυάται την Ελληνική κυριαρχία στους χώρους ευθύνης του και αποτελεί ένα πραγματικό «στολίδι» των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων.

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In Your Face

July 14, 2011: Last year, the Indian Army decided to add a para commando battalion to its Special Forces. This caused an uproar among Special Forces officers, who believed that the new unit would not be trained or equipped to existing Special Forces standards. So the initial plan, to recruit troops from the northeastern part of India the new battalion was to operate in, was changed to instead take troops from the seven existing para commando battalions. But there were still concerns about the troops of the new battalion getting adequate equipment.

The Para-Commandos are one component of Indian special operations forces. Increasingly used against terrorists and rebel factions, there are growing complaints that the troops involved are not getting adequate training or equipment. This is an increasingly common issue for all the Special Forces troops, not just the para commandos. India has several different special operations groups and, each of these groups has a specific mission, and all too often, serious problems with the government bureaucracy.

Para Commandos form the parachute infantry of the Army, but most have been given additional training and equipment to enable them to carry out commando type operations. Seven of the ten parachute battalions are trained for commando operations, while the other three are just parachute infantry.

The Special Protection group are assigned the task of protection for India's Prime Minister and VIPs from terrorist attacks.

The MARCOS unit acts as India's Navy SEAL organization and performs special ops on the high seas.

The primary counter-terror unit in the country, however, are the 15,000 National Security Guards and the ones who have borne most of the responsibility for dealing with various rebel and terrorist groups.

The army has also created a force of over 7,200 commandos so that each of the 359 infantry battalions in the army has a twenty man Ghatak (commando) platoon. This gives each battalion some shock troops. Each Gharak platoon is commanded by a captain and contains two NCOs and 17 troops with special weapons and tactics training. The Ghatak recruits from the best of the regular infantry, and puts them through months of commando type training.

India has been increasing spending on equipment for its ground forces over the last decade, but these efforts have been uneven. Some of this has been caused by corruption. Like many other nations, India has long had problems with kickbacks and favoritism in defense procurement. But it's been worse with India, which ranks 87 (out of 180) in an international survey of least corrupt nations. India has responded with a major effort to halt corruption in defense matters, but this has stalled some procurement efforts. The end result of this is that India is under increasing pressure, from below, to honor promises to upgrade the weapons and equipment of the infantry forces. These troops have fallen far behind other armies, and the troops, and especially their officers, are not being quiet about it. But government plans to upgrade infantry weapons and equipment have not amounted to much. The troops are not happy with this.

While India spends a lot of money on its fighter aircraft, naval vessels, and heavy ground equipment like tanks and APCs, very little is spent on taking care of the infantry. This isn't unique to India, it just happens that the infantry historically don't get first grab at funds within the military and are usually at the bottom of the list when it comes to spending in general.

The special operations forces have received new weapons and equipment, but not to the degree that their Western counterparts have. The regular infantry suffer lower morale when they realize that the special operations are getting better gear, especially compared to the often elderly weapons and equipment the infantry possess.

These differences are very visible to the infantry. That's because, eight years ago, the government attempted a stopgap upgrade effort. They spent $65 million to train and equip a commando ("Ghatak") platoon for each of its infantry battalions. The new platoons were intended to make the infantry more effective in dealing with irregulars in Kashmir and the northeast tribal areas. The Ghatak troops were trained to perform commando type operations (raids, long range patrols), especially at night. Thus one of the things the Ghatak troops received was night vision equipment. They also had more radios and additional weapons (sniper rifles, more compact assault rifles, day/night scopes). The Ghatak training enabled the troops to specialize in the more dangerous aspects of dealing with irregulars, thus making duty against irregulars less unpopular with the troops. But this just made Indian infantry angrier at the fact that they had ancient and worn out gear. They could see this every day when they encountered one of the Ghatak troops in their battalion.

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